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Honors	  Politics	   	  
Feb.	  28,	  2013	  
Drug	  Markets	  and	  the	  State:	  A	  Perspective	  from	  Political	  Economy	  
I.	  Introduction	  
	   The	  initial	  idea	  for	  this	  project	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  conceptual	  basis	  for	  studying	  state	  
regulation	  of	  drugs	  without	  accepting	  the	  state’s	  internal	  justifications,	  categories,	  and	  
rhetoric.	  The	  concept	  occupies	  a	  middle	  ground	  between	  theory	  and	  comparative	  studies;	  it	  
is	  meant	  to	  be	  inherently	  critical	  of	  the	  ways	  drugs	  are	  framed	  in	  current	  policy	  debate	  
without	  losing	  an	  awareness	  of	  and	  a	  connection	  to	  the	  subtleties	  of	  real	  policy.	  	  Two	  
approaches	  to	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  drugs	  underlie	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  project.	  	  
The	  first	  was	  to	  study	  drug	  regulation	  as	  a	  subfield	  of	  economic	  governance	  through	  
the	  lens	  of	  comparative	  political	  economy.	  Weber’s	  analysis	  of	  bureaucratic	  power,	  David	  
Harvey’s	  concept	  of	  the	  postmodern	  economy,	  and	  Hall	  and	  Soskice’s	  work	  on	  Varieties	  of	  
Capitalism	  provided	  the	  basic	  concept	  for	  the	  ideal	  types	  as	  well	  as	  the	  focus	  on	  material	  
incentives,	  interactions	  with	  markets,	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  early	  decisions	  on	  later	  
institutional	  arrangements.	  The	  second	  approach	  was	  to	  deconstruct	  drug	  policy	  by	  
drawing	  attention	  to	  how	  it	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  coercion	  by	  certain	  groups	  to	  gain	  or	  
maintain	  political	  &	  economic	  domination.	  Represented	  here	  by	  David	  Lenson,	  Stuart	  Hall,	  
Caroline	  Jean	  Acker,	  and	  Dale	  Pendell,	  this	  approach	  necessarily	  engages	  with	  rhetoric	  and	  
culture	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  expose	  the	  ideologies	  lying	  beneath	  benign	  concepts	  like	  “sobriety”,	  
“Drug-­‐free”,	  “normal”,	  and	  “productive”.	  The	  connections	  that	  historical	  scholarship	  on	  
drug	  regulation	  has	  unearthed	  –	  to	  unabashed	  Eurocentrism,	  unreformed	  racism,	  misogyny,	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homophobia,	  colonialism,	  suppression	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  eugenics,	  neo-­‐colonialism	  –	  
are	  ugly	  to	  look	  in	  the	  face.	  	  
All	  wars	  leave	  scars,	  especially	  civil	  wars,	  and	  drug	  wars	  are	  no	  different.	  Social	  
healing	  can	  only	  begin	  with	  understanding.	  Understanding	  is	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  when	  
those	  in	  authority	  distrust	  the	  public	  and	  reject	  rational,	  open	  debate	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  
is	  too	  dangerous,	  too	  complicated,	  too	  important	  a	  decision	  to	  leave	  to	  the	  masses.	  It	  is	  time	  
to	  have	  an	  open	  conversation	  about	  drug	  policy	  in	  the	  West,	  and	  to	  re-­‐establish	  the	  
bureaucracy	  as	  servants	  of	  the	  people,	  not	  their	  distant	  rulers.	  This	  paper	  does	  not	  
advocate	  for	  any	  particular	  institutional	  arrangement,	  because	  there	  is	  no	  perfect	  
regulatory	  solution	  for	  any	  market.	  Drugs,	  used	  in	  the	  wrong	  way,	  can	  cause	  undeniable	  
harm,	  and	  the	  right	  policy	  will	  always	  depend	  on	  the	  larger	  social	  context.	  It	  seems	  
appropriate,	  here,	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  millions	  incarcerated	  worldwide	  for	  simple	  possession,	  
and	  the	  simple	  standard	  that	  the	  most	  humane	  President	  of	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  
century	  would	  have	  had	  us	  follow:	  
“Penalties	  against	  possession	  of	  a	  drug	  should	  not	  be	  more	  damaging	  to	  an	  
individual	  than	  the	  use	  of	  the	  drug	  itself;	  and	  where	  they	  are,	  they	  should	  be	  
changed”1	  
	  
This	  is	  a	  simple	  goal.	  It	  is	  a	  rational	  goal.	  It	  was	  achievable	  in	  1977	  and	  it	  is	  achievable	  
today.	  All	  that	  stands	  in	  the	  way	  are	  those	  who	  have	  found	  ways	  to	  prosper	  by	  exacerbating	  
the	  excesses	  of	  a	  perverse	  and	  dysfunctional	  system.	  Whatever	  drug	  policies	  are	  followed	  
in	  the	  future,	  they	  should	  be	  logically	  coherent,	  intellectually	  honest,	  and	  socially	  aware.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  "Drug	  Abuse	  Message	  to	  the	  Congress",	  August	  2,	  1977	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II.	  Theorizing	  the	  Drug	  Regulation	  State	  
A.	  	  Governing	  the	  Drugs	  Economy	  
1.	  Why	  Regulation?	  
Over	  half	  a	  century	  ago,	  the	  Single	  Convention	  on	  Narcotic	  Drugs	  aimed	  to	  
consolidate	  and	  standardize	  across	  national	  borders	  an	  agreed-­‐upon	  list	  of	  illegal	  
psychoactive	  drugs	  that	  would	  only	  be	  tolerated	  for	  “medical	  and	  scientific	  purposes”.	  This	  
treaty,	  which	  “forms	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  global	  drug	  control	  regime	  as	  it	  exists	  today”	  and	  
established	  the	  regulatory	  International	  Narcotics	  Control	  Bureau	  (INCB),	  was	  supposed	  to	  
bring	  about	  a	  convergence	  and	  a	  consensus	  in	  the	  industrialized	  world	  about	  the	  best	  way	  
to	  handle	  drug	  use	  and	  addiction2.	  The	  list	  of	  illegal	  drugs	  is	  now	  roughly	  the	  same	  all	  
across	  the	  world,	  but	  the	  types	  and	  intensity	  of	  enforcement	  continues	  to	  vary	  dramatically	  
between	  countries,	  provinces,	  and	  even	  individual	  cities.	  These	  laws	  are	  interpreted	  and	  
enforced	  by	  a	  dizzying	  array	  of	  organizations	  throughout	  the	  world:	  law	  enforcement	  
agencies,	  courts,	  health	  bureaucracies,	  institutes	  of	  health,	  and	  many	  others.	  A	  long	  history	  
of	  work	  in	  comparative	  politics	  has	  sought	  to	  reveal	  the	  tools	  and	  institutions	  that	  allow	  
the	  state	  to	  regulate	  and	  govern	  the	  economy	  to	  some	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent.	  The	  tools	  
used	  to	  manage	  the	  drugs	  economy	  are	  fundamentally	  the	  same.	  
The	  modern	  state	  has	  several	  compelling	  interests	  in	  the	  drugs	  economy	  that	  
predispose	  it	  to	  intervention	  in	  the	  drugs	  economy	  rather	  than	  laissez-­‐faire.	  First,	  the	  
modern	  state	  requires	  adequate	  supplies	  of	  certain	  drugs	  for	  medicine	  and	  warfare,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  New	  York	  City	  Bar,	  “The	  International	  Drug	  Control	  Treaties:	  Just	  How	  Important	  Are	  They	  to	  US	  





thus	  benefits	  from	  a	  strong	  domestic	  drugs	  industry	  with	  a	  close	  relationship	  to	  the	  state.	  	  
Second,	  indiscriminate	  drug	  use	  could	  potentially	  harm	  economic	  productivity,	  public	  
order,	  or	  public	  health,	  things	  for	  which	  the	  modern	  state	  takes	  general	  responsibility.	  
Third	  and	  finally,	  the	  drugs	  economy	  is	  and	  has	  always	  been	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  the	  global	  
economy,	  and	  state	  actors	  (whether	  individuals	  or	  institutions)	  can	  increase	  their	  power	  
substantially	  by	  acquiring	  jurisdiction	  in	  this	  area.	  The	  bundle	  of	  agencies	  responsible	  for	  
drawing	  the	  line	  between	  the	  drug	  economy	  and	  the	  legitimate	  economy	  and	  taking	  the	  
necessary	  steps	  to	  enforce	  that	  line	  form	  a	  distinctive	  (if	  not	  always	  coherent)	  institutional	  
arrangement	  that	  this	  paper	  will	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  Drug	  Regulation	  State.	  	  
2.	  Defining	  Types	  for	  the	  Drug	  Regulation	  State	  
The	  different	  forms	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  can	  be	  captured	  in	  four	  types.	  Two	  
of	  the	  types,	  Drug	  War	  and	  Harm	  Reduction,	  are	  dominant	  in	  the	  industrialized	  world	  for	  
non-­‐cultural	  psychoactive	  drugs.	  Decriminalization	  is	  a	  reform	  model	  that	  has	  gained	  
support	  amongst	  US	  states	  and	  Latin	  American	  countries	  as	  criticism	  of	  Drug	  War	  
hegemony	  has	  increased.	  Legal	  Market,	  while	  rarely	  viewed	  as	  an	  acceptable	  policy	  
towards	  heroin,	  cocaine,	  or	  even	  marijuana,	  is	  the	  global	  default	  policy	  for	  alcohol,	  caffeine,	  
and	  tobacco,	  as	  well	  as	  hundreds	  of	  “herbal”	  substances	  and	  most	  pharmaceuticals.	  The	  
globalized	  consumer	  markets	  for	  alcohol	  and	  tobacco,	  as	  well	  as	  pharmaceuticals	  available	  
only	  with	  prescription	  and	  government	  monopolies	  on	  substances	  (like	  alcohol	  in	  
Scandinavia,	  or	  tobacco	  in	  China),	  can	  all	  be	  viewed	  as	  more	  or	  less	  restrictive	  variants	  of	  




Types	  for	  the	  Drug	  
Regulation	  State*	  
	  
Drug	  use	  unofficially	  or	  
officially	  sanctioned	  (non-­‐
normative	  drug	  policy)	  
Drug	  use	  is	  condemned	  and	  
discouraged	  (normative	  
drug	  policy)	  
Low	  intensity	  of	  






(Extension	  of	  the	  welfare	  
state,	  focus	  on	  public	  health)	  
High	  intensity	  of	  
punishment,	  focus	  on	  supply	  
control	  or	  reduction	  
Legal	  Market/Government	  
Monopoly	  
(Ranging	  from	  consumer	  
goods	  to	  prescription	  drugs)	  
Drug	  War	  
(Reliance	  on	  law	  
enforcement	  and	  
incarceration)	  
*Can	  vary	  significantly	  (intra-­‐state)	  depending	  on	  particular	  substance	  involved	  
	  
Because	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  historical	  institutions	  and	  jurisdictions,	  the	  mode	  of	  
regulation,	  within	  the	  same	  country	  or	  even	  the	  same	  regulatory	  agency,	  can	  vary	  
depending	  on	  substance.	  Many	  countries	  show	  some	  evidence	  of	  all	  the	  types	  in	  
arrangements	  something	  like	  this:	  Harm	  Reduction	  for	  severe	  opioid	  and	  sedative	  addicts,	  
some	  amount	  of	  Decriminalization	  for	  cannabis,	  Drug	  War	  for	  most	  other	  illicit	  substances,	  
and	  a	  Legal	  Market	  or	  a	  Government	  Monopoly	  for	  alcohol	  and	  tobacco.	  The	  two	  axes,	  
which	  distinguish	  the	  four	  types,	  are	  normativity	  and	  punitive	  intensity.	  Note	  that	  the	  drug	  
regulation	  state	  has	  much	  less	  control	  over	  the	  likelihood	  of	  punishment	  (which	  is	  
everywhere	  determined	  by	  the	  tactics,	  resources,	  and	  strategy	  of	  local	  enforcement)	  than	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over	  the	  type	  and	  degree	  of	  punishment	  for	  those	  caught3.	  High	  intensity	  of	  punishment	  
aims	  to	  curb	  supply;	  draconian	  penalties	  are	  intended	  both	  to	  deter	  involvement	  in	  the	  
illicit	  drugs	  economy	  (through	  escalating	  punishments	  for	  higher	  levels	  of	  involvement)	  
and	  disrupt	  supply	  directly	  by	  neutralizing	  supplier	  networks	  and	  destroying	  as	  much	  
product	  as	  possible.	  Low	  intensity	  of	  punishment	  allow	  for	  more	  frequent,	  less	  coercive	  
contact	  with	  user	  populations,	  which	  in	  turn	  allows	  an	  expansion	  of	  demand	  reduction	  
efforts	  like	  education,	  substitution,	  &	  treatment	  of	  co-­‐morbidities.	  Legal	  Market	  is	  strict	  
with	  those	  who	  break	  market	  laws	  and	  norms,	  which	  can	  be	  easily	  enforced	  because	  of	  the	  
market’s	  visibility.	  Government	  Monopoly	  is	  liable	  to	  deal	  strictly	  with	  any	  nascent	  gray	  
market	  or	  apprehended	  competitors,	  since	  their	  activities	  can	  threaten	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  
these	  markets	  and	  the	  tax	  revenue	  they	  generate.	  	  In	  any	  case	  where	  intensity	  of	  
punishment	  is	  high	  without	  corresponding	  attention	  to	  social	  inequalities,	  the	  impact	  of	  
enforcement	  will	  fall	  disproportionately	  on	  the	  working	  class,	  the	  unemployed,	  and	  social	  
or	  political	  Others.	  People	  lacking	  in	  basic	  resources	  or	  subject	  to	  discrimination	  are	  less	  
able	  to	  reduce	  the	  risks	  of	  their	  drug	  use	  and	  the	  drug	  use	  around	  them,	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
approached	  and	  searched	  by	  law	  enforcement,	  and	  much	  less	  able	  to	  defend	  themselves	  
against	  state	  prosecution.	  
Normativity	  is	  harder	  to	  define,	  as	  it	  involves	  not	  just	  policy	  and	  institutions	  but	  also	  
rhetoric,	  culture,	  and	  society.	  A	  highly	  normative	  drugs	  policy	  seeks	  to	  mobilize	  social	  
condemnation	  for	  drug	  use,	  reduce	  the	  public	  visibility	  of	  drug	  use,	  and	  change	  the	  habits	  
of	  drug	  users	  through	  more	  or	  less	  coercive	  means.	  A	  less	  normative	  or	  non-­‐normative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  David	  Rasmussen	  and	  Bruce	  Benson,	  The	  Economic	  Anatomy	  of	  a	  Drug	  War	  (Lanham,	  Maryland:	  
Rowland	  &	  Littlefield,	  1994)	  6	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drugs	  policy	  does	  not	  commit	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  to	  changing	  personal	  habits,	  or	  
systematically	  mark	  drug	  users	  as	  distinct	  from	  law-­‐abiding	  citizens.	  If	  normativity	  is	  
completely	  absent,	  then	  production	  and	  consumption	  of	  the	  drug	  is	  not	  differentiated	  from	  
production	  and	  consumption	  of	  other	  economic	  goods.	  Drugs	  can	  be	  potent	  symbols	  of	  the	  
cultural	  Other	  and	  the	  foreign,	  but	  they	  can	  also	  evoke	  fears	  of	  change	  within	  the	  dominant	  
culture	  itself.	  When	  drug	  use	  is	  “constructed	  as	  so	  deviant	  as	  to	  seem	  utterly	  incompatible	  
with	  conventional	  roles”,	  then	  the	  possibility	  that	  “one	  might	  encounter	  an	  addict…and	  fail	  
to	  recognize	  him	  or	  her”	  becomes	  a	  frightening	  threat	  to	  personal	  safety	  and	  national	  
security4.	  The	  construction	  of	  drug	  normativity,	  like	  other	  categories	  of	  social	  deviance,	  
references	  and	  implies	  a	  social	  consensus	  or	  a	  dominant	  culture	  that	  may	  be	  entirely	  
ideological.	  It	  is	  an	  especially	  malleable	  normative	  standard	  since	  “	  “sobriety’”	  like	  
“freedom”,	  is	  an	  empty	  concept,	  a	  null	  set	  defined	  only	  by	  what	  surrounds	  it,	  by	  its	  various	  
negations”5.	  During	  times	  of	  political	  uncertainty,	  “the	  depiction	  of	  a	  unified	  anticulture”	  
can	  “have	  the	  effect	  of	  creating	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  unified	  legitimate	  culture	  where	  there	  is	  
none”6.	  
A	  highly	  normative	  drugs	  policy	  is	  therefore	  especially	  likely	  when	  politically	  salient	  
identities	  –	  race,	  class,	  political	  affiliation,	  sexuality	  –	  are	  threatened,	  or	  in	  a	  process	  of	  
change.	  “Drug	  prohibitions	  often	  represent	  the	  restatement	  of	  threatened	  ethnic	  
boundaries…substances	  are	  condemned	  at	  least	  in	  part	  because	  of	  their	  association	  with	  a	  
particular	  ethnic	  or	  racial	  group,	  and	  striking	  at	  the	  substance	  in	  question	  is	  a	  means	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Caroline	  Jean	  Acker,	  Creating	  the	  American	  Junkie:	  Addiction	  Research	  in	  the	  Classic	  Era	  of	  Narcotic	  
Control	  (Baltimore	  &	  London:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2002)	  186	  
5	  David	  Lenson,	  On	  Drugs	  (Minneapolis,	  MN:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1995)	  14	  
6	  Lenson,	  On	  Drugs,	  16 
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stigmatizing	  that	  particular	  group”7.	  Strict	  drug	  norms	  can	  also	  be	  emphasized	  in	  a	  time	  
when	  other	  “invisible”,	  deviant	  identities	  are	  feared	  and	  hunted.	  For	  example,	  	  
“[in]	  the	  1950s,	  drug	  addiction	  and	  homosexuality	  had	  replaced	  prostitution	  as	  
symbolically	  charged	  forms	  of	  deviance…addiction	  and	  homosexuality	  were	  both	  
conditions	  that	  could	  be	  hidden…the	  parallel	  to	  communism	  at	  a	  time	  when	  
Americans	  were	  being	  alerted	  to	  suspect	  co-­‐workers	  in	  the	  State	  Department,	  in	  the	  
labor	  unions,	  and	  in	  Hollywood	  studios	  was	  not	  merely	  implicit;	  Narcotics	  
Commissioner	  Harry	  Anslinger	  argued	  forcefully	  in	  congressional	  hearings	  and	  the	  
press	  that	  the	  Chinese	  communists	  were	  smuggling	  heroin	  into	  the	  United	  States	  in	  
order	  to	  soften	  up	  the	  population	  in	  preparation	  for	  a	  takeover”8.	  	  
	  
Normativity,	  unlike	  punishment,	  can	  wax	  and	  wane	  without	  explicit	  policy	  reform,	  but	  it	  is	  
not	  a	  cultural	  variable	  independent	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state’s	  influence.	  It	  encompasses	  
the	  types	  of	  drug-­‐related	  behavior	  that	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  sanctions	  as	  norms	  and	  
conveys	  to	  civil	  society	  through	  its	  policies	  and	  actions,	  and	  the	  ways	  the	  drug	  regulation	  
state	  enlists	  civil	  institutions,	  cultural	  identities,	  and	  rhetorical	  scripts	  in	  the	  maintenance	  
of	  these	  norms.	  
The	  ideal	  types	  are	  thus	  not	  national	  models,	  or	  a	  categorization	  scheme	  for	  
countries,	  but	  instead	  emphasize	  how	  diverse	  organizations,	  programs,	  and	  procedures	  
become	  a	  national	  drugs	  policy,	  and	  how	  state	  practice	  in	  this	  area	  is	  “bound	  together	  by	  an	  
idea,	  namely,	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  actual	  or	  normative	  validity	  of	  rules	  and	  of	  the	  authority-­‐
relationships	  of	  some	  human	  beings	  toward	  others”9.	  	  In	  order	  to	  balance	  this	  complexity,	  
one	  might	  specify	  a	  dominant	  or	  hegemonic	  mode	  even	  when	  practice	  is	  diverse,	  especially	  
when	  one	  regulatory	  type	  provides	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  frame	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Phillip	  Jenkins,	  Synthetic	  Panics:	  The	  Symbolic	  Politics	  of	  Designer	  Drugs	  (New	  York	  &	  London:	  NYU	  
University	  Press,	  1999)	  13	  
8	  Acker,	  Creating	  the	  American	  Junkie,	  185-­‐186	  
9	  Max	  Weber,	  Sociological	  Writings	  ed.	  Wolf	  Heydebrand	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  The	  Continuum	  Publishing	  
Company,	  1999)	  272	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novel	  substances	  and	  use	  patterns.	  No	  regulatory	  state,	  not	  even	  the	  most	  prototypical,	  
would	  unambiguously	  fit	  a	  single	  type.	  Even	  small	  European	  states	  with	  Harm	  Reduction	  
dominance	  participate	  in	  interdiction	  of	  major	  drug	  trafficking,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
radical	  experiments	  in	  Decriminalization	  have	  happened	  in	  otherwise	  harsh	  Drug	  War	  
states.	  The	  “conceptual	  purity”	  of	  these	  ideal	  types	  will	  allow	  an	  appreciation	  both	  for	  the	  
international	  and	  historical	  diversity	  of	  “concrete	  cultural	  phenomena	  in	  their	  
interdependence”	  relating	  to	  drugs	  policy	  formation	  while	  still	  emphasizing	  the	  major	  
divergences	  in	  the	  field	  which	  have	  sharpened	  in	  the	  past	  few	  years10.	  The	  US,	  classified	  by	  
this	  scheme,	  would	  look	  something	  like	  this:	  
	  
Drug	  War	  dominance	  
Legal	  Market:	  alcohol,	  tobacco,	  common	  pharmaceuticals	  
Legal	  Market	  (Rx	  restricted):	  certain	  psychoactive	  pharmaceuticals	  
Decriminalization:	  marijuana	  (limited,	  varies	  by	  state)	  
Harm	  Reduction:	  opioids	  (limited,	  varies	  by	  state)	  
Drug	  War:	  dozens	  of	  Schedule	  I	  &	  II	  substances	  
	  
3.	  Bureaucracy	  vs.	  Democracy?	  
The	  drug	  regulation	  state	  is	  a	  concept	  broad	  enough	  to	  incorporate	  all	  the	  
“system[s]	  of	  laws,	  regulatory	  measures,	  courses	  of	  action,	  and	  funding	  priorities	  
concerning	  (illicit)	  psychoactive	  drugs	  and	  promulgated	  by	  a	  governmental	  entity	  or	  its	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  Weber,	  Sociological	  Writings,	  264-­‐65	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representatives”11.	  Here	  it	  will	  be	  defined	  by	  a	  slight	  modification	  of	  the	  Weberian	  
definition:	  if	  the	  state	  is	  the	  organization	  that	  claims	  a	  monopoly	  on	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  
violence,	  then	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  is	  the	  organization	  which	  claims	  a	  monopoly	  on	  the	  
determination	  of	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  drugs,	  and	  the	  means	  (violent	  or	  otherwise)	  by	  
which	  to	  enforce	  this	  determination.	  Drug	  states	  in	  the	  industrialized	  world	  have	  through	  
advancing	  strategies	  of	  bureaucratic	  dominance	  often	  gained	  a	  functional	  independence	  
from	  the	  normal	  political	  process	  that	  would	  be	  unimaginable	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  policy.	  The	  
US	  Attorney	  General	  was	  granted	  the	  power	  to	  emergency	  schedule	  substances	  in	  1984	  and	  
subsequently	  ceded	  that	  power	  to	  the	  administrator	  of	  the	  Drug	  Enforcement	  Agency12.	  
Since	  the	  DEA	  is	  also	  a	  federal	  law	  enforcement	  agency	  allowed	  post-­‐1984	  to	  “seize	  any	  
property	  allegedly	  used	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  narcotics	  trade”,	  the	  American	  federal	  drug	  
state	  can,	  without	  consulting	  Congress,	  the	  President,	  or	  the	  court	  system,	  create	  laws,	  
imprison	  citizens	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  those	  laws,	  and	  fund	  its	  own	  operations	  with	  those	  
citizens’	  confiscated	  property.	  	  
Comprehensive	  bureaucratic	  domination	  and	  the	  almost	  total	  exclusion	  of	  elected	  
bodies	  from	  drug	  policy	  is	  the	  strongest	  power	  position	  a	  drug	  regulation	  state	  can	  hope	  to	  
attain.	  While	  few	  other	  drug	  states	  have	  this	  level	  of	  power	  and	  independence,	  many	  of	  
them	  attempt	  to	  exclude	  drug	  scheduling	  from	  the	  normal	  political	  process	  and	  emphasize	  
the	  primacy	  of	  bureaucratic	  determination	  and	  international	  law	  over	  democratic	  will	  and	  
social	  change.	  Democracy	  in	  particular,	  because	  it	  insists	  on	  “universal	  accessibility	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Maria	  Moreira,	  Brendan	  Hughes,	  Claudia	  Costa	  Storti,	  and	  Frank	  Zobel,	  “Drug	  policy	  profiles:	  
Portugal”	  in	  EMCDDA	  Drug	  policy	  profiles	  (Lisbon:	  European	  Monitoring	  Centre	  for	  Drugs	  and	  Drug	  
Addiction,	  June	  2011)	  7	  (adapted	  from	  Kilpatrick,	  2000)	  
12	  Jenkins,	  Synthetic	  Panics,	  80-­‐89	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office”	  and	  “the	  prevention	  of...a	  closed	  “status	  group	  of	  officials”,	  “inevitably	  comes	  into	  
contact	  with	  the	  general	  tendencies	  of	  bureaucratization”13.	  The	  drug	  regulation	  state,	  in	  
one	  form	  or	  another,	  may	  be	  indispensable	  for	  industrial	  society;	  but	  the	  powers	  invested	  
in	  and	  monopolized	  by	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state,	  insofar	  as	  it	  comes	  to	  function	  
independently	  of	  elected	  officials	  and	  the	  normal	  political	  process,	  become	  powers	  held	  
against	  the	  political	  community	  and	  in	  the	  truest	  sense	  a	  diminishment	  of	  democratic	  
sovereignty.	  
An	  historical	  institutionalism	  perspective	  can	  show	  how	  the	  early	  development	  of	  
the	  drug	  state	  bureaucracy	  constrained	  the	  options	  of	  policymakers	  later	  on.	  These	  
constraints	  are	  particularly	  heavy	  because	  drug	  policy	  is	  a	  field	  in	  which	  technical	  and	  
insider	  concerns	  have	  always	  been	  able	  to	  dominate	  public	  opinion	  and	  the	  democratic	  
process.	  Apologists	  for	  the	  Obama	  administration	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  President	  may	  
desire	  reform,	  but	  that	  his	  hands	  are	  tied	  by	  the	  drug	  control	  treaties	  the	  United	  States	  
engineered	  and	  ratified	  under	  earlier	  Presidents.	  But	  those	  “baffled”	  by	  the	  Obama	  
administration’s	  continuation	  and	  even	  intensification	  of	  its	  predecessors’	  policies	  should	  
look	  not	  primarily	  at	  international	  relations	  and	  the	  binding	  nature	  of	  the	  drug	  treaties	  the	  
US	  is	  signatory	  to,	  but	  at	  the	  still	  massive	  power	  of	  the	  drug	  bureaucracy	  to	  delay	  or	  kill	  
reform	  legislation	  at	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  manipulate	  media	  coverage	  of	  drug	  policy	  
debate14.	  	  The	  story	  of	  the	  drug	  war	  state	  is	  at	  times	  a	  story	  of	  ignorance	  and	  prejudice	  and	  
at	  other	  times	  a	  story	  of	  genuine	  concern	  for	  public	  health,	  but	  whatever	  else	  it	  is,	  at	  heart	  
it	  is	  a	  story	  of	  creeping	  bureaucratic	  domination	  and	  its	  costs.	  The	  inability	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Weber,	  Sociological	  Writings,	  89	  
14	  NYC	  Bar,	  “The	  International	  Drug	  Control	  Treaties”,	  1	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unwillingness	  of	  the	  Obama	  Administration	  to	  confront	  the	  DEA	  carries	  echoes	  of	  Weber’s	  
early	  warnings	  about	  public	  leaders	  and	  bureaucracies:	  
“in	  every	  case	  the	  “ruler”	  will	  always	  find	  himself	  in	  the	  position	  of	  “dilettante”	  vis-­‐
a-­‐vis	  the	  “expert”	  officials	  trained	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  administration...[and]	  it	  is	  
the	  tendency	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  administration	  to	  always	  exclude	  the	  public	  and,	  as	  
far	  as	  possible,	  conceal	  its	  knowledge	  and	  actions	  from	  criticism”15.	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  too	  easy	  to	  mythologize	  the	  “power	  position	  of	  the	  fully	  
developed	  bureaucracy”,	  and	  drug	  policy	  is	  also	  a	  field	  that	  brings	  into	  stark	  relief	  the	  
limits	  of	  authority	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  enforcing	  obedience16.	  By	  almost	  any	  measure,	  the	  
period	  of	  militarized	  drug	  enforcement	  in	  America	  since	  1982	  has	  had	  few	  positive	  effects	  
and	  many	  detrimental	  ones,	  but	  drug	  enforcement	  bureaucratic	  resources	  have	  continually	  
grown	  regardless.	  In	  2004,	  former	  Interpol	  chief	  Raymond	  Kendall	  excoriated	  “[p]olicies	  
based	  solely	  on	  criminal	  sanctions:	  
Economic	  corruption	  increases,	  organised	  crime	  prospers	  and	  developing	  
economies	  are	  hard	  hit	  by	  military	  and	  environmental	  (crop	  eradication)	  
interventions	  that	  have	  no	  apparent	  positive	  effect...There	  is	  therefore	  an	  urgent	  
need	  for	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  and	  integrated	  approach...which	  also	  integrates	  harm	  
reduction	  strategies	  designed	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  of	  the	  individual	  drug	  user	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole”17.	  	  
	  
An	  analysis	  of	  bureaucratic	  power	  in	  the	  Drug	  War	  type,	  in	  particular,	  needs	  to	  
demonstrate	  how	  “a	  policy	  can	  fail	  completely	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  entrepreneurial	  
bureaucrats	  expand	  their	  reputations	  and	  end	  up	  being	  better	  off”18.	  The	  desired	  outcomes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Weber,	  Sociological	  Writings,	  96	  
16	  Ibid.	  96	  
17	  Marcus	  Whiting	  and	  Susanne	  MacGregor,	  “The	  development	  of	  European	  drug	  policy	  and	  the	  
place	  of	  harm	  reduction	  within	  this”	  in	  Harm	  reduction:	  evidence,	  impacts	  and	  challenges	  (Lisbon:	  
EMCDDA,	  April	  2010)	  71	  (from	  Le	  Monde	  26	  October	  2004)	  
18	  Rasmussen	  and	  Benson,	  The	  Economic	  Anatomy	  of	  a	  Drug	  War,	  131	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for	  a	  government	  bureaucracy	  (insulation	  from	  the	  normal	  political	  process	  and	  steady	  
increases	  in	  funding)	  may	  not	  be	  desirable	  outcomes	  from	  a	  broader	  social	  perspective.	  	  
All	  drug	  regulation	  states	  are	  also	  highly	  vulnerable	  to	  corruption,	  determined	  by	  
the	  degree	  to	  which	  that	  state	  has	  the	  power	  to	  materially	  affect	  the	  drug	  economy	  (by	  
shutting	  down	  suppliers,	  seizing	  imports,	  economic	  or	  legal	  penalties	  for	  users,	  etc.).	  It	  is	  
almost	  undisputed	  that	  the	  “illicit	  drug	  market	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  lucrative	  source	  of	  
police	  corruption	  that	  has	  ever	  existed”,	  and	  that	  corruption	  in	  many	  drug	  states	  is	  
“pandemic…	  the	  more	  officials	  hired	  for...suppression	  work,	  the	  more	  are	  bribed,	  or	  worse,	  
become	  distributors	  themselves”19.	  In	  the	  language	  of	  economics,	  
“when…government	  has	  modified	  a	  rights	  structure	  to	  prevent	  a	  competitive	  
market	  and	  has,	  consequently,	  created	  incentives	  for	  an	  illegal	  market	  to	  
arise...public	  officials	  have	  a	  valuable	  “asset”	  that	  may	  be	  sold.	  They	  can	  allow	  
certain	  individuals	  or	  groups	  to	  operate	  illegally	  while	  harassing	  other	  potential	  
market	  participants...in	  effect	  they	  can	  sell	  monopoly	  rights	  to	  a	  private-­‐sector	  
underground	  market	  and	  then	  enforce	  that	  rights	  allocation”20.	  	  
	  
The	  ramping	  up	  of	  US	  drug	  enforcement	  during	  the	  1980s	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  “fourfold	  
increase	  in	  convictions	  of	  federal	  officials	  for	  corruption	  –	  from	  115	  in	  1979	  to	  529	  in	  
1988”21.	  Oversight	  mechanisms	  and	  institutional	  design	  may	  mitigate	  the	  tendency	  
towards	  corruption,	  but	  even	  if	  frank	  corruption	  could	  be	  perfectly	  prevented,	  the	  drug	  
regulation	  state	  would	  still	  be	  tempted	  to	  in	  general	  use	  its	  powers	  in	  the	  furtherance	  of	  
established	  economic	  and	  political	  forces.	  	  It	  can	  easily	  become	  a	  profoundly	  conservative	  
institution	  voraciously	  opposed	  to	  liberalization	  and	  reform,	  as	  these	  threaten	  to	  shrink	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Rasmussen	  and	  Benson,	  The	  Economic	  Anatomy	  of	  a	  Drug	  War,	  116	  
20	  Ibid,	  108	  
21	  Ibid,	  116	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purview	  considerably	  and	  reduce	  the	  value	  of	  its	  main	  power	  resource	  -­‐	  the	  power	  to	  
allocate	  market	  rights	  in	  a	  highly	  lucrative	  and	  competitive	  sector	  of	  the	  modern	  economy.	  
This	  analysis	  will	  emphasize	  first	  the	  limited	  nature	  of	  government	  resources	  and	  
how	  different	  bureaucracies	  compete	  amongst	  each	  other	  for	  jurisdiction	  and	  funding,	  and	  
second	  the	  factors	  which	  might	  motivate	  the	  bureaucracy	  to	  maintain	  a	  punitive	  drugs	  
policy	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  unintended	  consequences,	  unfriendly	  evidence	  and	  social	  protest.	  
In	  a	  world	  of	  increasingly	  complex	  biological	  and	  chemical	  sciences,	  the	  ability	  of	  law	  
enforcement	  bureaucrats	  to	  govern	  the	  drugs	  economy	  is	  increasingly	  threatened.	  Finally,	  
this	  analysis	  needs	  to	  explain	  why	  some	  bureaucracies	  don’t	  push	  for	  draconian	  drugs	  
policies	  and	  instead	  remain	  in	  a	  limited	  or	  subservient	  role,	  and	  identify	  social,	  economic,	  
and	  political	  factors	  which	  militate	  towards	  either	  Drug	  War,	  Harm	  Reduction	  or	  
Decriminalization	  in	  industrialized	  and	  industrializing	  countries.	  The	  types	  must	  be	  
developed	  so	  that	  strands	  of	  each	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  every	  country’s,	  but	  they	  must	  also	  be	  
analyzed	  as	  ideological	  narratives	  which	  in	  their	  advanced	  stages	  seek	  to	  consolidate	  their	  
position	  in	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  and	  exclude	  the	  alternatives	  to	  the	  greatest	  extent	  
possible.	  While	  punitive	  drug	  laws	  have	  existed	  for	  centuries,	  states	  did	  not	  have	  the	  
capacity	  or	  willingness	  to	  implement	  harsh	  zero-­‐tolerance	  policies	  until	  the	  1970s	  and	  ‘80s.	  
The	  Drug	  War	  type	  is	  a	  recent	  political	  creation,	  consciously	  constructed	  as	  an	  end	  to	  the	  
liberalization	  of	  drug	  use	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  ‘70s.	  While	  precursors	  to	  Harm	  
Reduction	  and	  Decriminalization	  can	  be	  found	  throughout	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  centuries,	  their	  
emergence	  as	  more	  comprehensive	  types	  has	  only	  occurred	  in	  recent	  decades	  as	  part	  of	  the	  




B.	  Distinguishing	  Between	  the	  Ideal	  Types	  
1.	  Drug	  War	  State	  
	   Drug	  War	  as	  an	  ideal	  type	  is	  distinguished	  by	  the	  dominant	  role	  of	  law	  enforcement,	  
paramilitary,	  or	  military	  organizations	  in	  policy	  and	  administration.	  There	  is	  ample	  
evidence	  in	  the	  American	  case	  that	  “the	  organized	  force	  of	  law	  enforcement	  bureaucrats	  
was	  a	  major	  source	  of	  demand	  for	  the	  initial	  criminalization	  of	  illegal	  drugs”22.	  The	  first	  
prerequisite	  for	  any	  drug	  state	  is	  a	  functioning	  national	  bureaucracy,	  and	  in	  20th	  century	  
America,	  “the	  democratization	  of	  society	  in	  its	  totality	  in	  the	  modern	  sense	  of	  the	  word	  
[was]	  indeed	  an	  especially	  favorable...basis	  for	  instances	  of	  bureaucratization”23.	  These	  
factors,	  however,	  are	  not	  sufficient	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  or	  every	  country	  with	  a	  military	  
and	  a	  bureaucracy	  would	  still	  be	  Drug	  War	  dominant.	  The	  leap	  from	  passive	  prohibition	  to	  
aggressive	  drug	  enforcement	  is	  a	  substantial	  one,	  and	  is	  part	  of	  what	  distinguishes	  Drug	  
War	  from	  Harm	  Reduction,	  which	  can	  still	  be	  highly	  normative.	  
	   The	  first	  way	  to	  distinguish	  Drug	  War	  policies	  or	  Drug	  War	  dominance	  is	  through	  
analysis	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  process,	  and	  the	  types	  and	  intensities	  of	  punishments	  
administered	  by	  the	  state.	  A	  quick	  way	  to	  identify	  a	  possible	  Drug	  War	  dominant	  state	  is	  to	  
look	  at	  measures	  of	  the	  enforcement	  mechanism	  it	  most	  prefers	  and	  relies	  on:	  
incarceration	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  illicit	  drugs	  economy.	  There	  are	  not	  many	  countries	  
with	  prison	  rates	  higher	  than	  250	  per	  100,000,	  and	  so	  these	  jump	  out	  immediately	  as	  drug-­‐
war	  candidates.	  As	  can	  be	  seen,	  even	  the	  more	  restrictive	  Western	  European	  harm	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Rasmussen	  and	  Benson,	  The	  Economic	  Anatomy	  of	  a	  Drug	  War,	  128	  
23	  Weber,	  Sociological	  Writings,	  95	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reduction	  states	  (like	  Sweden)	  come	  nowhere	  close	  to	  the	  incarceration	  levels	  of	  states	  in	  
the	  Americas	  and	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union.	  
24	  
Even	  at	  this	  macro	  level,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  American	  Drug	  War	  state	  on	  an	  entire	  
hemisphere	  comes	  into	  focus:	  an	  average	  of	  357.5	  for	  Caribbean	  countries	  and	  175	  for	  
South	  American	  countries	  compared	  to	  98	  for	  Western	  Europe25.	  Of	  course,	  general	  
incarceration	  rates	  can	  be	  high	  for	  other	  reasons,	  so	  this	  variable	  cannot	  be	  studied	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Sarah	  Shannon	  and	  Chris	  Uggen,	  “Visualizing	  Punishment”	  hosted	  on	  “The	  Society	  Pages,	  
February	  19	  2013.	  Accessed	  April	  12	  2013.	  http://thesocietypages.org/papers/visualizing-­‐
punishment/	  
25	  Roy	  Walmsley,	  “World	  Prison	  Population	  List	  (9th	  edition)”,	  report	  for	  International	  Centre	  for	  
Prison	  Studies	  (London:	  University	  of	  Essex,	  2010)	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isolation,	  or	  without	  subtlety.	  But	  a	  large	  drug	  prisoner	  population	  is	  a	  sure	  sign	  of	  Drug	  
War	  dominance,	  if	  only	  because	  it	  is	  the	  outcome	  that	  the	  other	  models	  most	  explicitly	  seek	  
to	  avoid.	  
Another	  relatively	  quick	  way	  to	  compare	  large	  numbers	  of	  countries	  on	  drug	  
policies	  is	  to	  look	  at	  their	  penalties	  for	  individual	  possession	  versus	  penalties	  for	  traffickers	  
and	  producers,	  which	  are	  more	  universally	  severe.	  In	  the	  draconian	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  
1980s,	  Drug	  War	  influence	  was	  so	  dominant	  that	  the	  criminalization	  of	  personal	  use	  was	  
added	  to	  the	  international	  treaty	  obligations:	  “the	  1988	  Convention	  requires	  that	  countries	  
make	  possession	  for	  personal	  consumption	  a	  criminal	  violation”,	  though	  it	  does	  “not	  
specify	  what	  the	  punishment	  must	  be”26.	  States	  adopting	  Harm	  Reduction	  and	  
Decriminalization	  policies	  have	  developed	  numerous	  ways	  to	  be	  in	  “technical	  compliance	  
with	  the	  law,	  while	  [still]	  allowing	  for	  de	  facto	  policies	  more	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  desired	  
policy	  change	  within	  each	  country”27.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  “treaty	  obligations”	  explanation	  of	  the	  
Obama	  Administration’s	  actions	  in	  drug	  policy	  is	  so	  weak:	  much	  smaller	  countries	  like	  
Holland	  and	  Portugal	  have	  found	  ways	  to	  skirt	  the	  treaties’	  harsher	  requirements	  for	  
decades,	  and	  the	  possibility	  is	  zero	  that	  the	  INCB’s	  enforcement	  mechanism	  (“an	  embargo	  
on	  all	  prescription	  medicines	  coming	  into	  or	  going	  out	  of	  the	  country”)	  would	  be	  applied	  to	  
the	  United	  States28.	  While	  an	  about-­‐face	  on	  drug	  policy	  would	  certainly	  be	  embarrassing	  for	  
American	  diplomacy,	  there	  is	  no	  (external)	  material	  factor	  preventing	  such	  realignment.	  In	  
the	  American	  case,	  the	  treaties	  are	  a	  red	  herring	  used	  by	  the	  bureaucracy	  to	  “conceal	  its	  
knowledge	  and	  actions	  from	  criticism”	  and	  interpret	  its	  own	  actions	  as	  purely	  technocratic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  NYC	  Bar,	  “The	  International	  Drug	  Control	  Treaties”,	  5	  
27	  Ibid,	  5	  
28	  Ibid,	  3	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rather	  than	  materially	  self-­‐interested29.	  Given	  the	  flexibility	  that	  states	  have	  in	  assigning	  
types	  and	  severity	  of	  punishment,	  the	  proportionality	  of	  penalties	  for	  drug	  use	  relative	  to	  
other	  crimes	  indicates	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  state	  relies	  on	  punishment	  to	  maintain	  
normativity	  and	  deter	  suppliers.	  	  
The	  second	  systematic	  way	  in	  which	  they	  can	  be	  distinguished	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  specific	  harm	  reduction	  initiatives	  are	  allowed,	  promoted,	  and	  funded	  by	  the	  drug	  
regulation	  state.	  Even	  under	  Democratic	  presidents,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  lagged	  far	  behind	  
European	  countries	  in	  its	  commitment	  to	  harm	  reduction	  programs,	  and	  sometimes	  these	  
programs	  have	  been	  explicitly	  stalled	  or	  shut	  down	  by	  Drug	  War	  proponents.	  The	  EU	  
explicitly	  calls	  on	  all	  Member	  States	  to	  provide	  “a	  number	  of	  harm	  reduction	  interventions,	  
including:	  information	  and	  counseling;	  outreach;	  drug-­‐free	  and	  substitution	  treatment;	  
hepatitis	  B	  vaccination;	  prevention	  interventions	  for	  HIV,	  hepatitis	  B	  and	  C,	  tuberculosis	  
and	  sexually	  transmitted	  diseases;	  the	  distribution	  of	  condoms;	  and	  the	  distribution	  and	  
exchange	  of	  injecting	  equipment”30.	  By	  contrast,	  even	  in	  the	  2013	  budget	  that	  was	  
supposed	  to	  mark	  a	  “shift	  in	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  thinking”	  and	  “a	  more	  balanced	  
approach”,	  the	  US	  Office	  of	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Policy	  allocated	  nothing	  for	  drug	  
recovery	  services;	  the	  Director’s	  only	  response	  to	  this	  discrepancy	  was,	  “I	  think	  the	  money	  
sometimes	  lags	  behind	  the	  change	  in	  philosophy	  and	  the	  change	  in	  discussion”31.	  	  
But	  the	  low	  level	  of	  priority	  given	  to	  harm	  reduction	  programs	  and	  the	  welfare	  of	  
drug	  users,	  and	  long	  delays	  in	  implementation,	  are	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  Drug	  War	  mentality.	  It	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  Weber,	  Sociological	  Writings,	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30	  Whiting	  and	  MacGregor,	  “The	  development	  of	  European	  drug	  policy”,	  66	  






is	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  “habits	  of	  thought	  and	  political	  structures	  long	  anchored	  in	  a	  
drug	  war	  mentality	  blocked	  rapid	  government	  response	  to	  the	  implications	  of	  [early	  H.I.V]	  
research”32.	  During	  the	  height	  of	  the	  AIDS	  crisis,	  New	  York	  City	  at	  first	  refused	  to	  fund	  
needle-­‐exchanges	  and	  later	  pulled	  the	  plug	  on	  its	  successful	  pilot	  programs,	  claiming	  that	  
harm	  reduction	  was	  “surrender	  in	  the	  drug	  war”	  and	  that	  “drug	  use	  was	  a	  more	  serious	  
health	  threat	  than	  HIV”33.	  In	  the	  American	  case,	  the	  precedent	  for	  government	  disapproval	  
of	  harm	  reduction	  was	  established	  early	  on;	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  Harm	  Reduction	  and	  
Opioids	  sections	  of	  this	  paper,	  early	  regulatory	  bodies	  in	  the	  1920s	  “equated	  maintenance	  
[and	  physician-­‐assisted	  detox]	  with	  drug	  pushing”	  and	  aggressively	  pursued	  doctors	  who	  
attempted	  to	  treat	  addicts34.	  The	  Drug	  War	  model	  relies	  so	  heavily	  on	  strong	  punishments	  
to	  establish	  normativity	  that	  there	  is	  little	  space	  left	  for	  considerations	  of	  public	  health	  or	  
user	  welfare.	  
The	  final	  way	  to	  distinguish	  the	  drug	  war	  state	  from	  other	  types	  is	  through	  an	  
analysis	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  engages	  with	  
the	  broader	  culture	  and	  civic	  society.	  Drugs	  and	  drug	  users	  are	  not	  merely	  disapproved	  of	  
or	  targeted	  for	  interventions,	  but	  are	  actively	  demonized,	  stigmatized,	  identified,	  and	  
discriminated	  against	  in	  multiple	  spheres.	  Importantly,	  they	  are	  also	  vigorously	  excluded	  
from	  political	  debate	  and	  participation,	  perhaps	  because	  
“drug	  users	  in	  sufficient	  numbers	  could	  become	  a	  political	  force...[so]	  they	  are	  
depicted	  as	  both	  “out	  of	  it”	  and	  yet	  violently	  effective	  in	  assaulting	  the	  world	  and	  its	  
values…The	  media	  depict	  users	  as	  losers,	  but	  losers	  who	  are	  somehow	  always	  
winning…They	  are	  condemned	  both	  for	  withdrawing	  from	  and	  remaining	  in	  the	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  Acker,	  Creating	  the	  American	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  11	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  Maia	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  “The	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social	  world.	  Drug	  users	  are	  antisocial	  but	  are	  continually	  forging	  reprehensible	  
social	  configurations.	  They	  are	  lawless,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  subject	  to	  the	  law’s	  
most	  intimate	  scrutiny.”35	  	  
	  
The	  excommunication	  of	  drug	  users	  and	  advocates	  from	  participation	  in	  policy	  was	  
dramatically	  symbolized	  by	  the	  Reagan	  Administration’s	  “Just	  Say	  No”	  campaign,	  which	  	  
“explicitly	  called	  for	  an	  end	  to	  discourse	  on	  the	  subject.	  The	  absence	  of	  discussion	  
and	  hence	  of	  any	  discrimination	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  requisite	  demonization:	  during	  
the	  Cold	  War	  it	  was	  not	  allowable	  to	  say	  that	  there	  could	  be	  any	  “good	  Communists”,	  
or	  that	  there	  were	  different	  kinds	  of	  Communists…Just	  as	  in	  the	  1950s,	  when	  
Communists	  were	  portrayed	  as	  having	  penetrated	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  American	  life,	  
now	  undifferentiated	  “drugs”	  were	  said	  to	  permeate	  every	  crevice”36.	  	  
	  
If	  the	  Drug	  War	  state	  is	  successful,	  the	  “badness”	  of	  all	  drug	  users	  becomes	  such	  an	  
unquestioned	  consensus	  that	  considerations	  of	  user	  welfare	  become	  politically	  
unspeakable	  and	  immaterial.	  
The	  Drug	  War	  type	  makes	  unusual	  demands	  upon	  state	  capacity;	  when	  these	  
pressures	  become	  too	  intense,	  enforcement	  may	  become	  increasingly	  selective	  and	  
arbitrary.	  If	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  loses	  bureaucratic	  legitimacy	  and	  comes	  to	  act	  and	  be	  
viewed	  as	  simply	  another	  market	  or	  political	  actor,	  its	  ability	  to	  secure	  the	  popular	  consent	  
necessary	  for	  any	  policy	  of	  law	  enforcement	  may	  be	  irreparably	  damaged.	  When	  this	  
happens,	  Drug	  War	  dominance	  may	  be	  disturbed	  and	  formerly	  impossible	  alternatives	  may	  
become	  increasingly	  plausible	  or	  even	  necessary.	  
2.	  Harm	  Reduction	  
The	  major	  innovation	  of	  the	  Harm	  Reduction	  type,	  developed	  in	  the	  late-­‐80s	  and	  
early-­‐90s	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  increasingly	  harsh	  Drug	  War	  policies	  pushed	  by	  the	  US	  and	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the	  UK,	  was	  to	  “distinguis[h]	  between	  the	  drug	  trafficker,	  who	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  criminal,	  and	  
the	  drug	  user,	  who	  is	  seen	  more	  as	  a	  sick	  person	  in	  need	  of	  treatment”37.	  The	  difference	  
between	  dominance	  of	  Harm	  Reduction	  versus	  Decriminalization,	  while	  still	  substantial,	  is	  
not	  as	  great	  a	  divide	  as	  between	  either	  of	  these	  and	  Drug	  War.	  The	  key	  difference	  is	  the	  
degree	  of	  continued	  state	  involvement	  and	  whether	  a	  restrictive	  normativity	  towards	  illicit	  
drug	  use	  is	  maintained.	  Harm	  Reduction	  seeks	  to	  broadly	  involve	  the	  state	  in	  “preventing	  
and	  reducing	  drug	  use,	  dependence	  and	  drug	  related	  harms	  to	  health	  and	  society”	  and	  
assuring	  “a	  high	  level	  of	  security	  for	  the	  general	  public”38.	  In	  its	  purer	  forms	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  
evolve	  when	  a	  highly	  developed	  social	  welfare	  system	  coexists	  with	  a	  restrictive	  attitude	  
towards	  illegal	  drug	  use.	  In	  Europe,	  for	  example,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  “awareness	  of	  
HIV/AIDS	  and	  its	  links	  to	  injecting	  drug	  use”	  caused	  a	  “significant	  shift	  of	  opinion	  between	  
1985	  and	  the	  early	  1990s”39.	  While	  “public	  attitudes	  to	  drug	  taking...remain	  primarily	  
restrictive”,	  the	  concern	  and	  priority	  is	  on	  “health	  consequences”	  and	  outcomes	  rather	  than	  
punishing	  criminality	  and	  social	  deviance.	  Harm	  Reduction	  “mixes	  traditional	  law	  
enforcement	  approaches	  with	  an	  increasing	  focus	  on	  public	  health”,	  but	  is	  likely	  to	  
prioritize	  demand	  reduction	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  since	  supply	  reduction	  efforts	  are	  difficult	  to	  
assess	  in	  an	  evidence-­‐based	  way	  and	  can	  produce	  consequences	  (more	  violence,	  use	  of	  
more	  potent	  drug	  varieties,	  political	  alienation)	  which	  are	  highly	  undesirable	  from	  Harm	  
Reduction’s	  basic	  emphasis	  on	  public	  health	  and	  civic	  order40.	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Harm	  Reduction	  does	  not	  require	  or	  imply	  a	  liberal	  attitude	  towards	  drug	  use.	  Some	  
Harm	  Reduction	  dominant	  states,	  perhaps	  hoping	  to	  maintain	  the	  deterrence	  value	  of	  
strong	  normativity,	  reject	  the	  name	  itself	  and	  continue	  to	  maintain	  a	  hardline	  rhetoric	  that	  
has	  little	  impact	  on	  practice.	  Scandinavia,	  and	  Sweden	  in	  particular,	  has	  been	  highly	  critical	  
of	  any	  perceived	  leniency	  for	  drug	  users.	  Even	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  phrase	  “harm	  reduction”	  
in	  a	  joint	  EU	  statement	  to	  the	  UN	  2009	  was	  resisted	  by	  Sweden	  (and	  possibly	  others),	  and	  
in	  Stockholm	  in	  2008	  the	  World	  Forum	  Against	  Drugs	  declared	  itself	  opposed	  to	  “‘harm	  
reduction’	  that	  accept[s]	  drug	  use	  and	  do[es]	  not	  help	  drug	  users	  to	  become	  free...’[h]arm	  
reduction’	  is	  too	  often	  another	  word	  for	  drug	  legalisation	  or	  other	  inappropriate	  
relaxation”41.	  But	  Sweden	  has	  dutifully	  implemented	  the	  recommended	  EU	  harm	  reduction	  
programs,	  and	  with	  a	  2011	  prison	  rate	  of	  78	  per	  100,000,	  is	  among	  the	  best	  at	  providing	  
drug	  users	  with	  alternatives	  to	  incarceration42.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  not	  unrelated	  that	  Sweden’s	  
government	  operates	  an	  alcohol	  monopoly,	  and	  that	  per-­‐capita	  alcohol	  consumption	  in	  
Scandinavia	  is	  quite	  high	  compared	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  EU	  average.	  Overall,	  while	  
Harm	  Reduction	  dominance	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  strong	  normativity	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  
keep	  drug	  use	  and	  users	  out	  of	  the	  public	  sphere,	  the	  use	  of	  coercive	  force	  and	  
incarceration	  is	  magnitudes	  smaller	  than	  under	  Drug	  War,	  and	  the	  state	  makes	  at	  least	  
minimal	  provisions	  for	  the	  health	  and	  welfare	  of	  drug	  users	  seeking	  treatment.	  
Since	  Harm	  Reduction	  involves	  a	  commitment	  to	  and	  an	  expansion	  of	  social	  welfare	  
programs,	  it	  is	  dependent	  on	  political	  support	  for	  the	  welfare	  state.	  The	  strong	  welfare	  
states	  of	  Coordinated	  Market	  Economies	  like	  Germany	  are	  more	  prepared	  to	  take	  on	  these	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responsibilities	  than	  the	  more	  minimal	  welfare	  states	  of	  Liberal	  Market	  Economies	  like	  the	  
United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  The	  two	  are	  constructed	  to	  meet	  different	  economic	  
needs:	  the	  limited	  welfare	  states	  of	  LMEs	  use	  “means	  testing	  and	  low	  levels	  of	  benefits	  [to]	  
reinforce	  the	  fluid	  labor	  markets	  that	  firms	  use	  to	  manage	  their	  relations	  with	  labor”	  and	  
“encourage	  individuals	  to	  develop…general,	  rather	  than	  specific	  skills”.	  In	  CMEs,	  which	  
“require	  a	  workforce	  equipped	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  industry-­‐specific	  skills”,	  generous	  social	  
and	  unemployment	  benefits	  “help	  to	  assure	  workers	  that	  they	  can	  weather	  an	  economic	  
downturn	  without	  having	  to	  shift	  to	  a	  job	  in	  which	  their	  investment	  in	  specific	  skills	  does	  
not	  pay	  off”43.	  This	  in	  turn	  influences	  the	  behavior	  of	  firms	  and	  the	  state	  “in	  the	  face	  of	  
more	  intense	  international	  competition”:	  while	  “business	  interests	  in	  LMEs	  are	  likely	  to	  
pressure	  governments	  for	  deregulation”	  and	  “government	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  sympathetic”,	  in	  
CMEs	  “governments	  should	  be	  less	  sympathetic	  to	  deregulation	  because	  it	  threatens	  the	  
nation’s	  comparative	  institutional	  advantages…many	  firms	  draw	  competitive	  advantages	  
from	  systems…that	  depend	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  supportive	  regulatory	  regimes”44.	  	  
This	  bifurcated	  response	  to	  globalization	  explains	  why	  European	  countries	  were	  
able	  to	  construct	  comprehensive	  Harm	  Reduction	  systems	  during	  the	  1990s	  –	  the	  same	  
decade	  that	  Bill	  Clinton	  and	  the	  House	  Republicans	  ended	  “welfare	  as	  we	  know	  it”	  in	  the	  
United	  States.	  Any	  political	  program	  to	  expand	  the	  welfare	  state	  in	  an	  LME,	  especially	  
during	  times	  of	  economic	  duress,	  is	  likely	  to	  attract	  massive	  business	  opposition.	  Drug	  
policy	  is	  not	  completely	  path	  dependent,	  but	  there	  is	  real-­‐world	  evidence	  that	  shifting	  to	  
Harm	  Reduction	  policies	  is	  not	  as	  easy	  for	  LMEs	  as	  for	  CMEs.	  A	  functioning	  Harm	  Reduction	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model	  takes	  time	  to	  create,	  and	  involves	  structural	  reform	  of	  social	  services	  and	  the	  legal	  
system.	  Unlike	  most	  of	  Western	  Europe	  (but	  similar	  to	  Spain	  &	  Greece),	  the	  UK’s	  
incarceration	  rate	  rose	  substantially	  from	  2004	  to	  2010/2011.	  
	  
45	  
It	  may	  be	  that	  LMEs,	  less	  equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  social	  consequences	  of	  large-­‐
scale	  or	  long-­‐term	  unemployment,	  tend	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  law	  enforcement	  approaches	  to	  
increased	  drug	  and	  crime	  activity.	  Even	  the	  Drug	  Czar	  criticized	  a	  similar	  tendency	  in	  the	  
US:	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“people	  in	  law	  enforcement	  and	  criminal	  justice	  almost	  always	  have	  the	  fingers	  
pointed	  at	  them.	  They're	  told	  to	  do	  something	  about	  the	  drug	  problem	  in	  a	  
neighborhood,	  do	  something	  about	  the	  drug	  dealing	  downtown,	  do	  something	  about	  
drug-­‐related	  crime,	  and	  on	  and	  on.	  When	  you	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  law	  enforcement,	  
you’re	  here	  because	  you	  can	  do	  things,	  take	  charge,	  make	  decisions.	  And	  quite	  often	  
mayor,	  councilors,	  elected	  officials	  turn	  to	  law	  enforcement	  as	  an	  answer	  to	  those	  
problems.”46  
 
Allen	  identifies	  five	  reforms	  which	  separate	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK	  from	  Western	  and	  Northern	  
Europe:	  different	  and	  more	  lenient	  arrangements	  for	  children	  and	  adults,	  options	  to	  divert	  
even	  relatively	  serious	  cases	  from	  prosecution,	  milder	  sentencing	  tariffs,	  better	  treatment	  
options	  for	  people	  with	  drug	  dependency	  and	  psychiatric	  problems,	  and	  restrictions	  on	  
remands47.	  On	  a	  larger	  scale,	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  Harm	  Reduction	  dominance,	  “drug	  users	  
have…to	  overcome	  decades	  of	  silencing	  and	  incarceration	  to	  claim	  their	  right	  to	  health	  care	  
and	  public	  health	  protection”,	  which	  depends	  not	  just	  on	  policy	  reform	  but	  on	  real	  changes	  
in	  bureaucratic	  and	  clinical	  culture48.	  
3.	  	  Decriminalization	  
If	  Harm	  Reduction	  is	  in	  most	  cases	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  institutions	  of	  
public	  health	  and	  the	  welfare	  state,	  and	  thus	  path-­‐dependent	  to	  some	  degree,	  
Decriminalization	  is	  in	  most	  cases	  a	  reform	  measure,	  and	  a	  retreat	  from	  an	  issue	  of	  
illegality	  that	  has	  become	  contested	  or	  de-­‐legitimized.	  The	  state	  seeks	  to	  reduce	  its	  
expenditure	  of	  organizational	  resources	  on	  drug	  regulation	  by	  removing	  criminal	  penalties	  
for	  personal	  use	  and	  deferring	  more	  to	  market	  and	  cultural	  bodies	  and	  norms.	  Judicial	  
processes	  may	  be	  maintained	  for	  those	  arrested	  with	  large	  quantities	  of	  drugs;	  often,	  
punishment	  is	  retained	  for	  traffickers,	  while	  addicts	  may	  be	  required	  to	  register	  with	  the	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  Guy,	  “Interview	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  Czar”	  
47	  Allen,	  “Reducing	  the	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state	  or	  attend	  treatment	  services.	  In	  Portugal,	  a	  mixed	  Harm	  Reduction	  and	  
Decriminalization	  type,	  personal	  use	  is	  entirely	  decriminalized	  while	  trafficking	  is	  treated	  
like	  other	  felonies;	  being	  caught	  with	  “more	  than	  10	  daily	  doses	  of	  drugs”	  sends	  an	  
individual’s	  case	  to	  the	  Commission	  for	  the	  Dissuasion	  of	  Drug	  Abuse49.	  Decriminalization	  
seeks	  above	  all	  to	  avoid	  the	  prison	  populations	  and	  street	  violence	  which	  plague	  the	  Drug	  
War	  state,	  and	  so	  while	  the	  state	  may	  retain	  options	  like	  “warnings,	  banning	  [offenders]	  
from	  certain	  places,	  banning	  from	  meeting	  certain	  people,	  obligation	  of	  periodic	  visits	  to	  a	  
defined	  place,	  removal	  of	  professional	  license	  or	  firearms	  license”,	  etc.,	  only	  in	  its	  
punishments	  for	  major	  international	  traffickers	  does	  the	  Decriminalization	  type	  ever	  
approach	  the	  intensity	  of	  punishment	  that	  Drug	  War	  dominant	  states	  regularly	  mete	  out	  
upon	  those	  convicted	  of	  simple	  possession50.	  Punishment	  intensity	  in	  Harm	  Reduction	  
states	  usually	  lies	  somewhere	  in	  between	  the	  two;	  punishments	  for	  small-­‐time	  users	  and	  
dealers	  may	  be	  softened	  considerably	  but	  possession	  is	  usually	  not	  legally	  decriminalized.	  
Decriminalization	  of	  personal	  use	  necessarily	  entails	  allowing	  buyers	  and	  certain	  
sellers	  of	  the	  drug	  to	  operate	  openly	  and	  acquire	  legitimacy.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Legal	  Market,	  
however,	  sellers	  are	  either	  forced	  to	  remain	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  normal	  consumer	  
market	  and	  operate	  as	  a	  gray	  market	  (a	  black	  market	  that	  is	  known	  about	  and	  tolerated),	  or	  
are	  allowed	  to	  become	  legitimate	  if	  subject	  to	  extraordinary	  restrictions	  like	  very	  high	  
taxes,	  prohibitions	  on	  advertising,	  restrictions	  on	  legitimate	  customers,	  and	  limits	  on	  
product	  and	  financial	  transactions.	  The	  cannabis	  coffee	  shops	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  are	  an	  
excellent	  example	  of	  the	  second	  type.	  US	  reformers	  have	  pursued	  both	  avenues:	  the	  first	  
through	  measures	  by	  cities	  and	  states	  making	  marijuana	  the	  lowest	  priority	  for	  law	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enforcement,	  and	  the	  second	  by	  establishing	  “medical”	  markets	  where	  medical	  necessity	  
and	  sanction	  by	  physician	  serve	  (in	  theory)	  to	  protect	  market	  participants	  from	  federal	  
prosecution51.	  Decriminalization	  is	  rarely	  the	  dominant	  type,	  and	  so	  its	  implementation	  has	  
usually	  been	  piecemeal	  because	  of	  the	  limits	  placed	  on	  it	  by	  higher	  levels	  of	  jurisdiction	  
with	  a	  Drug	  War	  or	  Harm	  Reduction	  mentality.	  The	  tolerance	  given	  to	  sellers	  in	  practice,	  
for	  example,	  is	  rarely	  extended	  to	  suppliers,	  especially	  of	  the	  size	  needed	  for	  commercial	  
production.	  Because	  of	  this	  policy	  disjuncture,	  many	  Decriminalized	  cannabis	  sellers	  have	  
been	  forced	  to	  continue	  to	  buy	  from	  the	  same	  “independent	  growers”	  who	  serve	  the	  illicit	  
market52.	  Despite	  the	  recent	  proliferation	  of	  state	  medical	  marijuana	  laws	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  
uncertain	  legal	  status	  of	  most	  Decriminalization	  experiments	  continues	  to	  deter	  many	  from	  
participating:	  
“medical	  marijuana	  initiatives	  are	  much	  easier	  to	  pass	  than	  they	  are	  to	  implement.	  
As	  long	  as	  marijuana	  remains	  in	  the	  federal	  government’s	  Schedule	  1,	  the	  threat	  of	  
prosecution	  to	  anyone	  involved	  with	  its	  procurement	  or	  use	  has	  deterred	  all	  but	  a	  
minority	  of	  doctors,	  patients,	  and	  providers	  of	  medical	  marijuana	  from	  establishing	  
public	  distribution…Most	  medical	  users	  [continue	  to]	  get	  their	  marijuana	  through	  
the	  same	  means	  as	  recreational	  users:	  from	  friends	  who	  give	  or	  sell	  it	  to	  them,	  by	  
growing	  it	  themselves,	  or	  by	  buying	  it	  “on	  the	  street”	  from	  professional	  growers”53	  
	  
Decriminalization	  policy	  advocates	  are	  likely	  to	  emphasize	  the	  ability	  of	  forces	  in	  
society	  or	  the	  capitalist	  market	  to	  “meet	  needs,	  maintain	  control	  and	  manage	  risks”	  in	  the	  
drugs	  economy	  without	  systematic	  state	  regulation	  and	  coercion54.	  This	  coercion	  is	  viewed	  
not	  just	  as	  unnecessary,	  but	  actively	  harmful;	  “because,	  in	  the	  end,	  culture	  is	  a	  more	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powerful	  tool	  in	  dealing	  with	  drinking	  than	  medicine,	  economics,	  or	  the	  law”,	  and	  the	  
state’s	  pervasive	  interference	  has	  the	  disrupted	  natural	  processes	  of	  cultural	  adaptation	  to	  
intoxicants.	  Specific	  harm	  intervention	  programs	  may	  be	  implemented,	  but	  drug	  policy	  is	  
not	  wholly	  re-­‐conceived	  as	  social	  welfare	  policy	  as	  it	  is	  under	  Harm	  Reduction,	  and	  drug	  
treatment	  services	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  province	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  than	  of	  the	  state.	  
Decriminalization	  can	  achieve	  some	  control	  over	  the	  drug	  economy	  by	  supervising	  a	  semi-­‐
legitimate	  gray	  market,	  or	  generate	  revenue	  by	  establishing	  a	  legal	  drugs	  market	  subject	  to	  
taxation	  and	  heavy	  restrictions.	  Above	  all,	  it	  seeks	  to	  end	  the	  use	  of	  normativity	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  
drug	  policy,	  and	  reconcile	  the	  gulf	  between	  drug	  markets	  and	  the	  legitimate	  economy.	  
Decriminalization	  is	  appealing	  to	  reformers	  in	  current	  Drug	  War	  dominant	  states	  
because	  it	  can	  be	  implemented	  relatively	  quickly,	  it	  forces	  a	  rapid	  de-­‐escalation	  of	  Drug	  
War	  enforcement,	  and	  it	  signals	  a	  retreat	  from	  normativity	  and	  coercion	  in	  state	  regulation	  
of	  the	  drugs	  market.	  It	  does	  not	  require	  a	  developed	  social	  welfare	  network	  or	  a	  sustained	  
commitment	  to	  public	  health	  improvement.	  But	  Decriminalization	  can	  also	  have	  
unintended	  consequences,	  as	  the	  historical	  cases	  of	  alcohol	  and	  tobacco	  show.	  By	  
permitting	  drug	  businesses	  to	  operate	  semi-­‐openly	  but	  simultaneously	  burdening	  them	  
with	  heavy	  restrictions	  and	  legal	  uncertainty,	  Decriminalization	  creates	  powerful	  
advocates	  for	  an	  eventual	  Legal	  Market.	  In	  the	  worst	  instances,	  the	  Decriminalization	  state	  
or	  the	  Legal	  Market	  can	  become	  rackets	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  drug	  producers,	  to	  the	  
detriment	  of	  public	  health	  and	  the	  state’s	  legitimacy.	  	  
4.	  Legal	  Market/Government	  Monopoly	  
	   Legal	  Market	  is	  fairly	  self-­‐explanatory:	  production,	  distribution,	  and	  use	  of	  the	  drug	  
are	  all	  legal	  and	  sanctioned,	  provided	  certain	  conditions	  are	  met.	  	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  that	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it	  is	  an	  uncomplicated	  “default”	  policy,	  or	  that	  it	  has	  a	  depoliticized	  relationship	  to	  the	  drug	  
regulation	  state	  and	  the	  drugs	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  Coffee,	  alcohol,	  and	  oxycodone	  are	  all	  
sold	  in	  Legal	  Markets,	  but	  their	  availability	  and	  the	  requirements	  for	  producers	  and	  
distributors	  are	  profoundly	  different.	  Legalization	  is	  not	  an	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  deal,	  and	  no	  
substance	  has	  faced	  an	  uncomplicated	  path	  to	  social	  acceptance:	  
“Legalization	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  the	  imposition	  of	  an	  unregulated	  market	  
price.	  There	  could	  be	  elaborate	  controls	  on	  suppliers,	  for	  example,	  as	  there	  are	  in	  
many	  states	  for	  alcohol,	  with	  an	  extreme	  case	  being	  one	  in	  which	  only	  physicians	  
could	  supply	  some	  drugs.	  Less	  restrictive	  rules	  for	  sale,	  such	  as	  limited	  time	  of	  sale	  
at	  specially	  licensed	  pharmacies,	  could	  be	  accompanied	  by	  prohibition	  of	  
advertising…Movement	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  legalizers’	  position	  are	  likely	  
because…many	  of	  the	  alleged	  benefits	  of	  a	  drug	  war	  are	  either	  false	  or	  exaggerated,	  
and	  many	  of	  the	  unintended	  consequences	  are	  undesirable.	  Thus,	  legalizers	  could	  
support	  the	  start	  of	  an	  experimentation	  process	  that	  involves	  more	  modest	  changes	  
in	  drug	  policy…while	  the	  libertarian	  argument	  may	  have	  little	  chance	  in	  a	  national	  
debate,	  it	  may	  have	  considerable	  impact	  in	  some	  jurisdictions,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  successful,	  
it	  may	  spread	  through	  emulation”55	  
	  
Legal	  Market’s	  greatest	  strength	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  tested	  and	  true	  model,	  familiar	  to	  anyone	  who	  
has	  bought	  alcohol	  or	  cigarettes,	  or	  filled	  a	  prescription.	  Producers	  can	  operate	  openly	  and	  
without	  the	  stain	  of	  illegitimacy,	  and	  in	  return	  are	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  authenticity	  and	  
safety	  of	  their	  products.	  
Despite	  these	  advantages,	  the	  opposition	  to	  establishing	  Legal	  Markets	  for	  most	  
drugs	  is	  exceedingly	  strong,	  and	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Legal	  Market	  itself.	  From	  an	  
economics	  standpoint,	  firms	  in	  established	  Legal	  Markets	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  prevent	  the	  
establishment	  of	  new	  Legal	  Markets.	  Statistical	  studies	  since	  the	  early	  1990s	  have	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“confirmed	  previous	  perceptions	  that	  alcohol	  and	  marijuana	  are	  substitutes”56.	  This	  is	  
especially	  significant	  since	  evidence	  shows	  that	  since	  the	  ‘80s,	  	  
“public	  policy	  probably	  has	  implicitly	  encouraged	  beer	  consumption	  over	  
marijuana…Besides	  the	  illegality	  of	  marijuana	  and	  rising	  penalties	  during	  the	  1980s,	  
the	  price	  of	  alcoholic	  beverages	  has	  been	  falling	  relative	  to	  the	  overall	  consumer	  
price	  index,	  in	  part	  because	  the	  federal	  excise	  tax	  on	  beer	  failed	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  
inflation”57	  
	  
At	  least	  some	  beer	  companies	  fear,	  probably	  correctly,	  that	  	  
“Legalization	  of	  marijuana	  would	  change	  the	  current	  equation	  enormously:	  if	  
Moore’s	  (1990:124)	  estimates	  are	  accurate,	  the	  money	  price	  of	  marijuana	  would	  fall	  
to	  perhaps	  one-­‐fifteenth	  its	  illegal	  price.	  Falling	  search,	  toxicity,	  and	  safety	  costs,	  as	  
well	  as	  elimination	  of	  legal	  penalties,	  would	  mean	  an	  enormous	  shift	  in	  incentives	  
toward	  consumption	  of	  marijuana	  rather	  than	  beer”58	  
	  
In	  2010,	  the	  California	  Beer	  &	  Beverage	  Distributors	  contributed	  money	  to	  the	  campaign	  to	  
oppose	  Proposition	  19,	  which	  would	  have	  “legalize[d]	  pot	  and	  its	  cultivation	  and	  
distribution”59.	  In	  a	  Government	  Monopoly	  of	  alcohol,	  the	  situation	  is	  even	  worse,	  as	  the	  
bureaucracy	  has	  another	  strong	  incentive	  to	  oppose	  new	  Legal	  Markets.	  But	  perhaps	  the	  
strongest	  obstacle	  to	  legalization	  is	  even	  simpler:	  “it	  is	  a	  drastic	  change	  in	  policy	  that	  is	  not	  
likely	  to	  appeal	  to	  public	  officials	  concerned	  with	  job	  security”,	  and	  “the	  probable	  results,	  
especially	  for	  cocaine	  and	  heroin,	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  undesirable	  by	  the	  majority	  
of	  those	  who	  influence	  policy”60.	  The	  idea	  is	  gaining	  energy	  in	  Latin	  America,	  but	  for	  all	  
substances	  except	  marijuana,	  it	  remains	  a	  fringe	  proposal	  in	  the	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  
States.	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II.	  The	  political	  economy	  of	  drug	  scheduling	  
A.	  The	  politics	  of	  pharmacology	  
	   “As	  for	  our	  mercury,	  never	  forget	  that	  though	  it	  is	  most	  essential	  for	  our	  
work	  and	  much	  beloved,	  it	  contains	  a	  subtle	  poison.	  Both	  Böhme	  and	  Paracelsus	  
agree	  on	  this	  point.	  Paracelsus	  adds	  that	  it	  is	  the	  work	  of	  the	  alchemist	  to	  separate	  
the	  poison	  from	  the	  arcanum.	  	  
	   The	  poison	  attacks	  the	  fixed	  properties	  (themselves	  moribund	  poisons)	  and	  
dissolves	  them.	  Poison	  is	  antidote	  and	  antidote	  poison”61	  
	  
	   It	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  today	  the	  enthusiasm	  that	  greeted	  the	  first	  pharmaceutical	  
innovations	  of	  the	  modern	  era,	  especially	  the	  substances	  that	  have	  acquired	  the	  most	  
severe	  stigma.	  Heroin	  was	  discovered	  alongside	  aspirin,	  and	  was	  at	  first	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  
greater	  discovery.	  Cocaine	  was	  welcomed,	  as	  caffeine	  had	  been	  centuries	  earlier,	  as	  a	  tonic	  
for	  the	  intellect	  and	  a	  stimulant	  for	  physical	  labor.	  Humanity’s	  most	  beneficial	  drugs	  are	  
simultaneously	  its	  most	  dangerous	  and	  destructive,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  perfectly	  
separate	  those	  two	  principles.	  Tobacco,	  perhaps	  history’s	  most	  popular	  recreational	  drug,	  
is	  an	  organic	  poison	  that	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  industrial	  insecticide62.	  Atropine,	  famous	  as	  a	  
deadly	  poison	  and	  weapon	  of	  assassins,	  is	  simultaneously	  a	  WHO	  core	  drug	  for	  medical	  
systems	  and	  an	  antidote	  to	  nerve	  gas	  poisoning.	  Even	  the	  most	  basic	  and	  essential	  products	  
of	  the	  pharmacological	  revolution,	  the	  antibiotics,	  can	  with	  indiscriminate	  use	  bring	  into	  
being	  more	  deadly	  versions	  of	  the	  diseases	  they	  are	  meant	  to	  treat.	  	  
If	  early	  appraisals	  of	  new	  drugs	  are	  often	  rosy	  and	  narrowly	  focused	  on	  their	  
benefits,	  advanced	  industrial	  societies	  in	  many	  cases	  seem	  to	  have	  developed	  the	  opposite	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disorder:	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  attention	  to	  the	  harms	  that	  drugs	  cause,	  but	  without	  any	  
sense	  of	  proportion	  or	  any	  practical	  discussion	  or	  plan	  on	  how	  to	  rationally	  assess	  and	  
reduce	  the	  risks	  involved.	  Risk	  cannot	  be	  eliminated	  from	  the	  practice	  of	  medicine,	  nor	  
from	  the	  pursuit	  of	  happiness	  through	  consumption,	  whether	  it	  is	  consumption	  of	  anti-­‐
depressants,	  cigarettes,	  coffee,	  high-­‐fructose	  corn	  syrup	  or	  illicit	  methamphetamine.	  The	  
loss	  of	  perspective	  in	  cultural	  narratives	  and	  public	  debate	  about	  drug	  use	  -­‐	  the	  inability	  to	  
admit	  that	  drugs	  have	  harms	  but	  also	  powerful	  benefits,	  that	  people	  believe	  they	  derive	  
utility	  from	  their	  use	  of	  drugs,	  that	  some	  drugs	  are	  more	  harmful	  than	  others,	  that	  legal	  
drugs	  like	  alcohol	  and	  tobacco	  cause	  far	  worse	  damage	  than	  illicit	  drugs	  -­‐	  has	  
immeasurably	  aided	  Drug	  War	  advocates	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  stall	  and	  derail	  reforms	  
patterned	  on	  Harm	  Reduction	  or	  Decriminalization.	  
The	  study	  of	  illicit	  drugs	  cannot	  be	  isolated,	  as	  it	  has	  traditionally	  been,	  from	  the	  
study	  of	  licit	  drugs.	  No	  matter	  how	  precisely	  the	  state	  wishes	  to	  draw	  the	  line	  between	  
legality	  and	  illegality,	  and	  no	  matter	  how	  complex	  a	  scheduling	  and	  licensing	  system	  it	  
creates,	  it	  cannot	  escape	  from	  the	  fundamental	  uncertainty	  or	  arbitrariness	  of	  this	  
distinction.	  It	  is	  fundamentally	  arbitrary	  because	  no	  substance	  has	  a	  defined,	  predictable	  
effect	  in	  all	  instances.	  Because	  of	  what	  Lenson	  calls	  “user	  construction”	  (and	  Timothy	  Leary	  
famously	  referred	  to	  as	  “set	  and	  setting”),	  the	  “consumerist	  framework	  [in	  which]	  all	  that	  
can	  be	  said	  is	  that	  a	  given	  drug	  has	  certain	  empirically	  observable	  biochemical	  effects”	  is	  
wrong	  more	  often	  that	  it	  is	  right63.	  Drugs	  simply	  do	  not	  have	  the	  fixed,	  predictable,	  
scientifically	  verifiable	  identities	  that	  cultural	  prejudice	  and	  bureaucratic	  administration	  
have	  assigned	  them.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  chemical	  substances	  do	  not	  have	  distinctive	  properties,	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but	  that	  these	  properties	  can	  only	  emerge,	  and	  be	  studied,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  interaction	  
with	  infinitely	  more	  complex	  physical	  and	  social	  bodies.	  	  
Just	  as	  any	  drug	  war	  is	  really	  a	  war	  against	  certain	  people,	  drugs’	  effects	  are	  
inseparable	  from	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  they	  are	  used.	  “[E]ven	  the	  commonest	  
pharmaceuticals	  do	  not	  work	  autonomously”	  because	  of	  differences	  in	  individual	  
biochemistry	  and	  the	  power	  of	  the	  placebo	  effect.	  Even	  the	  ability	  of	  aspirin	  or	  Tylenol	  to	  
relieve	  pain	  is	  dependent	  on	  user	  construction	  and	  an	  “ongoing	  relationship”	  of	  expectation	  
between	  the	  user’s	  consciousness	  and	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  drug64.	  Alcohol,	  the	  most	  
ubiquitous	  recreational	  substance	  in	  the	  world,	  is	  an	  extremely	  protean	  drug	  capable	  of	  
causing	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  behavioral	  changes.	  Its	  modern,	  Western	  associations	  with	  social	  
disinhibition,	  anxiolysis,	  promiscuity,	  and	  even	  violence	  are	  cultural	  constructions,	  not	  
pharmacological	  actions:	  “Persons	  learn	  about	  drunkenness	  what	  their	  societies	  import	  to	  
them,	  and	  comporting	  themselves	  in	  consonance	  with	  these	  understandings,	  they	  become	  
living	  confirmations	  of	  their	  society’s	  teachings”65.	  Anthropological	  studies	  of	  isolated	  
cultures	  confirm	  that	  different	  social	  constructions	  of	  the	  drug	  can	  lead	  to	  vastly	  different	  
behavior;	  among	  the	  Camba	  of	  Bolivia,	  for	  example,	  where	  heavy,	  regular	  consumption	  of	  
high-­‐proof	  alcohol	  leads	  to	  “no	  social	  pathology	  –	  none.	  No	  arguments,	  no	  disputes,	  no	  
sexual	  aggression,	  no	  verbal	  aggression.	  There	  was	  pleasant	  conversation	  or	  silence…	  
Where	  norms	  and	  standards	  are	  clear	  and	  consistent,	  the	  drinker	  can	  become	  more	  rule-­‐
bound	  than	  his	  sober	  counterpart”66.	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There	  is	  little	  hope	  that	  neuroscientific	  techniques	  like	  receptor	  binding	  assays	  will	  
comfortably	  resolve	  these	  ambiguities	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  A	  massive	  gap	  lies	  between	  
confirming	  that,	  as	  suspected,	  a	  behavioral	  stimulant	  like	  cocaine	  or	  amphetamine	  has	  
dopaminergic	  activity	  in	  vivo,	  and	  predicting	  the	  behavioral	  effects	  of	  an	  unknown	  molecule	  
through	  empirical	  tests	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  live	  experiments	  or	  user	  feedback:	  
What	  is	  enormously	  difficult	  to	  comprehend	  is	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  
action	  of	  a	  drug	  on	  a	  simple	  neuron,	  which	  causes	  it	  either	  to	  fire	  or	  not	  to	  fire,	  and	  
the	  wide	  diversity	  of	  central	  nervous	  system	  effects,	  including	  subtle	  changes	  in	  
mood	  and	  behavior	  which	  that	  same	  drug	  will	  induce...At	  the	  molecular	  level,	  an	  
explanation	  of	  the	  action	  of	  a	  drug	  is	  often	  possible;	  at	  the	  cellular	  level,	  an	  
explanation	  is	  sometimes	  possible;	  but	  at	  the	  behavioral	  level,	  our	  ignorance	  is	  
abysmal.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  assume,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  drug	  that	  inhibits	  the	  
firing	  of	  a	  particular	  neuron	  will	  therefore	  produce	  a	  depressive	  state	  in	  an	  animal:	  
there	  may	  be	  dozens	  of	  unknown	  intermediary	  reactions	  involving	  transmitters	  and	  
modulators	  between	  the	  demonstration	  of	  the	  action	  of	  a	  drug	  on	  a	  neuronal	  system	  
and	  the	  ultimate	  effect	  on	  behavior67.	  
	  
Today’s	  science	  is	  still	  unable	  to	  predict	  the	  effects	  of	  drugs	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  sociological	  
studies,	  but	  the	  imprimatur	  of	  science	  and	  health	  authorities	  has	  been	  used	  to	  justify	  the	  
criminalization	  of	  drugs	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  -­‐	  even	  when	  
scientists	  and	  public	  health	  officials	  have	  been	  systematically	  excluded	  from	  the	  drug	  
policy-­‐making	  process.	  Drug	  policy	  is	  always	  social	  and	  always	  political,	  and	  any	  attempt	  to	  
reduce	  it	  to	  scientific	  or	  technocratic	  determination	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  project	  of	  
bureaucratic	  domination.	  
Modern	  pharmacological	  law	  rivals	  any	  corporate	  tax	  code	  in	  its	  loopholes	  for	  
insiders	  and	  its	  self-­‐contradictions.	  Worse,	  its	  tautologies	  have	  overflowed	  into	  social	  
thought	  and	  even	  language:	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Even	  the	  ordinary	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  “drug”	  is	  utterly	  ambiguous.	  While	  the	  
War	  on	  Drugs	  rages	  on,	  you	  can	  still	  drive	  past	  a	  mall	  and	  see	  a	  seven-­‐foot	  neon	  sign	  
reading	  DRUGS	  on	  the	  facade	  of	  a	  chain	  pharmacy.	  We	  assume	  that	  this	  is	  possible	  
because	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  drugs	  taken	  for	  medical	  purposes	  and	  
those	  taken	  for	  recreation,	  but	  this	  boundary	  too	  is	  far	  from	  rigid...	  
	   The	  unavoidable	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  is	  that	  a	  substance	  becomes	  a	  drug	  in	  the	  
pejorative	  sense	  when	  and	  only	  when	  a	  law	  interdicts	  it	  -­‐	  only	  when	  somebody	  
decrees	  that	  it	  is	  a	  drug,	  that	  it	  is	  another	  antithesis	  to	  sobriety.	  It	  becomes	  an	  
official	  medicament	  when	  its	  availability	  is	  restricted	  by	  prescription.	  Other	  
substances	  with	  psychoactive	  powers,	  such	  as	  sugar	  and	  many	  herbal	  remedies,	  are	  
for	  some	  reason	  unregulated,	  or	  classified	  as	  vitamins,	  minerals,	  or	  foods.	  This	  
dubious	  taxonomy	  was	  not	  accomplished	  in	  a	  single	  instant.	  It	  was	  the	  product	  of	  
many	  discrete	  legislative	  actions	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  As	  one	  substance	  after	  
another	  was	  interdicted	  or	  restricted,	  the	  operant	  definition	  of	  sobriety	  also	  
changed.	  And	  for	  each	  of	  these	  changes,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  find	  an	  ulterior	  motive”68	  
	  
THC,	  a	  Schedule	  1	  drug	  with	  “no	  recognized	  medical	  value”,	  has	  been	  synthesized	  and	  
patented	  as	  “drobabinol”	  -­‐	  available	  by	  prescription	  to	  cancer	  patients	  for	  nausea,	  at	  
hundreds	  of	  times	  the	  cost	  of	  extracted	  THC.	  Heroin,	  similarly	  Schedule	  1	  with	  “no	  
recognized	  medical	  value”,	  is	  prescribed	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  other	  advanced	  European	  medical	  
systems	  -­‐	  and	  in	  fact,	  as	  a	  prodrug	  whose	  “effects...are	  almost	  entirely	  due	  to	  morphine”,	  is	  
basically	  equivalent	  to	  drugs	  which	  are	  regularly	  used	  and	  prescribed	  in	  hospitals	  across	  
the	  country69.	  Perspectives	  from	  political	  economy	  are	  uniquely	  suited	  to	  untangling	  the	  
economic	  and	  political	  motives	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  norms	  and	  institutions	  of	  the	  
modern	  drug	  economy.	  Political	  economy’s	  focus	  on	  institutions	  and	  material	  actors	  can	  
help	  separate	  the	  “signal”	  of	  structural	  change	  in	  policy	  from	  the	  “noise”	  of	  cultural	  tropes	  
and	  assumptions,	  and	  it	  has	  long	  sought	  to	  clarify	  the	  process	  by	  which	  economic	  changes	  
or	  opportunities	  are	  translated	  into	  political	  imperatives	  and	  cultural	  narratives.	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Illicit	  drugs	  and	  drug	  users	  are	  banned	  and	  persecuted	  not	  because	  of	  their	  effects	  
on	  public	  health	  (which	  can	  be	  reduced	  better	  by	  other	  methods)	  or	  the	  threat	  they	  
represent	  to	  the	  nation-­‐state	  (which	  has	  always	  been	  dubious),	  but	  because	  particular	  
coalitions	  aligned	  at	  particular	  times:	  status	  groups	  threatened	  by	  economic	  and	  
demographic	  change,	  politicians	  who	  stand	  to	  gain	  political	  power	  by	  exacerbating	  class	  
and	  ethnic	  tensions,	  bureaucracies	  looking	  to	  expand	  their	  resources	  and	  jurisdiction,	  and	  
domestic	  producer	  groups	  threatened	  by	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  new	  product	  or	  distribution	  
scheme.	  In	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  countries	  dominated	  by	  these	  coalitions,	  the	  
otherwise	  convergent	  trend	  towards	  Harm	  Reduction	  in	  the	  industrialized	  countries	  has	  
been	  heavily	  contested	  or	  halted.	  
B.	  Fordism	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  drug	  regulation	  states	  
The	  development	  of	  drug	  regulation	  states	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  took	  
place	  within	  much	  larger	  political-­‐economic	  shifts	  that	  entailed	  drastically	  expanded	  
responsibilities	  for	  the	  state	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  an	  industrial	  economy	  and	  society.	  The	  
modernizing	  states	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  USA,	  mindful	  of	  the	  new	  potential	  for	  both	  
productivity	  and	  rebellion	  in	  the	  working	  class,	  sought	  to	  control	  behavior	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  
had	  previously	  been	  thought	  either	  tyrannical	  or	  impractical.	  
“The	  socialization	  of	  the	  worker	  to	  conditions	  of	  capitalist	  production	  entails	  the	  
social	  control	  of	  physical	  and	  mental	  powers	  on	  a	  very	  broad	  basis…[an]	  intricate	  
affair	  [that]	  entails,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  some	  mix	  of	  repression,	  habituation,	  co-­‐
optation	  and	  cooperation,	  all	  of	  which	  have	  to	  be	  organized	  not	  only	  within	  the	  
workplace	  but	  throughout	  society	  at	  large”70.	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Drug	  policy,	  in	  the	  beginning,	  was	  explicitly	  economic	  policy,	  designed	  to	  change	  
entrenched	  spending	  habits	  in	  order	  to	  make	  consumerism	  work.	  This	  was	  not	  a	  shadow	  
agenda	  but	  was	  foremost	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  key	  figures	  in	  the	  economy:	  “supported	  by	  
industrialists	  such	  as	  Henry	  Ford	  and	  Pierre	  du	  Pont...[p]rogressive	  reformers	  sought	  to	  
bring	  science,	  law,	  and	  moral	  authority	  to	  bear	  on	  social	  problems,	  including	  those	  
associated	  with	  drug	  use”71.	  Owners	  like	  Ford,	  whose	  name	  would	  become	  symbolic	  for	  
this	  entire	  period	  and	  model	  of	  capitalist	  production,	  
“meant	  to	  provide	  workers	  with	  sufficient	  income	  and	  leisure	  time	  to	  consume	  the	  
mass-­‐produced	  products	  the	  corporations	  were	  about	  to	  turn	  out...but	  this	  
presumed	  that	  workers	  knew	  how	  to	  spend	  their	  money	  properly...the	  ‘new	  man’	  of	  
mass	  production	  had	  [to	  have]	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  moral	  probity,	  family	  life,	  and	  
capacity	  for	  prudent	  (i.e.	  non-­‐alcoholic)	  and	  ‘rational’	  consumption	  to	  live	  up	  to	  
corporate	  needs	  and	  expectations”72.	  	  
	  
For	  many	  early	  reformers,	  drugs	  were	  a	  threat	  to	  industrialization	  itself,	  a	  self-­‐destructive	  
atavism	  that	  suggested	  a	  return	  to	  the	  savage	  and	  pre-­‐industrial,	  with	  all	  their	  foreign	  and	  
racial	  connotations.	  
In	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  reform	  process	  was	  already	  underway	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  
century,	  and	  reformers	  looking	  for	  the	  causes	  of	  crime,	  poverty,	  and	  unrest	  in	  the	  new	  
industrial	  cities	  quickly	  latched	  on	  to	  the	  highly	  visible	  alcoholic	  debauchery	  of	  the	  time:	  	  
“For	  Europeans	  and	  the	  British,	  drinking	  was	  a	  way	  of	  life	  essential	  in	  societies	  
where	  most	  water	  source	  was	  polluted.	  They	  brought	  this	  way	  of	  life	  with	  them	  to	  
the	  colonies...[and]	  alcohol	  was	  a	  staple	  of	  colonial	  life.	  Wine,	  and	  opium	  for	  that	  
matter,	  were	  also	  among	  the	  mainstays	  of	  colonial	  physicians	  and	  lay	  medical	  
practice”73.	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But	  a	  combined	  movement	  of	  middle-­‐class	  reformers,	  Protestant	  churches,	  and	  employers	  
sought	  to	  change	  what	  these	  social	  groups	  saw	  as	  the	  bad	  habits	  of	  the	  American	  working	  
class.	  	  Other	  factors	  were	  technological	  innovation	  and	  changing	  demographics:	  
“the	  efficiency	  and	  profitability	  of	  turning	  corn	  into	  whiskey,	  heavy	  frontier	  drinking,	  
the	  spread	  of	  urban	  saloons,	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  beer-­‐drinking	  Germans	  and	  whiskey-­‐
swilling	  Irish...The	  American	  Society	  for	  the	  Promotion	  of	  Temperance	  (ASPT),	  
founded	  by	  evangelical	  clergymen	  in	  1826,	  also	  gained	  support	  from	  farmers,	  
industrialists,	  and	  homemakers...Alcohol	  was	  seen	  as	  imperiling	  capitalist	  enterprise,	  
domestic	  tranquility,	  and	  national	  virtue.	  In	  the	  1850s,	  eleven	  states	  passed	  
prohibitory	  legislation,	  although	  most	  were	  soon	  repealed”74.	  	  
	  
Though	  alcohol	  would	  eventually	  be	  cleared	  of	  these	  slanders	  	  -­‐	  that	  it	  was	  anti-­‐capitalist,	  
made	  men	  prone	  to	  violence,	  encouraged	  sexual	  deviancy,	  and	  made	  the	  nation	  vulnerable	  
to	  foreign	  attack-­‐	  these	  same	  barely	  altered	  tropes	  have	  formed	  the	  backbone	  of	  almost	  
every	  drug	  prohibition	  campaign	  since.	  
Drug	  prohibition	  became	  a	  key	  part	  in	  the	  new	  urbanism	  and	  a	  cornerstone	  in	  the	  
modernization	  of	  American	  cities.	  	  Drug	  manufacturers	  and	  doctors	  were	  not	  in	  a	  good	  
political	  position	  to	  contest	  these	  moves	  –	  in	  the	  new	  climate	  of	  morality	  and	  civic	  high-­‐
mindedness,	  they	  were	  criticized	  for	  profiting	  from	  suffering	  by	  turning	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  
addiction	  in	  their	  patients	  or	  customers.	  “For	  the	  manufacturers	  and	  purveyors	  of	  
medicines	  -­‐	  physicians,	  pharmacists,	  and	  pharmaceutical	  manufacturers	  -­‐	  widespread	  drug	  
use	  contributed	  to	  a	  crisis	  of	  professional	  legitimacy”75.	  Campaigns	  moved	  simultaneously	  
against	  prostitution,	  gambling,	  alcohol,	  heroin,	  cocaine,	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  dancing.	  By	  1910	  
major	  American	  cities	  had	  closed	  their	  brothels	  and	  ended	  their	  unofficial	  tolerance	  of	  
gangs	  and	  vice	  districts.	  The	  move	  towards	  modernity	  was	  defined	  by	  the	  new	  ability	  of	  the	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city	  (backed	  up	  by	  the	  state)	  to	  regulate	  the	  urban	  vice	  market,	  and	  the	  substitution	  of	  
criminal	  sanctions	  for	  social	  condemnation.	  The	  unintentional	  result	  was	  uneven	  cultural	  
change,	  a	  "new	  pattern…in	  which	  some	  norms	  were	  liberalized	  while	  other	  behaviors	  were	  
more	  harshly	  condemned"76.	  Alcohol,	  tobacco,	  serial	  or	  casual	  heterosexuality,	  and	  
gambling	  were	  eventually	  liberalized	  and	  cleansed	  of	  their	  association	  with	  vice	  and	  the	  
underworld,	  but	  other	  behaviors	  became	  highly	  illegal	  and	  associated	  with	  extreme	  
deviancy,	  especially	  prostitution,	  opiate	  and	  cocaine	  use,	  and	  alternative	  sexualities.	  
	   During	  WWI,	  the	  interwar	  years,	  and	  WWII,	  the	  links	  between	  the	  American	  state	  
and	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  normativity	  and	  regulation,	  only	  
increased.	  The	  state	  during	  wartime	  depends	  on	  its	  domestic	  drugs	  industry	  to	  supply	  
medicines	  for	  the	  wounded,	  performance	  enhancers	  for	  specialists	  like	  airplane	  pilots,	  and	  
poisons	  &	  antitoxins	  for	  offensive	  or	  defensive	  chemical	  warfare.	  The	  onset	  of	  WWI	  quickly	  
made	  the	  Western	  Allies	  realize	  their	  deficiencies	  in	  chemical	  design	  and	  production;	  
“American	  dependence	  on	  German	  pharmaceuticals	  was	  starkly	  apparent”	  and	  “nearly	  all	  
the	  important	  drug	  discoveries	  of	  the	  preceding	  sixty	  years	  had	  been	  made	  in	  Germany”77.	  
Concerned	  about	  Germany’s	  early	  dominance	  in	  chemistry	  and	  drug	  production,	  the	  
American	  state	  worked	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  burgeoning	  domestic	  industry	  to	  create	  
German-­‐style	  funding,	  research,	  and	  production	  networks	  in	  the	  US.	  American	  dominance	  
was	  cemented	  in	  this	  sector	  through	  government	  weapons	  research	  and	  adaptation	  of	  
German	  industrial	  methods:	  while	  “few	  American	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  before	  World	  War	  I	  
extended	  their	  scientific	  efforts	  beyond…quality-­‐control	  tasks”,	  the	  “U.S.	  Army	  Chemical	  
Warfare	  Service	  provided	  an	  American	  precedent	  for	  tightly	  organized	  cooperative	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research	  to	  identify	  useful	  compounds	  and	  produce	  them	  in	  large	  quantities”	  and	  together	  
with	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  research-­‐oriented	  firms,	  “sought	  to	  transplant	  the	  German	  
research	  tradition	  to	  American	  soil”78.	  The	  World	  Wars,	  and	  the	  new	  links	  they	  forged	  
between	  national	  defense,	  the	  medical	  profession,	  and	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	  were	  a	  
crucial	  period	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state.	  Industry	  leaders	  and	  the	  
American	  Medical	  Association,	  eager	  to	  escape	  the	  taint	  of	  their	  “long	  historical	  association	  
with	  unscrupulous	  manufacturers	  of	  nostrums”,	  welcomed	  the	  legitimacy	  brought	  by	  
increasing	  federal	  interest	  and	  regulation79.	  
After	  WWII,	  the	  US	  worked	  to	  spread	  both	  its	  economic	  and	  drug	  policy	  institutions	  
throughout	  its	  new	  global	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  “The	  international	  spread	  of	  Fordism	  
occurred…within	  a	  particular	  frame	  of	  international	  political-­‐economic	  regulation	  and	  a	  
geopolitical	  configuration	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  dominated	  through	  a	  very	  distinctive	  
system	  of	  military	  alliances	  and	  power	  relations”80.	  The	  synthesized	  products	  of	  the	  new	  
pharmaceutical	  revolution	  were	  celebrated	  and	  distributed	  worldwide,	  while	  plant-­‐based	  
and	  extracted	  drugs	  associated	  with	  traditional	  medicine,	  foreigners,	  and	  racial	  minorities	  
were	  suppressed	  like	  never	  before.	  By	  the	  1950s,	  the	  links	  between	  the	  state,	  Fordism,	  and	  
social	  normativity	  seemed	  ironclad:	  
“The	  decisions	  of	  corporations	  became	  hegemonic	  in	  defining	  the	  paths	  of	  mass	  
consumption	  growth,	  presuming,	  of	  course,	  that	  the	  other	  two	  partners	  in	  the	  grand	  
coalition	  [labor	  and	  the	  state]	  did	  whatever	  was	  necessary	  to	  keep	  effective	  demand	  
at	  levels	  sufficient	  to	  absorb	  the	  steady	  growth	  of	  capitalist	  output”81.	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But	  the	  nascent	  civil	  rights	  movement	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  soon	  revealed	  serious	  
cracks	  in	  the	  new	  American	  hegemony	  and	  the	  supposed	  cultural	  consensus	  of	  the	  1950s.	  
New	  patterns	  of	  drug	  use	  became	  indelibly	  associated,	  amongst	  both	  the	  authorities	  and	  
young	  drug	  users,	  with	  a	  particular	  political	  experience	  and	  a	  new,	  critical	  attitude	  towards	  
authority.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Fordist	  period,	  the	  drug	  normativity	  that	  had	  helped	  reinforce	  
consumerism	  and	  suppress	  dissent	  against	  the	  dominant	  economic	  order	  had	  deteriorated.	  
The	  true	  importance	  of	  this	  normativity	  for	  Fordism’s	  growth	  dynamics	  is	  difficult	  to	  assess,	  
but	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  new	  moral	  conservatism	  of	  the	  ‘70s	  and	  ‘80s,	  drug	  use	  and	  other	  
deviancies	  were	  the	  root	  source	  of	  both	  economic	  stagnation	  and	  cultural	  fragmentation.	  	  
The	  reappearance	  of	  social	  normativity	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  not	  a	  spontaneous	  
cultural	  shift.	  The	  resurgent	  conservative	  movement	  in	  the	  late	  ‘70s	  and	  ‘80s	  engineered	  it,	  
and	  understood	  it	  as	  the	  social	  cornerstone	  for	  the	  drastic	  changes	  they	  sought	  to	  make	  to	  
Western	  economies.	  
C.	  Post-­‐Fordism:	  revolt	  and	  restoration	  
The	  Post-­‐Fordist	  economic	  shift	  produced	  two	  very	  divergent	  trends	  in	  the	  political	  
economy	  of	  psychoactive	  drugs.	  The	  first	  trend	  was	  one	  of	  liberalization	  and	  the	  diffusion	  
of	  technology:	  increasing	  availability,	  access	  to,	  and	  use	  of	  a	  wider	  variety	  of	  drugs	  than	  
ever	  before,	  vastly	  improved	  techniques	  for	  drug	  research	  and	  production,	  and	  the	  
acceptance	  of	  many	  psychoactive	  pharmaceuticals	  as	  part	  of	  normal,	  domestic	  American	  
life.	  Prominent	  members	  of	  both	  the	  dominant	  culture	  and	  the	  later	  counterculture	  
envisioned	  a	  future	  of	  “better	  living	  through	  chemistry”	  where	  new	  drugs	  would	  solve	  not	  
only	  hosts	  of	  medical	  complaints	  and	  illnesses,	  but	  even	  deep	  personal,	  social,	  and	  political	  
problems.	  But	  the	  second	  trend,	  which	  would	  prove	  dominant	  in	  the	  end,	  was	  one	  of	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increasing	  risk,	  fear,	  and	  control.	  The	  Thalidomide	  scandal	  ended	  the	  honeymoon	  period	  
between	  the	  American	  government	  and	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry.	  The	  adoption	  of	  
marijuana	  and	  the	  psychedelics	  by	  the	  anti-­‐war	  counterculture	  led	  states	  to	  associate	  
alternative	  drug	  use	  with	  new	  forms	  of	  resistance	  and	  radicalism.	  Many	  Western	  states,	  led	  
by	  the	  US,	  increasingly	  saw	  uncontrolled	  drug	  use	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  public	  order	  and	  authority,	  
and	  launched	  intentionally	  harsh	  and	  repressive	  campaigns	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  a	  normative	  
authority	  that	  new	  leaders	  believed	  had	  been	  lost	  during	  the	  1960s.	  
Several	  incidents	  early	  in	  the	  1960s	  led	  to	  government	  mistrust	  of	  the	  
pharmaceutical	  industry	  and	  new	  institutional	  attitudes	  towards	  drug	  regulation,	  
emphasizing	  caution	  and	  restriction	  over	  innovation.	  Thalidomide,	  a	  sedative	  that	  caused	  
nerve	  damage	  and	  severe	  birth	  defects	  in	  Europe,	  was	  never	  approved	  in	  the	  US	  because	  of	  
a	  single	  stubborn	  regulator	  named	  Frances	  Kelsey.	  The	  Merrell	  Corporation	  had	  been	  
aggressively	  pushing	  for	  access	  to	  the	  American	  market	  and	  tried	  to	  get	  her	  fired	  when	  she	  
questioned	  studies	  the	  company	  submitted	  to	  the	  FDA	  in	  196282.	  When	  the	  damage	  became	  
world	  news	  later	  that	  year,	  the	  American	  medical	  establishment’s	  prior	  concern	  that	  “new	  
medicines	  were	  reaching	  European	  patients	  earlier	  than	  Americans”	  understandably	  faded	  
into	  the	  background83.	  	  
“Reports	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  tragedy	  in	  Europe	  soon	  aligned	  support	  behind	  an	  
increase	  in	  the	  FDA’s	  regulatory	  authority	  over	  drug	  testing…[and]	  the	  agency	  tilted	  
heavily	  toward	  precaution	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s”84.	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Scrutiny	  of	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  only	  increased	  after	  Sandoz’s	  investigational	  
compound	  LSD-­‐25	  became	  the	  unofficial	  sacrament	  of	  the	  California	  counterculture	  and	  the	  
most	  popular	  psychedelic	  drug	  in	  history85.	  The	  end	  result	  was	  that	  during	  the	  same	  time	  
that	  technological	  innovation	  was	  unleashing	  an	  explosion	  of	  new	  compounds,	  the	  
regulatory	  climate	  was	  one	  of	  suspicion	  and	  extreme	  caution.	  Drug	  makers’	  fears	  of	  
government	  and	  media	  attention	  increasingly	  led	  them	  to	  shy	  away	  from	  advocating	  for	  or	  
investigating	  controversial	  substances	  like	  psychedelics	  (Sandoz	  abandoned	  LSD	  
production	  in	  1965	  and	  changed	  its	  company	  name	  to	  Novartis)86.	  Regulators’	  total	  
rejection	  of	  many	  promising	  substances	  during	  this	  period,	  and	  the	  conservatism	  it	  
fostered	  in	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	  helped	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  Drug	  War	  
offensives	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  1980s.	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  these	  revelations	  were	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  social	  benefits	  
of	  the	  alliance	  between	  medicine,	  the	  state,	  and	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	  cultural	  
changes	  and	  technological	  innovation	  were	  profoundly	  changing	  drug	  use	  patterns	  in	  the	  
United	  States.	  Previous	  illicit	  drug	  user	  populations	  had	  mostly	  existed	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  
American	  society,	  either	  as	  members	  of	  racial	  minorities,	  the	  urban	  working	  class,	  or	  both;	  
having	  little	  hope	  of	  voice	  or	  acceptance	  in	  the	  larger	  culture,	  they	  had	  to	  accept	  their	  
stigmatization,	  though	  many	  “developed	  self-­‐justifying	  ideologies”87.	  But	  during	  the	  1960s,	  
“an	  explosion	  of	  drug	  use	  by	  middle-­‐class	  youth”	  meant	  that	  drug	  users	  –	  especially	  of	  
marijuana	  and	  psychedelics	  -­‐	  were	  increasingly	  white,	  educated,	  middle-­‐class,	  and	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politically	  motivated88.	  These	  new	  drug	  users	  had	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  privilege	  to	  
publicly	  demand	  changes	  in	  drug	  policy,	  and	  to	  contest	  the	  stigmatization	  that	  the	  state	  
imposed	  upon	  them	  with	  the	  labels	  of	  “user”	  and	  “addict”.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  “the	  counter-­‐
cultural	  critiques	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  1960s…paralleled	  movements	  of	  the	  excluded	  
minorities	  and	  the	  critique	  of	  depersonalized	  bureaucratic	  rationality”89.	  The	  biggest	  
changes	  that	  came	  about	  were	  the	  creation	  of	  treatment	  networks	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  
stigma	  surrounding	  drug	  use	  and	  addiction:	  
“As	  drug	  use	  spilled	  out	  of	  isolated	  and	  marginalized	  groups	  into	  more	  mainstream	  
sectors	  of	  American	  society,	  addiction	  was	  redefined	  in	  less	  stigmatizing	  terms.	  A	  
broadening	  menu	  of	  available	  psychoactives…contributed	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
generic	  concept	  of	  dependence	  that	  could	  embrace	  not	  only	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  drugs,	  
but	  also	  compulsive	  behaviors	  such	  as	  gambling.	  The	  introduction	  of	  methadone	  
maintenance	  treatment	  in	  1964	  signaled…the	  beginning	  of	  an	  expansion	  of	  
treatment	  methods	  and	  access	  to	  treatment…A	  grassroots	  movement	  of	  free	  clinics,	  
most	  famously	  the	  Haight	  Ashbury	  Free	  Clinic	  in	  San	  Franscisco,	  began	  in	  the	  late	  
1960s	  to	  meet	  the	  medical	  needs	  of	  young	  people	  who	  had	  cut	  themselves	  adrift	  
from	  families	  and	  mainstream	  institutions;	  in	  this	  clinical	  setting,	  a	  new	  set	  of	  
encounters	  between	  clinicians	  and	  drug	  users	  produced	  a	  new	  definition	  of	  
addiction”90	  
	  
Many	  of	  the	  interventions	  developed	  informally	  by	  the	  counterculture	  during	  this	  time	  
were	  resurrected	  during	  the	  AIDS	  crisis	  and	  continue	  to	  underpin	  Harm	  Reduction	  policies	  
today.	  But	  the	  federal	  commitment	  to	  improving	  treatment	  proved	  short-­‐lived,	  and	  any	  
hopes	  of	  adopting	  Harm	  Reduction	  policies	  nationwide	  were	  dashed	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  new	  
moral	  conservatism.	  
	   Neoliberal	  conservatives	  rose	  to	  power	  by	  focusing	  political	  and	  media	  attention	  on	  
the	  least	  appealing,	  most	  threatening	  elements	  of	  the	  new	  liberality.	  Tolerance	  for	  drugs	  in	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America	  peaked	  under	  the	  Jimmy	  Carter’s	  administration,	  and	  he	  personally	  advocated	  
national	  decriminalization	  of	  up	  to	  an	  ounce	  of	  marijuana91.	  But	  this	  was	  to	  change	  quickly	  
as	  “the	  height	  of	  the	  decriminalization	  movement	  in	  1977-­‐78	  coincided	  with	  a	  growing	  
conservative	  reaction	  against	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  decadent	  legacy	  of	  the	  radical	  1960s	  –	  
in	  matters	  of	  sexuality	  and	  personal	  behavior	  as	  much	  as	  in	  drug	  abuse”92.	  The	  New	  Right	  
breathed	  new	  life	  into	  stereotypes	  of	  the	  drug	  user	  as	  a	  freakish,	  often	  violent	  Other	  by	  
focusing	  on	  unfamiliar	  synthetic	  drugs	  and	  formerly	  unspeakable	  sexual	  deviancies:	  
“during	  1977,	  morality	  campaigners	  won	  significant	  victories	  by	  focusing	  on	  aspects	  
of	  the	  new	  permissiveness	  to	  mobilize	  mass	  constituencies.	  A	  movement	  against	  
child	  pornography	  was	  the	  first	  strategy	  in	  several	  decades	  that	  succeeded	  in	  
reversing	  public	  tolerance	  of	  sexually	  explicit	  materials.	  Closely	  related	  to	  the	  child	  
pornography	  issue	  was	  an	  official	  campaign	  to	  suppress	  pedophilia	  and	  child	  
molestation,	  a	  theme	  used	  indirectly	  to	  stigmatize	  homosexuals	  and	  gay	  rights	  laws.	  
A	  new	  politics	  of	  morality	  became	  apparent…[t]his	  conservative	  mood	  provided	  the	  
context	  for	  the	  official	  severity	  towards	  methamphetamine	  and	  the	  even	  harsher	  
attitude	  towards	  PCP.	  Though	  public	  tolerance	  towards	  drug	  abuse	  did	  not	  suddenly	  
in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  synthetics	  did	  succeed	  in	  creating	  a	  plausible	  
anti-­‐drug	  rhetoric	  with	  wide	  social	  appeal.	  Like	  child	  pornography,	  PCP	  and	  
methamphetamine	  seemed	  literally	  indefensible…”93.	  
	  
The	  new	  morality	  campaigners	  also	  resurrected	  old	  class	  and	  racial	  anxieties	  about	  drug	  
use,	  which	  had	  new	  political	  salience	  in	  an	  era	  where	  scenes	  of	  mass	  unemployment	  and	  
urban	  unrest,	  exacerbated	  my	  monetarist	  policies,	  came	  to	  dominate	  white	  America’s	  
perception	  of	  the	  urban	  environment:	  
“In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  by	  far	  the	  most	  intense	  publicity	  concerning	  the	  damage	  done	  by	  
illicit	  drugs	  focused	  on	  PCP…This	  drug	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  one’s	  humanity	  could	  
apparently	  be	  destroyed	  by	  drugs,	  leaving	  a	  savage	  and	  primitive	  monster,	  and	  
racial	  rhetoric	  implied	  that	  such	  atavistic	  reversion	  was	  especially	  likely	  for	  Afircan	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Americans…Throughout,	  the	  paramount	  danger	  was	  that	  savage	  “jungle”	  habits	  
would	  be	  transmitted	  to	  the	  young	  white	  middle	  class”94	  
	  
This	  rhetoric,	  and	  the	  policy	  it	  influenced,	  was	  about	  much	  more	  than	  just	  
resurrecting	  old	  prejudices	  and	  turning	  back	  the	  clock	  on	  social	  equality.	  The	  new	  
monetarist	  governments	  intended	  to	  profoundly	  reshape	  the	  economy,	  and	  the	  new	  
morality	  provided	  the	  necessary	  basis	  of	  authority	  for	  divisive	  economic	  policies.	  	  In	  
Britain,	  for	  example,	  the	  Thatcher	  government’s	  “social	  market	  doctrine	  [sought]	  to	  dispose	  
of	  unemployment	  as	  a	  matter	  for	  political	  concern	  or	  government	  intervention,	  by	  putting	  
the	  blame	  for	  unemployment	  on	  the	  failure	  of	  individuals…to	  adapt	  themselves	  to	  the	  
requirements	  of	  the	  market”95.	  The	  New	  Right	  associated	  social	  normativity	  and	  capitalist	  
productivity,	  asserting	  that	  the	  decline	  of	  morality	  and	  respect	  for	  authority	  was	  the	  direct	  
cause	  of	  economic	  decline	  and	  the	  growth	  in	  political	  radicalism	  and	  dissent.	  In	  return	  for	  
diminished	  liberties,	  they	  promised	  “a	  renaissance	  of	  liberty	  and	  the	  liberal	  society,	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  new	  national	  consensus	  by	  which	  the	  chains	  of	  collectivism	  [would]	  be	  thrown	  
off,	  the	  trends	  of	  the	  past	  thirty	  years	  reversed,	  and…national	  and	  economic	  fortunes	  
revived”96.	  These	  governments	  constructed	  the	  Drug	  War	  type	  to	  enlist	  law	  enforcement	  in	  
the	  suppression	  of	  working	  class	  opposition	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  massive	  
unemployment	  resulting	  from	  monetarist	  policy.	  A	  newly	  harsh,	  fearful	  public	  morality	  and	  
hugely	  expanded	  discretion	  for	  law	  enforcement	  would	  help	  prevent	  the	  development	  of	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widespread	  social	  protest	  by	  liberal	  professionals	  or	  “the	  main	  obstacle	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  
the	  social	  market	  economy	  –	  the	  organized	  working	  class”97.	  
D.	  Relationship	  with	  industry	  and	  medicine	  
The	  first	  drug	  regulation	  states	  arose	  alongside	  domestic	  pharmaceutical	  industries	  
and	  medical	  establishments,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  relationships	  is	  undoubtedly	  
fundamental	  to	  the	  drug	  state’s	  functioning	  but	  too	  complex	  for	  easy	  generalizations	  
regarding	  each	  type.	  There	  are	  powerful	  incentives	  for	  industry,	  the	  state,	  and	  medicine	  to	  
cooperate	  in	  governing	  the	  drugs	  economy,	  but	  has	  at	  times	  sought	  power	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
the	  others.	  The	  era	  of	  aggressive	  drug	  prohibition	  in	  the	  United	  States	  began	  with	  such	  a	  
power	  grab.	  In	  1919,	  the	  Treasury	  Department	  began	  criminally	  prosecuting	  physicians	  
who	  practiced	  opioid	  harm	  reduction	  (maintenance	  and	  substitution)	  and	  clinics	  that	  had	  
arisen	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  1914	  Harrison	  Act,	  which	  limited	  the	  use	  of	  opioids	  to	  the	  medical	  
professions98.	  While	  some	  American	  physicians	  had	  sought	  government	  help	  in	  limiting	  
their	  responsibility	  for	  opiate	  addiction,	  they	  had	  not	  intended	  to	  cede	  control	  of	  
prescription	  practices	  to	  the	  federal	  bureaucracy.	  But	  hamstrung	  by	  the	  “deeply	  
problematic	  nature	  of	  opiates	  for	  physicians”	  (who	  were	  often	  blamed	  for	  opioid	  addiction	  
in	  their	  patients),	  “physicians	  and	  pharmacists...reacted	  with	  fear”99.	  Many	  addicts	  “initially	  
sought	  help	  from	  physicians”	  when	  the	  Harrison	  Act	  interrupted	  their	  formerly	  legal	  
supplies	  of	  drugs,	  which	  “could	  have	  meant	  proper	  medical	  treatment	  for	  thousands	  of	  
addicts	  who	  had	  not	  sought	  help	  before”100.	  The	  aggressive	  intervention	  of	  the	  Treasury	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Department’s	  narcotics	  division	  established	  bureaucratic	  dominance	  over	  the	  medical	  
profession	  in	  one	  stroke,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  Harm	  Reduction	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  
dealt	  an	  early	  blow	  “with	  the	  sanction	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  (AMA),	  [which]	  
came	  to	  favor	  strict	  enforcement	  of	  the	  Harrison	  Act”101.	  Early	  experiences	  with	  prohibition	  
gave	  powerful	  advantages	  to	  bureaucrats	  in	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  medical	  profession,	  
and	  in	  countries	  with	  a	  long	  history	  of	  aggressive	  prohibition	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  
bureaucracy	  (and	  Drug	  War	  by	  extension)	  over	  the	  Harm	  Reduction	  priorities	  of	  the	  
medical	  establishment	  is	  almost	  assured.	  
It	  is	  a	  mistake,	  sadly	  common	  in	  popular	  opinion	  and	  culture,	  to	  assert	  an	  
uncomplicated	  relationship	  between	  “Big	  Pharma”	  and	  the	  state,	  and	  thus	  to	  suggest	  that	  
all	  drugs	  policy	  is	  essentially	  an	  industry	  conspiracy	  against	  the	  public102.	  The	  first	  
important	  point	  is	  that	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  is	  not	  a	  monolith	  with	  a	  unified	  voice	  
or	  set	  of	  interests,	  which	  vary	  widely	  based	  on	  firm	  size,	  nationality,	  and	  market	  strategy.	  
Second,	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  have	  at	  times	  fiercely	  contested	  the	  increasing	  heavy	  
regulation	  of	  their	  products	  and	  distribution	  networks	  by	  the	  DEA,	  though	  this	  has	  been	  on	  
a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  rather	  than	  a	  systematic	  basis.	  The	  Drug	  Abuse	  Control	  Act	  of	  1965,which	  
made	  many	  common	  pharmaceuticals	  prescription-­‐only,	  was	  “bitterly	  opposed	  by	  the	  
pharmaceutical	  industry”103Many	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  would	  plausibly	  benefit	  from	  
looser	  regulation,	  especially	  those	  with	  research	  interests	  in	  the	  cannabinoid	  and	  
psychedelic	  fields.	  The	  interests	  of	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  the	  state	  are	  not	  
pre-­‐determined	  or	  solely	  geared	  towards	  naked	  economic	  gain,	  but	  evolve	  through	  years	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and	  decades	  of	  institutional	  and	  cultural	  routine.	  Firms	  operating	  in	  the	  drugs	  economy	  
today,	  depending	  on	  the	  types	  of	  products	  and	  services	  they	  wish	  to	  offer,	  occupy	  one	  of	  
three	  groups	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state.	  Only	  one	  of	  the	  types	  is	  an	  
unambiguous	  supporter	  of	  Drug	  War	  policies	  in	  almost	  every	  instance.	  The	  vulnerabilities	  
of	  the	  other	  positions,	  and	  especially	  the	  degrees	  of	  dependence	  on	  maintaining	  a	  working	  
relationship	  with	  the	  bureaucracy,	  help	  explain	  why	  industry	  has	  not	  sought	  to	  
substantially	  contest	  the	  strictures	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  and	  has	  in	  most	  cases	  been	  
a	  willing	  participant	  in	  drug	  prohibition.	  
1.	  New	  Entrants	  and	  Reformers	  
The	  first	  group	  is	  composed	  of	  firms	  whose	  desired	  market	  strategy	  is	  blocked	  by	  
the	  actions	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state,	  and	  so	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  some	  degree	  
liberalization	  and	  reform.	  One	  example	  would	  be	  GW	  Pharmaceuticals,	  whose	  “oral	  
marijuana	  spray,	  Sativex,	  is	  a	  patented	  standardized	  dose	  of	  natural	  cannabis	  extracts”,	  but	  
continues	  to	  face	  massive	  regulatory	  hurdles	  because	  of	  the	  blanket	  prohibition	  on	  
cannabinoids104.	  As	  will	  be	  detailed	  later	  in	  the	  cannabinoid	  and	  psychedelic	  sections,	  the	  
heavy	  restrictions	  on	  research	  into	  these	  compounds	  were	  probably	  designed	  to	  prevent	  
these	  economic	  interests	  from	  ever	  materializing.	  They	  also	  had	  a	  decades-­‐long	  dampening	  
influence	  on	  research	  which	  only	  started	  to	  fade	  in	  the	  mid-­‐90s,	  and	  which	  stained	  all	  those	  
working	  in	  the	  field	  with	  social	  illegitimacy:	  	  
“human	  research	  with	  hallucinogens	  has,	  until	  now,	  vanished	  from	  the	  scene…A	  
source	  of	  embarrassment	  and	  shame,	  hallucinogen	  research	  became	  a	  non-­‐issue,	  
virtually	  disappearing	  from	  the	  professional	  literature	  and	  educational	  curriculums.	  
By	  the	  early	  1970s,	  psychiatric	  researchers	  and	  academicians	  had	  perceived	  that	  to	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continue	  to	  advocate	  for	  human	  research	  with	  hallucinogens,	  or	  to	  even	  be	  
identified	  with	  past	  interest	  in	  their	  therapeutic	  potential,	  might	  seriously	  
jeopardize	  their	  future	  careers…For	  those	  who	  would	  maintain	  their	  enthusiasm	  for	  
the	  potentials	  of	  these	  singular	  substances,	  a	  path	  of	  professional	  marginalization	  
would	  follow.	  For	  those	  who	  would	  take	  a	  stand	  against	  their	  perfidious	  threat,	  
accolades	  and	  professional	  advancement	  would	  be	  forthcoming”105	  
	  
The	  substantial	  obstacles	  to	  any	  human	  research	  with	  these	  drugs	  and	  the	  social	  stigma	  
surrounding	  their	  use	  in	  any	  context	  led	  major	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  to	  stay	  far	  away	  from	  
any	  compound	  that	  showed	  even	  a	  hint	  of	  psychedelic	  activity.	  	  
Aside	  from	  their	  suppression	  by	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state,	  however,	  psychedelic	  
drugs	  seem	  poorly	  designed	  to	  become	  the	  blockbuster	  commercial	  products	  that	  large	  
pharmaceutical	  firms	  focus	  and	  depend	  on.	  Many	  of	  the	  most	  culturally	  popular	  
psychedelics	  are	  plants	  or	  fungi	  with	  long	  histories	  of	  human	  use;	  they	  cannot	  be	  patented,	  
and	  if	  legalized,	  could	  be	  grown	  by	  consumers	  rather	  than	  purchased.	  There	  is	  little	  to	  no	  
evidence	  that	  the	  “classical”	  psychedelics	  have	  addictive	  qualities,	  or	  that	  synthetic	  
variations	  produce	  substantially	  improved	  efficacy;	  and	  unlike	  all	  the	  best-­‐selling	  
pharmaceuticals,	  they	  work	  best	  with	  infrequent	  use	  rather	  than	  daily	  dosing:	  	  
“Relatively	  few	  studies	  used	  LSD	  as	  a	  “psychopharmacotherapeutic”	  agent	  in	  
humans,	  i.e.	  daily	  dosing	  regimes…the	  psychedelic	  approach,	  favored	  by	  North	  
American	  researchers,	  involved	  administration	  of	  a	  single,	  or	  at	  most	  a	  small	  
number	  of,	  high	  dose	  (300	  to	  1500	  mcg)	  LSD	  session(s)	  after	  a	  relatively	  short	  
course	  of	  psychotherapy”106	  
	  
Worldwide,	  this	  group	  continues	  to	  be	  weak,	  and	  is	  mainly	  the	  province	  of	  small	  
firms,	  non-­‐profits	  like	  the	  MAPS	  (Multi-­‐Disciplinary	  Association	  for	  Psychedelic	  Studies),	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university	  researchers,	  and	  of	  course,	  gray	  and	  black	  market	  chemists.	  Psychedelic	  
research	  has	  enjoyed	  a	  renaissance,	  especially	  in	  the	  past	  decade;	  “the	  bitter	  and	  
acrimonious	  debate	  that	  raged	  through	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  and	  into	  the	  1980s	  has	  
subsided”	  in	  the	  FDA	  if	  not	  the	  DEA	  or	  the	  ONDCP,	  as	  “scientific	  and	  health	  policy	  makers	  
have	  determined	  that	  these	  drugs,	  although	  possessing	  an	  inherent	  abuse	  potential,	  do	  
have	  a	  safety	  profile	  of	  acceptable	  magnitude	  when	  compared	  to	  drugs	  currently	  the	  
subject	  of	  formal	  research	  investigation	  as	  well	  as	  others	  actively	  dispensed	  in	  clinical	  
practice”107.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  bureaucratic	  obstacles	  to	  any	  of	  these	  drugs	  reaching	  even	  a	  
restricted	  medical	  market	  are	  immense.	  Virtually	  all	  drugs	  approved	  by	  the	  FDA	  today	  are	  
“fast-­‐tracked”	  (a	  process	  which	  still	  takes	  years)	  through	  a	  process	  adopted	  under	  industry	  
pressure	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  but	  universities	  and	  nonprofits	  do	  not	  have	  the	  millions	  of	  
dollars	  upfront	  required	  to	  access	  this	  inside	  track:	  
“The	  FDA	  was	  notoriously	  slow	  about	  approving	  new	  drugs	  until	  the	  industry	  
agreed	  in	  1992	  to	  pay	  large	  (six-­‐figure)	  user	  fees	  to	  expedite	  the	  process.	  By	  1997,	  






2.	  The	  Neutral	  Sector	  
The	  second	  group	  is	  undoubtedly	  the	  largest	  and	  contains	  most	  of	  the	  largest	  
pharmaceutical	  corporations	  that	  are	  mostly	  neutral	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state.	  
They	  produce	  or	  sell	  products	  that	  are	  either	  largely	  uncontroversial	  and	  unregulated	  or	  
controversial	  products	  that	  are	  nonetheless	  recognized	  as	  socially	  necessary.	  Unlike	  the	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small-­‐scale	  non-­‐profits	  and	  researchers	  in	  group	  1,	  most	  of	  the	  firms	  in	  group	  2	  are	  for-­‐
profit	  corporations	  with	  products	  in	  the	  mainstream	  consumer	  or	  medical	  markets.	  
Because	  of	  this,	  group	  2	  has	  greater	  financial	  and	  political	  resources	  than	  group	  1,	  and	  a	  
much	  greater	  ability	  to	  defend	  its	  product	  markets	  from	  state	  intervention.	  In	  2012,	  when	  
the	  DEA	  spearheaded	  an	  effort	  to	  place	  controls	  on	  hydrocodone	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  place	  
for	  more	  powerful	  opioids,	  a	  strong	  drug	  industry	  reaction	  motivated	  Congress	  to	  reject	  the	  
measures109.	  These	  companies	  might,	  at	  times,	  prefer	  a	  looser	  regulatory	  regime,	  and	  their	  
relationship	  with	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  is	  sometimes	  adversarial.	  Nonetheless,	  they	  do	  
not	  support	  publicly	  support	  reform	  or	  liberalization	  in	  the	  drug	  policy	  arena,	  either	  
because	  they	  perceive	  the	  opportunity	  costs	  to	  be	  excessively	  high	  or	  because	  they	  view	  
the	  drug	  regulation	  state’s	  restrictions	  as	  a	  worthwhile	  trade-­‐off	  for	  the	  benefits	  it	  can	  
deliver.	  	  
The	  opportunity	  cost	  is	  the	  enmity	  of	  a	  government	  bureaucracy	  that	  has	  
extraordinary	  power	  to	  allocate	  market	  rights	  and	  in	  the	  course	  of	  doing	  so	  can	  easily	  
decide	  the	  future	  of	  a	  product	  and	  sometimes	  an	  entire	  firm.	  Firms	  at	  every	  single	  stage	  of	  
the	  production	  chain	  for	  Scheduled	  substances	  depend	  on	  a	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  
DEA:	  
Enacted	  in	  1970,	  the	  CSA	  establishes	  a	  statutory	  framework	  through	  which	  the	  
federal	  government	  regulates	  the	  lawful	  production,	  possession,	  and	  distribution	  of	  
controlled	  substances.	  Further,	  the	  act	  requires	  persons	  who	  handle	  controlled	  
substances	  or	  listed	  chemicals	  (such	  as	  drug	  manufacturers,	  wholesale	  distributors,	  
doctors,	  hospitals,	  pharmacies,	  and	  scientific	  researchers)	  to	  register	  with	  the	  Drug	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Enforcement	  Administration	  (DEA)	  in	  DOJ,	  which	  administers	  and	  enforces	  the	  
CSA110.	  
	  
An	  effort	  to	  change	  drug	  laws,	  always	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  by	  the	  DEA,	  could	  invoke	  enhanced	  
scrutiny	  in	  retaliation.	  The	  DEA	  showed,	  when	  it	  moved	  to	  quash	  the	  (flagrantly	  abusive)	  
Florida	  painkillers	  market	  in	  the	  late	  2000s,	  that	  it	  is	  willing	  and	  able	  stop	  the	  dispensing	  of	  
Scheduled	  substances	  from	  pharmacies	  over	  a	  wide	  jurisdiction	  and	  tussle	  with	  national	  
pharmacy	  chains111.	  Any	  company	  seeking	  to	  change	  drug	  laws	  to	  sell	  a	  new	  product	  is	  
more	  likely	  to	  be	  portrayed	  by	  the	  media	  as	  a	  callous	  and	  greedy	  pusher	  than	  a	  libertarian	  
champion	  of	  individual	  freedom.	  Finally,	  the	  trend	  for	  decades	  has	  been	  towards	  greater	  
restriction,	  and	  few	  firms	  are	  daring	  enough	  to	  put	  their	  own	  resources	  into	  fighting	  a	  
seemingly	  inexorable	  global	  political	  project.	   	  
The	  largest	  firms	  also	  receive	  indirect	  benefits	  from	  a	  harsh	  regulatory	  environment,	  
and	  they	  may	  be	  loath	  to	  give	  up	  these	  structural	  advantages.	  Quite	  simply,	  drug	  
prohibition	  drives	  monopolization,	  on	  both	  the	  legal	  and	  illegal	  sides	  of	  the	  drug	  business,	  
because	  political	  access	  becomes	  just	  as	  (if	  not	  more)	  important	  than	  product	  quality	  or	  
market	  acumen.	  Drug	  testing	  and	  approval	  now	  requires	  a	  very	  large	  amount	  of	  money	  and	  
a	  working	  relationship	  with	  the	  FDA,	  a	  huge	  barrier	  of	  entry	  for	  any	  new	  firm	  
contemplating	  entering	  the	  market.	  The	  massively	  complicated	  drug	  approval	  process	  
leaves	  almost	  no	  bureaucratic	  resources	  for	  monitoring	  pharmaceutical	  use	  in	  society:	  “In	  
contrast	  to	  the	  streamlined	  approval	  process,	  the	  observation	  of	  adverse	  drug	  reactions	  is	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relegated	  to	  a	  far	  less	  efficient	  and	  proactive	  system:	  once	  a	  pharmaceutical	  is	  approved,	  
the	  work	  of	  exposing	  harmful	  effects	  is	  chiefly	  a	  matter	  for	  private	  activist	  groups	  and	  
attorneys”112.	  
Even	  better	  for	  established	  firms,	  the	  prohibitions	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  have	  
fallen	  most	  heavily	  on	  the	  most	  potentially	  innovative	  drugs,	  the	  psychedelics	  and	  the	  
cannabinoids.	  Prohibition	  thus	  protects	  firms	  working	  with	  established	  drug	  families	  
(opioids,	  stimulants,	  sedatives,	  and	  antidepressants)	  from	  being	  blindsided	  by	  new	  
products	  from	  a	  body	  of	  compounds	  that	  the	  large	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  have	  largely	  
neglected	  and	  understand	  poorly.	  This	  has	  today	  created	  a	  dichotomous	  system	  for	  
substance	  classification	  based	  on	  origin.	  Substances	  synthesized	  by	  large	  pharmaceutical	  
corporations,	  if	  considered	  liable	  to	  abuse,	  are	  placed	  in	  Schedule	  II	  or	  more	  likely	  III	  or	  IV.	  
Substances	  derived	  from	  plant	  sources,	  or	  synthesized	  by	  independent	  researchers	  or	  
chemists,	  are	  placed	  in	  Schedule	  I,	  regardless	  of	  their	  merits.	  Scientists	  wishing	  to	  engage	  in	  
even	  the	  most	  benign	  experiments	  with	  a	  massive	  range	  of	  substances	  can	  only	  do	  so	  under	  
the	  auspices	  of	  the	  government	  and	  top	  corporations	  supervised	  by	  the	  DEA113.	  The	  
indirect	  effect	  of	  prohibition	  has	  been	  to	  confine	  legitimate	  medical	  research	  to	  massive	  
corporations	  and	  a	  few	  universities,	  and	  to	  neglect	  or	  bury	  contributions	  from	  other	  
sources	  no	  matter	  what	  their	  potential	  value.	  In	  conclusion,	  though	  there	  is	  no	  conspiracy	  
by	  large	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  to	  support	  prohibition,	  and	  at	  times	  their	  interests	  run	  
counter	  to	  those	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state,	  they	  are	  nonetheless	  an	  important	  bulwark	  of	  
support	  for	  the	  status-­‐quo.	  Their	  conservative	  attitude	  towards	  reform	  can	  be	  explained	  by	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their	  dependence	  on	  the	  bureaucracy	  for	  market	  rights	  and	  the	  benefits	  they	  passively	  
derive	  from	  the	  anticompetitive	  effects	  of	  prohibition.	  
3.	  Prohibition	  Profiteers	  
The	  third	  category	  will	  be	  crucial	  for	  this	  analysis	  and	  could	  be	  expanded	  to	  include	  
many	  industries	  and	  firms	  beyond	  pharmaceutical	  production,	  especially	  drug	  testing	  &	  
treatment	  and	  private	  corrections.	  These	  firms	  occupy	  product	  or	  service	  niches	  that	  are	  
either	  sustained	  entirely	  or	  heavily	  subsidized	  by	  drug	  prohibition.	  Since	  their	  market	  
strategies	  would	  be	  either	  useless	  or	  less	  effective	  in	  an	  open	  market,	  they	  have	  a	  strong	  
motivation	  for	  increasing	  or	  at	  least	  maintaining	  existing	  restrictions	  surrounding	  drugs,	  
and	  are	  alongside	  law	  enforcement	  bureaucrats	  the	  strongest	  supporters	  of	  harsh	  drug	  
restrictions	  and	  drug	  war	  states.	  
These	  firms	  are	  the	  fiercest	  defenders	  of	  Drug	  War	  policies.	  In	  many	  cases	  they	  
attempt	  to	  use	  the	  media	  or	  connections	  with	  the	  bureaucracy	  to	  make	  drug	  policy	  harsher	  
in	  order	  to	  increase	  their	  opportunities	  for	  business.	  The	  strongest	  reaction	  against	  the	  
recent	  legalization	  of	  marijuana	  by	  state	  initiative	  in	  Washington	  and	  Colorado	  came	  from	  
the	  DEA	  and	  its	  former	  chiefs,	  eight	  of	  whom	  signed	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Attorney	  General	  this	  
March	  demanding	  a	  crackdown.	  Two	  of	  these	  former	  chiefs	  own	  the	  massive	  drug	  testing	  
company	  Bensinger,	  Dupont	  &	  Associates,	  which	  conducts	  drug	  testing,	  mainly	  for	  
marijuana,	  for	  “10	  million	  employees	  around	  the	  US.	  Their	  clients	  have	  included	  the	  biggest	  
players	  in	  industry	  and	  government:	  Kraft	  Foods,	  American	  Airlines,	  Johnson	  &	  Johnson,	  
the	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  and	  even	  the	  Justice	  Department	  itself”114.	  An	  
especially	  strong	  alliance	  has	  formed	  in	  the	  US	  between	  prison	  guard	  unions	  and	  private	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prison	  corporations;	  Corrections	  Corporation	  of	  America	  and	  GEO	  Group	  spent	  millions	  on	  
political	  contributions	  during	  the	  2000s	  (mostly	  in	  Florida,	  Georgia,	  and	  California),	  and	  
combined,	  spend	  close	  to	  $2	  million	  dollars	  a	  year	  lobbying	  Congress	  to	  maintain	  high	  
federal	  prison	  populations115.	  These	  efforts	  are	  supported	  by	  public	  sector	  law	  
enforcement	  and	  prison	  guard	  unions,	  probably	  because	  “law	  enforcement	  agencies	  
around	  the	  country	  could	  lose	  as	  much	  as	  $11	  billion	  in	  taxpayer	  money	  if	  marijuana	  
prohibition	  is	  repealed,	  according	  to	  Harvard	  economics	  professor	  Jeff	  Myron.	  Weed	  
arrests	  account	  for	  half	  of	  all	  drugs	  arrests	  in	  the	  US”116.	  
In	  the	  US,	  due	  to	  continual	  state	  underinvestment	  in	  drug	  treatment	  services,	  a	  large	  
for-­‐profit	  drug	  treatment	  sector	  has	  become	  another	  bulwark	  of	  Drug	  War	  policies.	  When	  
President	  Nixon	  declared	  the	  first	  War	  on	  Drugs,	  he	  also	  promised	  federal	  support	  for	  
treatment	  programs,	  and	  “publicly	  funded	  methadone	  maintenance	  clinics	  and	  therapeutic	  
communities	  were	  established	  in	  cities	  around	  the	  country”117.	  But	  Ronald	  Reagan	  
eviscerated	  funding	  for	  these	  programs	  while	  escalating	  enforcement,	  forcing	  those	  drug	  
addicts	  who	  could	  pay	  into	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  profoundly	  unequal	  "two-­‐
tier	  system	  of	  response	  to	  drug	  dependence:	  treatment	  for	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  classes	  
and	  incarceration	  for	  most	  others,	  including	  the	  poor,	  the	  uninsured,	  ethnic	  minorities,	  and	  
immigrants"	  and	  thus	  a	  "profusion	  of	  private	  sector	  drug	  treatments	  that	  offered	  
detoxification,	  counseling,	  and	  other	  treatment	  services…[which]	  coexisted	  with	  continuing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  Amanda	  Petteruti	  and	  Paul	  Ashton.	  “Gaming	  the	  System:	  How	  the	  Political	  Strategies	  of	  Private	  
Prison	  Companies	  Promote	  Ineffective	  Incarceration	  Policies”,	  report	  by	  the	  	  Justice	  Policy	  Institute,	  
June	  2011.	  
116	  Kevin	  Gray,	  “The	  Drug	  Warriors	  Cashing	  In	  on	  Pot	  Prohibition”,	  2	  
117	  Acker,	  Creating	  the	  American	  Junkie,	  218	  
Kosinski	  57 
 
and	  pervasive	  stigmatization	  of	  drug	  users	  both	  as	  citizens	  and	  as	  patients"118.	  This	  group	  
of	  firms	  will	  continue	  to	  forcefully	  advocate	  for	  Drug	  War	  policies	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  
consequences	  are	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  society,	  and	  so	  will	  their	  employees,	  unless	  they	  can	  be	  
persuaded	  that	  equally	  secure	  jobs	  would	  be	  available	  in	  a	  more	  humane	  system.	  
	  
III.	  The	  practice	  of	  prohibition	  –	  drug	  scheduling	  in	  action	  
The	  reactions	  of	  mainstream	  American	  institutions	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  &	  early	  20th	  
century	  to	  the	  new	  drugs	  that	  were	  becoming	  available	  established	  a	  model	  and	  rhetoric	  
for	  later	  regulation	  and	  prohibition.	  From	  very	  early	  on,	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  dominant	  
American	  media	  and	  society	  figures	  towards	  drugs	  tended	  towards	  moral	  panic.	  Moral	  
panic	  is	  "an	  incident	  of	  widespread	  social	  fear	  that	  appears	  seemingly	  out	  of	  nowhere	  and	  
that	  grows	  in	  the	  space	  of	  a	  few	  months	  or	  years,	  then	  fades	  to	  nothing…Issues	  ignite	  public	  
concern	  when	  they	  successfully	  focus	  generalized	  public	  anxiety	  over	  matters	  such	  as	  race,	  
gender,	  ethnicity,	  or	  generational	  tensions"119.	  It	  can	  be	  suspected	  or	  diagnosed:	  
“when	  the	  official	  reaction	  to	  a	  person,	  groups	  of	  persons	  or	  series	  of	  events	  is	  out	  of	  
all	  proportion	  to	  the	  actual	  threat	  offered…when	  the	  media	  representations	  
universally	  stress	  'sudden	  and	  dramatic'	  increases	  (in	  numbers	  involved	  or	  events)	  
and	  'novelty',	  above	  and	  beyond	  that	  which	  a	  sober,	  realistic	  appraisal,	  could	  sustain,	  
then…it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  beginnings	  of	  moral	  panic"120.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  extracted	  alkaloids	  appeared	  commercially	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  and	  more	  
fully	  synthetic	  pharmaceuticals	  began	  appearing	  during	  the	  interwar	  period.	  Many	  of	  these	  
drugs	  became	  associated	  with	  a	  particular	  foreign	  country,	  immigrant	  group,	  or	  racial	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group.	  Drugs	  do	  not	  occur	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  users,	  but	  their	  inert	  forms	  are	  hooks	  on	  which	  
to	  hang	  emotions	  and	  desires	  arising	  from	  stressful	  demographic	  and	  economic	  change.	  
Drug	  policy	  is	  inherently	  close	  to	  the	  question	  of	  who	  is	  "in"	  and	  who	  is	  "out",	  of	  where	  the	  
boundaries	  are	  or	  should	  be	  between	  nation,	  state,	  and	  individual.	  In	  a	  country	  with	  a	  
highly	  normative,	  highly	  punitive	  drug	  state,	  the	  consequences	  for	  winners	  and	  losers	  both	  
are	  enormous,	  and	  drug	  policy	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  xenophobia	  and	  culture.	  
	   All	  drug	  classification	  systems	  are	  arbitrary,	  but	  fortunately,	  drug	  regulation	  states	  
have	  for	  most	  of	  history	  been	  preoccupied	  with	  a	  few	  categories	  of	  substances.	  The	  
following	  section	  divides	  the	  most	  heavily	  regulated	  and	  contested	  drugs	  into	  ‘families’	  
with	  similar	  uses	  and	  patterns	  of	  regulation.	  Each	  of	  these	  families,	  from	  a	  regulatory	  
viewpoint,	  is	  potentially	  risky	  or	  harmful	  for	  a	  different	  reason.	  The	  types	  of	  risks	  
presented,	  along	  with	  early	  observations	  of	  use	  patterns	  and	  user	  groups,	  provided	  the	  
basis	  for	  state	  interest	  in	  the	  drugs	  economy	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  drug	  regulation	  states.	  
The	  first	  step	  in	  a	  truly	  integrated	  drugs	  policy	  is	  a	  lucid	  examination	  of	  the	  risks	  and	  
benefits	  of	  the	  drugs	  used	  in	  the	  modern	  world.	  Drug	  policy	  is	  not	  a	  smoothly	  continuous	  
process;	  it	  has	  usually	  been	  formulated	  in	  bursts	  of	  activity	  followed	  by	  long	  periods	  of	  
relative	  inaction.	  The	  initial	  encounters	  between	  regulatory	  institutions	  and	  each	  particular	  
drug	  family	  were	  thus	  still	  influential	  in	  policy	  decades	  later,	  even	  when	  new	  social	  or	  
scientific	  studies	  had	  overturned	  previous	  conclusions	  and	  assumptions.	  The	  institutional	  
pattern	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  set	  permanently,	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  in	  the	  American	  case	  that	  
certain	  drugs,	  especially	  heroin	  and	  methamphetamine,	  have	  had	  cyclical	  patterns	  of	  use	  
over	  the	  course	  of	  decades.	  
A.	  Drug	  families	  I:	  Opioid	  narcotics	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The	  opioids	  were	  the	  family	  of	  drugs	  most	  influential	  in	  bringing	  about	  the	  creation	  
of	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  drug	  control	  authority.	  The	  story	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  could	  in	  
many	  ways	  be	  said	  to	  have	  begun	  with	  the	  extraction	  of	  morphine,	  “first	  isolated	  in	  pure	  
form	  from	  opium	  latex	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  19th	  century”121.	  Its	  simultaneous	  
discovery	  by	  Derosne,	  Séguin,	  and	  Sertürner	  suggests	  that	  its	  isolation	  was	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  
technological	  advancement,	  since	  the	  pain-­‐relieving	  properties	  of	  opium	  had	  been	  known	  
as	  far	  back	  as	  4000	  B.C.122	  If	  any	  drug	  family	  cried	  out	  most	  obviously	  for	  some	  degree	  of	  
restriction,	  it	  was	  the	  opioids,	  because	  they	  are	  both	  notoriously	  physically	  addictive	  and	  
indispensable	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  medicine.	  Indeed,	  the	  commercialization	  of	  opium	  in	  the	  
19th	  and	  morphine	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  was	  the	  strongest	  impetus	  behind	  the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  licensed	  medical	  profession	  with	  privileged	  access	  to	  restricted	  
medicines	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  state.	  In	  1900,	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	  the	  medical	  
market,	  and	  the	  market	  for	  physicians	  were	  all	  disorganized	  and	  almost	  totally	  free	  from	  
state	  control.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  WWI,	  however,	  this	  project	  had	  been	  almost	  completely	  
accomplished.	  The	  rapid	  development	  of	  the	  drug	  regulation	  state	  can	  only	  be	  explained	  by	  
the	  rapid	  growth	  in	  importance	  of	  the	  pharmaceutical	  and	  medical	  sectors	  during	  a	  time	  of	  
nationalist	  competition	  and	  eventually	  industrial	  war.	  
Opioids,	  alongside	  alcohol	  and	  prostitution,	  were	  the	  highest	  priority	  for	  would-­‐be	  
reformers,	  but	  the	  stigma	  that	  legal	  regulation	  generated	  only	  interfered	  with	  sincere	  
attempts	  to	  deal	  with	  increasing	  addiction.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  opioid	  
addiction	  was	  real,	  and	  that	  America	  society	  was	  unprepared	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  quick	  rise	  in	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drug	  use.	  But	  the	  foreign	  origins	  of	  opioids,	  and	  the	  deep	  fears	  the	  junkie	  lifestyle	  evoked	  in	  
business	  leaders	  during	  an	  era	  of	  industrialization,	  led	  to	  a	  “lush	  mythology”	  which	  
exaggerated	  the	  problem	  and	  stigmatized	  users	  far	  than	  was	  ever	  warranted	  or	  helpful.	  
The	  hypodermic	  syringe	  was	  invented	  in	  1850s,	  heroin	  “introduced	  as	  a	  cough	  remedy	  in	  
1898”123.	  In	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Harrison	  Act’s	  enactment,	  
"the	  sale	  of	  opiates	  outside	  of	  medical	  channels	  increased,	  especially	  in	  northeastern	  
American	  cities.	  Recreational	  use	  of	  opiates	  shifted	  from	  the	  smoking	  of	  opium	  
centered	  in	  urban	  Chinatowns	  to	  nonmedical	  consumption	  of	  morphine,	  swallowed	  
or	  injected	  subcutaneously…By	  1910	  heroin	  sniffing	  had	  attached	  to	  a	  shifting	  urban	  
entertainment	  scene	  that	  included	  dance	  halls,	  poolrooms,	  and	  vaudeville	  
theater…To	  many	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  Anglo-­‐American	  Protestants,	  the	  traditional	  
elites	  in	  American	  cities,	  this	  pattern	  of	  drug	  use	  reflected	  an	  alarming	  increase	  in	  
vice,	  a	  problem	  that	  added	  to	  their	  anxieties	  about	  the	  profound	  social	  
transformations	  resulting	  from	  industrialization,	  urbanization,	  and	  new	  patterns	  of	  
immigration.	  Their	  concerns	  resulted	  in	  an	  array	  of	  Progressive	  Era	  reform	  
movements”124.	  	  
	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  opiophobia	  unleashed	  by	  these	  progressives	  not	  only	  outlasted	  
them,	  it	  allowed	  the	  burgeoning	  federal	  bureaucracy	  to	  sabotage	  the	  first	  attempts	  by	  
doctors	  and	  social	  workers	  to	  manage	  the	  problem	  without	  the	  involvement	  of	  law	  
enforcement.	  The	  intense	  normativity	  of	  the	  era’s	  social	  scientists	  and	  clinicians	  
compounded	  the	  problem:	  
“the	  interaction	  between	  the	  first	  cohort	  of	  modern	  recreational	  opiate	  users	  and	  
researchers	  in	  psychiatry	  and	  pharmacology	  produced	  a	  construction	  of	  the	  tough	  
urban	  addict…closely	  linked	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  federal	  treatment	  and	  enforcement	  
structure	  grounded	  in	  a	  supply-­‐side	  policy	  approach	  to	  dealing	  with	  unauthorized	  
use	  of	  opiates	  and	  cocaine”125	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The	  American	  federal	  government	  first	  attempted	  to	  create	  a	  treatment	  hospital	  for	  opioid	  
addicts	  in	  the	  1930s,	  but	  it	  was	  sabotaged	  by	  its	  heavy	  use	  of	  coercion:	  “most	  of	  the	  
inmates	  were	  federal	  prisoners	  serving	  sentences	  for	  violation	  of	  drug	  law…[and]	  within	  a	  
few	  years	  of	  its	  opening”,	  “a	  combined	  hospital-­‐prison	  became	  simply	  a	  prison”126.	  The	  
Federal	  government	  has	  allowed	  an	  increasingly	  broad	  range	  of	  Harm	  Reduction	  
interventions	  by	  states,	  cities,	  and	  private	  groups,	  but	  the	  pittances	  allotted	  to	  these	  
programs	  compared	  to	  enforcement,	  and	  the	  continued	  stigmatization	  and	  incarceration	  of	  
addicts	  on	  a	  large	  scale,	  means	  that	  the	  US’s	  commitment	  to	  Harm	  Reduction	  remains	  
mostly	  rhetorical.	  
	   It	  seems	  that	  the	  trend	  in	  the	  industrialized	  countries	  today,	  and	  even	  in	  the	  United	  
States,	  is	  towards	  highly	  normative	  Harm	  Reduction	  policies	  for	  opioids.	  The	  latest	  annual	  
report	  by	  the	  ONDCP	  is	  full	  of	  mentions	  to	  Harm	  Reduction	  programs	  and	  priorities:	  
“The	  Administration’s	  approach	  to	  drug	  policy…emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  
recognizing	  that	  drug	  addiction	  is	  a	  chronic	  disease	  of	  the	  brain	  and	  that	  drug	  
policies	  should	  be	  balanced,	  compassionate,	  and	  humane.	  To	  effectively	  address	  the	  
disease,	  prevention,	  treatment,	  and	  recovery	  support	  services	  should	  be	  integrated	  
into	  health	  care	  systems…It	  supports	  the	  use	  of	  modern	  approaches	  to	  the	  drug	  
problem,	  to	  include	  the	  expansion	  of	  medication-­‐assisted	  therapies	  for	  drug	  
treatment	  and	  criminal	  justice	  reforms	  such	  as	  alternatives	  to	  incarceration	  that	  
break	  the	  cycle	  of	  drug	  use,	  crime,	  incarceration,	  and	  re-­‐arrest”127.	  
	  
Even	  the	  most	  conservative	  of	  policymakers	  should	  be	  able	  to	  appreciate	  that	  the	  battle	  cry	  
of	  a	  “Drug-­‐free	  America”	  makes	  no	  sense	  in	  the	  case	  of	  opioids.128	  They	  are	  used	  to	  relieve	  
the	  unbearable	  pain	  of	  those	  in	  surgery,	  soldiers	  wounded	  in	  battle,	  terminal	  cancer	  
patients,	  the	  very	  old	  on	  their	  deathbeds.	  Without	  them	  medicine	  would	  be,	  if	  not	  totally	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impossible	  to	  practice,	  then	  at	  least	  exceptionally	  cruel.	  Most	  people	  in	  the	  industrialized	  
world	  will,	  at	  some	  point	  in	  their	  life,	  be	  given	  these	  drugs	  by	  a	  doctor,	  and	  benefit	  from	  
their	  still	  unequaled	  analgesic	  properties.	  The	  visibility	  of	  the	  opioids	  and	  the	  impossibility	  
of	  disputing	  their	  usefulness	  have	  made	  Harm	  Reduction	  the	  obvious	  choice,	  even	  for	  
governments	  that	  continue	  Drug	  War	  policies	  in	  general.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  rationality	  that	  
has	  taken	  hold	  in	  health	  policy	  and	  clinics	  has	  not	  spread	  to	  law	  enforcement	  and	  popular	  
culture.	  Users	  of	  illicit	  opioids	  are	  still	  heavily	  stigmatized	  (and	  are	  consequently	  secretive),	  
and	  in	  many	  countries	  are	  still	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  blamed	  and	  incarcerated	  for	  their	  drug	  
habit	  than	  referred	  to	  treatment	  or	  screened	  for	  co-­‐morbid	  physical	  and	  mental	  health	  
conditions.	  	  
In	  the	  US,	  this	  continuing	  stigma	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  mystique	  that	  continues	  to	  
surround	  one	  particular	  semi-­‐synthetic	  opioid,	  even	  as	  more	  powerful	  synthetics	  are	  
regularly	  used	  in	  medical	  practice.	  One	  of	  the	  questions	  that	  began	  this	  Section	  II	  -­‐	  why	  
heroin	  is	  legal	  in	  Europe,	  but	  illegal	  in	  the	  United	  States	  -­‐	  has	  not	  been	  answered.	  One	  
possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  it	  has	  a	  higher	  abuse	  liability	  than	  morphine	  and	  other	  opiates,	  
but	  no	  study	  has	  shown	  this	  to	  be	  consistently	  true129.	  Another	  argument	  relates	  to	  a	  kind	  
of	  institutional	  memory	  -­‐	  “doctors	  are	  appalled	  at	  the	  thought	  of	  employing	  a	  substance	  
about	  which	  there	  is	  so	  lush	  a	  mythology	  of	  superstitious	  dread	  and	  cultural	  revulsion”130.	  
But	  Switzerland	  and	  Britain,	  where	  the	  medical	  profession	  has	  fought	  for	  the	  use	  of	  heroin,	  
have	  just	  as	  long	  a	  history	  as	  the	  US	  with	  opioids	  and	  addict	  populations.	  The	  differences	  in	  
national	  usage	  of	  particular	  opioids,	  however,	  points	  towards	  industry	  influence	  on	  which	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opioids	  are	  preferred	  for	  medical	  practice.	  The	  US,	  more	  than	  any	  other	  country,	  has	  
shifted	  towards	  synthetic	  and	  semi-­‐synthetic	  opioids,	  especially	  oxycodone	  and	  
oxymorphone.	  	  
There	  is	  no	  pharmacological	  reason	  to	  prefer	  oxycodone	  to	  morphine.	  But	  today	  the	  
United	  States	  manufactures	  83%	  and	  consumes	  80%	  of	  the	  oxycodone	  produced	  
globally131.	  Oxycodone	  was	  one	  of	  the	  synthetics	  produced	  by	  Germany	  when	  the	  country	  
was	  isolated	  from	  opium	  supplies	  during	  wartime.	  Its	  patent	  long-­‐expired,	  Purdue	  Pharma	  
repackaged	  it	  in	  1995	  in	  time-­‐release	  form	  (a	  “contin”).	  Purdue’s	  advertising	  strategy	  
aimed	  to	  explicitly	  confront	  and	  capitalize	  on	  the	  opiophobia	  instilled	  in	  the	  American	  
medical	  profession	  by	  Drug	  War	  policies.	  It	  “knew	  it	  needed	  to	  overcome	  doctors'	  fears	  
about	  addiction,	  so	  it	  treated	  the	  time-­‐release	  formula	  as	  a	  magic	  bullet.	  It	  claimed	  the	  drug	  
would	  give	  pain	  patients	  steadier	  12-­‐hour	  coverage,	  avoid	  withdrawal,	  and	  frustrate	  
addicts	  seeking	  a	  euphoric	  rush”132.	  Sales	  rapidly	  increased	  “from	  $45	  million	  in	  1996	  to	  
$1.5	  billion	  in	  2002	  to	  nearly	  $3	  billion	  by	  2009”133.	  Unlike	  morphine,	  it	  can	  be	  derived	  
from	  thebaine	  -­‐	  a	  non-­‐narcotic	  poppy	  alkaloid	  that	  can	  only	  be	  derived	  in	  industrial	  
quantities	  from	  genetically	  engineered	  poppy	  strains	  grown	  in	  Spain	  and	  Australia.	  Those	  
two	  countries	  accounted	  for	  96%	  of	  all	  thebaine	  exports	  in	  2010,	  but	  industry	  in	  the	  US	  
processes	  it	  into	  a	  usable	  form	  and	  produces	  60%	  of	  the	  world’s	  industrial	  thebaine134.	  	  
Oxycodone	  is,	  of	  course,	  no	  less	  euphoric	  or	  addictive	  than	  any	  other	  strong	  μ-­‐opioid	  
agonist,	  a	  fact	  that	  doctors,	  patients,	  and	  addicts	  across	  America	  quickly	  began	  to	  realize.	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But	  this	  happy	  coincidence	  of	  domestic	  manufacturing,	  reliable	  supply	  from	  allied	  
countries,	  and	  allegedly	  non-­‐addictive	  analgesia	  went	  a	  long	  way	  towards	  accounting	  for	  
the	  success	  of	  oxycodone	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  state	  interest	  in	  supervising	  its	  use	  until	  
widespread	  abuse	  and	  addiction	  (especially	  in	  Florida)	  were	  too	  blatant	  to	  ignore.	  Purdue	  
Pharma	  was	  able	  to	  avoid	  federal	  prosecution	  by	  funding	  campaigns	  to	  warn	  and	  educate	  
about	  prescription	  abuse	  and	  paying	  the	  government	  a	  $600	  million	  fine.	  The	  company	  
started	  “RX	  Patrol,	  a	  website	  that	  circulates	  police	  reports	  on	  drug	  crimes”	  and	  even	  “offers	  
rewards	  for	  citizens	  who	  bring	  perpetrators	  to	  justice”,	  a	  strategy	  to	  reinforce	  oxycodone’s	  
legitimacy	  by	  blaming	  its	  problems	  on	  criminals	  with	  a	  desire	  to	  get	  high	  rather	  than	  a	  
deliberately	  misleading	  marketing	  strategy	  and	  loose	  supervision	  of	  prescriptions135.	  	  
The	  switch	  to	  oxycodone	  had	  benefits	  for	  the	  state	  and	  industry	  -­‐	  more	  of	  the	  
processing	  is	  done	  domestically	  for	  thebaine	  than	  for	  morphine,	  it	  cannot	  be	  diverted	  for	  
heroin	  production,	  and	  it	  can	  be	  obtained	  from	  Western	  democracies	  rather	  than	  
developing	  countries	  in	  Asia	  and	  Africa.	  The	  benefits	  for	  Purdue	  Pharma	  were	  impressive	  -­‐	  
their	  product	  not	  only	  captured	  significant	  market	  share,	  but	  also	  drove	  massive	  growth	  in	  
the	  painkiller	  market	  as	  whole.	  In	  2010	  they	  captured	  $3.1	  B	  of	  the	  $11	  B	  painkiller	  
revenues	  in	  the	  United	  States	  2010136.	  Unclear,	  and	  apparently	  immaterial,	  are	  the	  interests	  
of	  patients,	  who	  were	  encouraged	  to	  pay	  significantly	  more	  for	  a	  drug	  falsely	  portrayed	  as	  
non-­‐addictive	  and	  not	  liable	  to	  overdose	  or	  tolerance.	  Furthermore,	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  
strategies	  like	  those	  used	  by	  Purdue,	  opioid	  use	  in	  the	  US	  has	  skyrocketed	  in	  the	  past	  two	  
decades,	  with	  uncertain	  consequences	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Three	  times	  as	  many	  Americans	  died	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




from	  opioid	  overdoses	  in	  2008	  than	  in	  1999,	  and	  the	  US	  alone	  now	  consumes	  more	  than	  
half	  of	  the	  world’s	  opioid	  production	  each	  year137.	  
B.	  Drug	  families	  II:	  Psychedelics	  and	  cannabinoids	  	  
The	  Drug	  War	  type	  built	  on	  earlier	  systems	  of	  drug	  prohibition,	  but	  went	  far	  beyond	  
them	  in	  its	  scope	  and	  ambitions.	  The	  Drug	  War	  state	  first	  appeared	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  
the	  late	  1960s,	  and	  it	  was	  prompted	  more	  by	  psychedelic	  and	  cannabinoid	  use	  than	  by	  any	  
of	  the	  other	  new	  recreational	  drugs.	  “Two	  “drug	  wars”	  have	  been	  waged	  since	  World	  War	  
II…The	  first	  escalation	  of	  drug	  enforcement	  occurred	  between	  1965	  and	  1970,	  when	  the	  
drug	  arrest	  rate	  rose	  from	  34	  to	  228,	  a	  114	  percent	  annual	  rate	  of	  increase”138.	  Why	  did	  
these	  drugs,	  those	  that	  most	  specifically	  alter	  consciousness,	  attract	  such	  fearful	  reactions	  
from	  conservatives	  and	  authority	  figures?	  The	  answer,	  in	  America,	  is	  that	  a	  resistance	  
against	  the	  state’s	  power	  in	  one	  area,	  the	  power	  to	  make	  war,	  became	  associated	  with	  drug	  
deviance.	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  first	  War	  on	  Drugs	  was	  impeccable:	  “it’s	  declaration	  by	  
President	  Richard	  Nixon	  in	  1973	  came	  just	  as	  American	  forces	  were	  returning	  from	  
Vietnam,	  and	  just	  as	  the	  countercultural	  revolution	  was	  disintegrating	  at	  home…Domestic	  
political	  opposition	  to	  the	  war	  rippled	  out	  into	  broader	  cultural	  insurgency,	  and	  the	  
counterculture	  was	  born…139”	  	  
Perhaps	  because	  the	  counterculture,	  a	  product	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  was	  explicitly	  a	  
“revolution	  of	  consciousness”,	  a	  “reaction	  back	  into	  the	  old	  individualist	  idealism	  of	  the	  
American	  nineteenth	  century”	  which	  “rejected	  not	  only	  the	  memories,	  art,	  ethics,	  and	  
politics	  of	  the	  previous	  generation,	  but	  its	  very	  consciousness,	  whatever	  it	  was	  that	  made	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hatred	  of	  the	  Other	  worth	  the	  price	  of	  extinction”140.	  The	  criticisms	  that	  the	  counterculture	  
made	  of	  postwar	  consumer	  society	  were	  frightening	  to	  those	  who	  had	  grown	  up	  in	  earlier	  
times	  and	  still	  valued	  social	  stability	  and	  authority,	  and	  figures	  like	  Leary	  and	  Alpert	  
specifically	  attributed	  these	  criticisms	  to	  the	  insights	  they	  received	  from	  psychedelics:	  
“along	  with	  the	  social	  upheaval	  surrounding	  opposition	  to	  an	  increasingly	  
unpopular	  war	  in	  South-­‐East	  Asia,	  hallucinogens	  assumed	  a	  central	  role	  in	  a	  
movement	  that	  began	  to	  question	  many	  of	  the	  basic	  values	  and	  precepts	  of	  
mainstream	  Euro-­‐American	  culture.	  The	  populace,	  fueled	  by	  sensational	  media	  
accounts,	  grew	  to	  identify	  hallucinogens	  as	  a	  prime	  suspect	  in	  inciting	  the	  
accelerating	  state	  of	  cultural	  havoc.	  And	  along	  with	  the	  drugs	  themselves,	  adherents	  
of	  the	  experimental	  and	  treatment	  models	  became	  increasingly	  identified	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  problem.	  Such	  circumstances	  were	  in	  no	  way	  improved	  by	  the	  rash	  
pronouncements	  from	  the	  radical	  wing	  of	  what	  had	  rapidly	  become	  identified	  as	  an	  
hallucinogen-­‐inspired	  political	  movement”141	  
	  
On	  top	  of	  this,	  the	  counterculture	  was	  intensely	  critical	  of	  America	  society	  during	  a	  time	  of	  
national	  crisis,	  as	  the	  country	  contemplated	  its	  first	  military	  defeat	  in	  generations:	  
“the	  war	  was	  going	  badly,	  [and]	  a	  scapegoat	  was	  needed.	  The	  counterculture	  and	  
allied	  political	  dissent	  from	  the	  war	  effort	  were	  conflated	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  
drugs…The	  declaration	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Drugs	  in	  1973	  represented	  a	  relocation	  of	  the	  
enemy	  from	  a	  country	  half	  a	  world	  way	  to	  our	  own	  cities	  and	  towns.	  It	  was	  –	  and	  to	  
some	  extent	  still	  is	  –	  a	  war	  of	  revenge	  against	  U.S.	  citizens	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  
defeat	  in	  Vietnam”142.	  	  
	  
Conservatives	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  learned	  to	  associate	  psychedelic	  drugs	  with	  
political	  protest,	  and	  this	  fear	  persists	  today:	  “Widespread	  use	  of	  drugs	  might	  spawn	  a	  class	  
of	  Others	  for	  whom	  perception	  itself	  is	  variable	  and	  capable	  of	  operating	  in	  more	  than	  one	  
mode.	  It	  might	  even	  (as	  for	  an	  instant	  in	  the	  1960s)	  lead	  to	  mass	  apostasy”.143	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But	  the	  disproportionate	  repression	  directed	  towards	  these	  drugs	  may	  have	  even	  
deeper	  roots.	  Compared	  to	  alcohol	  as	  well	  as	  other	  illicit	  drugs	  of	  abuse,	  the	  traditional	  
psychedelics	  and	  marijuana	  are	  much	  less	  liable	  to	  cause	  overdoses,	  cancer,	  addiction,	  and	  
violence.	  Under	  a	  pure	  Harm	  Reduction	  type,	  they	  become	  de-­‐prioritized,	  simply	  because	  
they	  do	  not	  pose	  the	  same	  social	  risks	  as	  the	  opioids	  and	  stimulants.	  What	  they	  might	  pose	  
a	  risk	  to,	  unlike	  the	  opioids	  and	  the	  stimulants	  (which	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  the	  perfect	  
capitalist	  products,	  “a	  kind	  of	  parody	  of	  the	  routine	  engines	  of	  desire”)	  is	  the	  consumerist	  
materialism	  that	  has	  encouraged	  under	  flexible	  accumulation144.	  Perhaps	  the	  federal	  
government’s	  inability	  to	  admit	  this	  fear	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  official	  reasons	  against	  
marijuana	  medicalization	  and	  legalization	  have	  changed	  little	  over	  the	  decades	  and	  today	  
seem	  outdated	  in	  an	  age	  where	  psychoactive	  pharmaceuticals	  are	  ubiquitous:	  	  
“the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  industrial	  age	  still	  prevails,	  wherein	  a	  worker	  using	  cannabis	  is	  said	  to	  
be	  unproductive,	  a	  student	  incapable	  of	  learning,	  a	  driver	  more	  prone	  to	  
accidents…but…the	  real	  heterodoxy	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  cannabis’s	  oneiric	  or	  aesthetically	  
disinterested	  consciousness	  can	  momentarily	  detach	  the	  user	  from	  the	  consumerist	  matrix	  
on	  which	  both	  the	  postmodern	  economy	  and	  its	  social	  order	  depend”145	  
	  
	   Cannabis	  and	  the	  psychedelics	  were	  also	  perfect	  symbols	  for	  the	  counterculture	  
because	  they	  could	  be	  grown	  by	  individuals	  or	  small	  groups	  rather	  than	  mass-­‐produced	  
and	  distributed	  through	  commercial	  or	  medical	  systems.	  These	  drugs	  may	  not	  be	  
inherently	  anti-­‐capitalist,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  seem	  (at	  least	  initially)	  that	  could	  become	  just	  
another	  commodity.	  Lenson,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  this	  side-­‐effect	  was	  in	  fact	  purposeful	  
and	  intended,	  describing	  it	  as	  “Consumerism	  policing	  itself,	  rather	  than	  Consumerism	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policing	  the	  world	  to	  protect	  it	  from	  anti-­‐capitalist	  “others”	  like	  Communists	  or	  
neutrals”146:	  
“In	  the	  1960s	  pot	  smoking	  became	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  counterculture’s	  anticapitalist	  
bias;	  the	  drug	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  free…curtailing	  cultivation	  only	  drives	  users	  back	  
into	  the	  black	  market.	  One	  wonders	  if	  this	  was	  its	  aim.	  In	  this	  way	  users	  are	  at	  least	  
compelled	  to	  reenter	  a	  consumerist	  arena	  of	  some	  kind,	  even	  if	  an	  illegal	  one.	  The	  
skyrocketing	  cost	  of	  marijuana	  during	  this	  period	  suggests	  that	  its	  economic	  nature	  
has	  been	  redefined:	  from	  “free	  herb”	  to	  a	  luxury	  consumer	  item.	  This	  
metamorphosis	  aligns	  marijuana	  more	  closely	  with	  other	  drugs	  that	  cannot	  be	  so	  
readily	  produced	  privately	  for	  personal	  consumption,	  and	  facilitates	  the	  notion	  that	  
“drugs”	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  all	  the	  same”147	  
	  
Pushing	  users	  back	  into	  the	  familiar	  degradations	  of	  the	  black	  market,	  despite	  its	  
consequences	  for	  these	  users	  and	  society,	  may	  have	  seemed	  less	  frightening	  than	  allowing	  
them	  to	  freely	  develop	  a	  system	  of	  unregulated,	  de-­‐commodified	  production	  by	  small	  
communities	  and	  individuals.	  
	   Again,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  ascertain	  how	  vital	  the	  drugs	  really	  were	  to	  the	  politics	  and	  
consciousness	  of	  the	  era.	  The	  best	  evidence	  that	  they	  were	  significant	  is	  the	  importance	  
attached	  to	  them	  by	  both	  proponents	  and	  detractors,	  and	  the	  disproportionality	  of	  the	  
crackdown	  when	  it	  came.	  What	  is	  certain	  is	  that	  the	  early	  use	  of	  marijuana	  and	  LSD	  in	  the	  
West	  “intersect[ed]	  with	  several	  powerful	  social	  forces	  in	  American	  culture:	  the	  leaden	  
proprieties	  of	  the	  conformist	  ‘50s,	  Leary’s	  “parochial	  social	  insanities”,	  were	  being	  cast	  
aside…[and]	  the	  presumptive	  authorities	  of	  church	  and	  state	  were	  being	  revealed	  as	  the	  
corrupt	  proponents	  of	  an	  immoral	  war;	  and	  the	  ugly	  gangrene	  of	  American	  racism	  was	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being	  exposed	  by	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement”148.	  These	  drugs	  would	  not	  be	  easily	  forgiven,	  
indelibly	  associated	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  authorities	  with	  political	  radicalism.	  	  
Nixon	  fell,	  but	  the	  Drug	  War	  state	  did	  not;	  “After	  Nixon’s	  resignation	  in	  1974,	  the	  
intent	  to	  prosecute	  the	  War	  on	  Drugs	  was	  emblematized	  by	  President	  Gerald	  Ford’s	  
appointment	  of	  Nelson	  Rockefeller	  as	  vice	  president,	  since	  Rockefeller,	  as	  governor	  of	  New	  
York,	  had	  implemented	  the	  most	  draconian	  drug	  laws	  in	  the	  nation’s	  history”149.	  
Incarceration	  rates	  continued	  to	  rise,	  but	  more	  slowly	  than	  before,	  at	  least	  until	  Reagan	  
came	  into	  office.	  Marijuana	  use,	  though	  it	  remained	  illegal,	  was	  never	  eradicated	  from	  
segments	  of	  the	  popular	  culture,	  and	  even	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ‘70s	  it	  was	  losing	  its	  ability	  to	  
shock	  the	  public	  into	  moral	  panic.	  The	  damage	  done	  to	  psychedelics	  was	  more	  lasting	  and	  
more	  severe:	  “The	  hallucinogens,	  along	  with	  the	  proponents	  of	  their	  continued	  exploration,	  
were	  cast	  out,	  becoming	  pariahs	  in	  a	  land	  and	  a	  time	  that	  increasingly	  viewed	  them	  as	  
threats	  to	  public	  safety	  and	  social	  order”150.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Section	  II,	  they	  have	  once	  again	  
become	  subjects	  of	  intense	  scientific	  interest	  and	  research,	  conducted	  by	  a	  more	  cautious	  
and	  rigorous	  generation.	  “[T]empered	  with	  an	  appreciation	  that	  the	  controversial	  nature	  of	  
these	  drugs	  caused	  a	  suspension	  of	  nearly	  a	  generation’s	  worth	  of	  research”,	  they	  have	  
learned	  to	  emphasize	  “ongoing	  studies…taking	  a	  painstaking,	  systematic	  approach,	  
and…avoiding	  claims	  that	  cannot	  be	  substantiated	  by	  data”151.	  The	  downside	  of	  this	  low-­‐
profile	  approach	  is	  that	  these	  researchers	  are	  very	  hesitant	  to	  engage	  in	  public	  advocacy	  
and	  activism	  for	  drug	  law	  reform.	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C.	  Drug	  families	  III:	  Stimulants	  
	   By	  the	  last	  few	  years	  of	  the	  1970s,	  it	  seemed	  like	  the	  huge	  demographic	  shifts	  in	  
American	  drug	  consumption	  habits	  would	  spell	  an	  end	  to	  decades	  of	  restrictive	  drug	  policy	  
on	  marijuana.	  President	  Carter	  and	  several	  federal	  agencies	  publicly	  called	  for	  the	  
decriminalization	  of	  personal	  amounts	  of	  marijuana.	  By	  the	  “height	  of	  the	  decriminalization	  
movement	  in	  1977-­‐78”,	  “eleven	  states	  and	  several	  cities”	  had	  done	  so,	  “seventeen	  more	  
significantly	  reduced	  their	  penalties”	  and	  overall,	  “strict	  enforcement	  of	  drug	  laws	  seemed	  
benighted	  and	  futile”152.	  “It	  seemed	  for	  a	  time	  that	  pot,	  at	  any	  rate,	  was	  destined	  for	  some	  
form	  of	  legalization.	  The	  turning	  of	  the	  tide	  against	  it	  is	  often	  attributed	  to	  the	  advent	  of	  
cheap	  mass-­‐marketed	  stimulants”153.	  Crack	  and	  methamphetamine	  provided	  opportunities	  
to	  portray	  stimulant	  use	  as	  a	  problem	  caused	  by	  and	  affecting,	  respectively,	  urban	  blacks	  
and	  rural	  working-­‐class	  whites,	  rather	  than	  a	  national	  problem	  of	  abuse	  tacitly	  encouraged	  
by	  states	  and	  business	  interests	  in	  the	  postwar	  economy.	  
	   Synthetic	  stimulants,	  outside	  of	  medical	  use,	  are	  more	  associated	  with	  work	  and	  the	  
working	  class	  than	  any	  other	  class	  of	  drugs.	  Unlike	  other	  drugs	  associated	  with	  the	  
underclasses,	  however,	  stimulants	  have	  proved	  popular	  with	  employers	  as	  well;	  witness	  
the	  presence	  of	  coffee	  makers	  in	  almost	  every	  American	  corporate	  office.	  Pendell	  describes	  
amphetamine	  as:	  
“The	  worker’s	  friend,	  but	  the	  boss’s	  friend	  as	  well.	  You’re	  putting	  out	  extra,	  ramping	  
overtime,	  robbing	  your	  body	  to	  finish	  the	  shift.	  The	  boss	  meets	  his	  quota	  and	  
pockets	  the	  surplus.	  Colonial	  bosses	  in	  South	  America	  paid	  their	  workers	  with	  
coca”154	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  This	  is	  probably	  because	  in	  low,	  measured	  doses,	  stimulants	  (including	  the	  most	  popular	  
drug	  in	  the	  world,	  caffeine)	  don’t	  seem	  like	  drugs;	  they	  are	  
“perceived	  as	  nearly	  transparent	  to	  both	  cognition	  and	  intellect.	  The	  user	  is	  able	  to	  
function	  well	  in	  almost	  all	  physical	  and	  mental	  activities	  –	  better,	  indeed,	  because	  
she	  or	  he	  is	  oblivious	  to	  hunger	  and	  fatigue…Often	  people	  feel	  like	  
working…motivation	  to	  work	  seems	  to	  be	  conflated	  with	  or	  empowered	  by	  a	  
sublimated	  mechanism	  of	  desire.	  It	  is	  because	  of	  the	  basic	  compatibility	  of	  
stimulants	  at	  this	  level	  with	  work	  and	  ordinary	  social	  life	  that	  these	  drugs	  were	  at	  
first	  thought	  to	  be	  relatively	  transparent”155	  
	  
The	  initial	  enthusiasm	  for	  amphetamine,	  the	  prototypical	  modern	  stimulant,	  should	  
therefore	  not	  be	  surprising.	  Caffeine	  is,	  in	  almost	  every	  way,	  an	  inferior	  substance:	  
“caffeine	  generally	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  reaction	  time	  while	  amphetamine	  improves	  
reaction	  time;	  caffeine	  impairs	  hand	  steadiness	  while	  amphetamine	  improves	  hand	  
steadiness;	  amphetamine	  improves	  coordination	  performance	  more	  than	  does	  
caffeine.	  In	  all	  areas,	  amphetamine	  at	  the	  proper	  dosage	  had	  fewer	  side	  effects	  than	  
caffeine.	  Neither	  caffeine	  nor	  amphetamine	  improved	  intellectual	  performance”156	  
	  
Ironically,	  caffeine’s	  unpleasant	  side	  effects	  and	  higher	  general	  toxicity	  make	  impossible	  
the	  massive	  binges,	  dose	  escalations,	  and	  resulting	  psychotic	  escapades	  that	  amphetamine	  
addicts	  engage	  in.	  When	  corporate	  white	  America	  was	  confronted	  by	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  its	  
favorite	  productivity	  aid,	  it	  reacted	  with	  an	  understandable	  horror.	  
	   Stimulants,	  at	  first	  embraced	  by	  the	  state	  during	  wartime	  and	  the	  postwar	  boom,	  
eventually	  became	  more	  stigmatized	  (in	  illicit	  forms	  of	  use)	  than	  any	  other	  class	  of	  
substance.	  Many	  of	  the	  initial	  users	  were	  soldiers,	  as	  “during	  World	  War	  II,	  large	  quantities	  
of	  amphetamine	  (hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  doses)	  were	  issued	  to	  soldiers,	  sailors,	  and	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aviators	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  conflict”157.	  Speed	  (the	  popular	  name	  for	  amphetamine)	  was	  
used	  for	  productivity,	  not	  just	  by	  beatnik	  writers	  like	  Jack	  Kerouac,	  but	  mathematicians	  like	  
Paul	  Erdos,	  as	  well	  as	  millions	  of	  workers	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  economy:	  
“The	  1950s	  were	  the	  speed	  decade.	  In	  1954	  two	  percent	  of	  the	  adult	  population	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  used	  amphetamine	  habitually,	  and	  a	  much	  larger	  percentage	  used	  
amphetamine	  occasionally.	  The	  numbers	  were	  even	  higher	  in	  Japan.	  Speed,	  we	  might	  say,	  
fueled	  the	  post-­‐war	  recovery…As	  late	  as	  1971,	  stimulants,	  mainly	  amphetamines,	  were	  
reported	  to	  account	  for	  twenty	  percent	  of	  medical	  prescriptions”158	  
	  
But	  as	  use	  accelerated	  and	  developed,	  the	  side	  effects	  of	  heavy	  amphetamine	  use	  became	  
increasingly	  impossible	  to	  ignore:	  “Rampant	  paranoia.	  Bad-­‐mouthing.	  Violence	  and	  general	  
unsocial	  acting	  out.	  Complete	  loss	  of	  perspective.	  Burn	  out,	  or	  full	  schizophrenic	  psychosis.	  
Trouble”159.	  	  
	   The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  mental	  “transparency”	  of	  stimulants,	  and	  their	  compatibility	  
with	  normal	  social	  function,	  is	  only	  a	  cultural	  construction,	  and	  one	  that	  quickly	  breaks	  
down	  at	  very	  high	  doses	  or	  with	  more	  intense	  routes	  of	  administration	  like	  smoking	  or	  
intravenous	  injection.	  Instead	  of	  functioning	  optimally,	  “the	  mind	  seems	  to	  be	  running	  too	  
fast,	  so	  that	  narrative	  and	  logical	  connectors	  begin	  to	  disintegrate”160.	  In	  binges	  or	  extreme	  
doses,	  stimulants	  can	  “invert[]	  the	  hierarchies	  of	  motivation	  by	  which	  people	  conduct	  their	  
daily	  lives”,	  revealing	  the	  “voracity	  of	  human	  desire	  at	  its	  uttermost”	  and	  bringing	  on	  a	  
state	  which	  “clinical	  literature	  variously	  describes…as	  schizophrenic,	  psychotic,	  or	  autistic	  
…to	  the	  clinical	  observer,	  [the]	  behavior	  closely	  resemble[s]	  the	  compulsions	  of	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psychotics”161.	  To	  an	  unprepared	  observer,	  a	  speed	  freak-­‐out	  can	  be	  profoundly	  disturbing;	  
despite	  myths	  in	  popular	  culture,	  stimulants	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  cause	  psychotic	  
episodes	  than	  the	  psychedelics,	  and	  high	  doses	  combined	  with	  sleep	  deprivation	  can	  
provoke	  in	  otherwise-­‐normal	  individuals	  a	  state	  that	  is	  almost	  indistinguishable	  from	  
paranoid	  schizophrenia.	  	  
Speed	  users	  found	  little	  sympathy	  in	  the	  psychedelic	  counterculture	  of	  the	  1960s	  
and	  70s.The	  highly	  visible	  consequences	  of	  stimulant	  abuse,	  plus	  amphetamine’s	  
association	  with	  corporations	  and	  the	  military,	  led	  the	  otherwise	  drug-­‐friendly	  
counterculture	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  stigmatization	  of	  speed	  users.	  Flagrant	  abuse	  of	  any	  
drug	  can	  produce	  anti-­‐social	  consequences,	  but	  speed	  was	  also	  “associated	  with	  working-­‐
class	  youth	  whose	  behavior	  and	  aspirations	  often	  clashed	  with	  the	  more	  middle-­‐class	  
hippies”162Countercultural	  icons	  like	  Allen	  Ginsberg	  denounced	  amphetamines	  and	  their	  
users:	  
“Speed	  is	  anti-­‐social,	  paranoid-­‐making,	  it’s	  a	  drag,	  bad	  for	  your	  body,	  bad	  for	  your	  
mind,	  generally	  speaking,	  in	  the	  long	  run	  uncreative	  and	  it’s	  a	  plague	  in	  the	  whole	  
dope	  industry.	  All	  the	  gentle	  nice	  dope	  fiends	  are	  getting	  screwed	  up	  by	  the	  real	  
horror	  monster	  Frankenstein	  speed	  freaks	  who	  are	  going	  around	  stealing	  and	  bad	  
mouthing	  everybody”163	  
	  
In	  mainstream	  society,	  stereotypes	  of	  the	  crackhead	  and	  the	  tweaker	  replaced	  the	  by-­‐then	  
worn	  stereotype	  of	  the	  stoned	  hippie,	  who	  had	  begun	  to	  seem	  more	  comical	  than	  
threatening.	  
The	  shift	  from	  a	  liberal	  atmosphere	  to	  an	  all-­‐out	  drug	  war	  occurred	  with	  astonishing	  
speed.	  Tragically,	  the	  more	  tolerant	  policies	  of	  the	  late	  ‘60s	  and	  ‘70s	  may	  have	  contributed	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to	  their	  own	  demise	  -­‐	  by	  being	  successful.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1984-­‐89	  escalation,	  “illegal	  
drug	  use	  among	  high	  school	  seniors	  and	  persons	  in	  households	  already	  had	  been	  declining	  
for	  half	  a	  decade”164.	  Stimulants	  had	  already	  lost	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  social	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  
wider	  culture:	  after	  being	  stigmatized	  in	  an	  intense	  campaign	  organized	  by	  Senator	  Dodd	  of	  
Connecticut,	  their	  casual	  availability	  was	  curtailed	  and	  “seriously	  addicted	  pill	  heads”	  were	  
subjected	  to	  an	  intense	  campaign	  of	  dehumanization	  and	  association	  with	  “extreme	  
instances	  of	  random	  violence	  and	  crime	  sprees”165.	  Overall,	  a	  trend	  of	  “[d]eclining	  white	  
and	  middle-­‐class	  usage	  permitted	  the	  drug	  problem	  to	  be	  framed	  as	  a	  distinctively	  urban	  
and	  minority	  phenomenon”166.	  Stimulant	  abuse	  was	  redefined	  with	  crack	  as	  an	  urban	  black	  
problem,	  and	  again	  with	  methamphetamine	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  the	  rural	  working	  class.	  This	  
entailed	  some	  suppression	  of	  historical	  memory,	  since	  methamphetamine,	  the	  “deadly	  new	  
drug”	  of	  the	  ’70s,’80s,	  ‘90s,	  and	  2000s	  has	  been	  a	  popular	  drug	  in	  regional	  American	  
markets	  since	  the	  early	  1950s	  and	  ‘60s167.	  Scrutiny	  of	  government	  use	  of	  stimulants	  during	  
wartime,	  and	  of	  the	  marketing	  and	  prescribing	  practices	  for	  medical	  amphetamines,	  melted	  
away	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  new,	  seemingly	  unending	  moral	  panic.	  	  
	   The	  rising	  profits	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  treatment	  industry	  and	  the	  new	  drug	  testing	  
industry	  showed	  the	  healthcare	  sector	  that	  prohibition	  did	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  reduced	  
profits.	  This	  new	  productive	  dynamic	  between	  the	  private	  drug	  treatment	  industry	  and	  the	  
drug	  war	  state	  led	  to	  a	  tacit	  industrial	  endorsement	  of	  draconian	  drug	  war	  policies.	  	  
Finally,	  law	  enforcement	  organizations	  in	  the	  US	  had	  a	  powerful	  new	  incentive	  to	  prosecute	  
particular	  kinds	  of	  drug	  offenders.	  In	  the	  1980s	  the	  DEA,	  bolstered	  by	  the	  synthetic	  and	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stimulant	  panics,	  “complained	  to	  Congress	  that	  it	  was	  short	  on	  PE/PI	  (Purchase	  Evidence	  
and	  Pay	  for	  Information)	  money”.	  In	  response,	  Congress	  made	  major	  amendments	  to	  asset	  
forfeiture	  laws	  in	  1984168.	  The	  Comprehensive	  Crime	  Act	  of	  1984	  “required	  the	  Justice	  
Department	  to	  share	  the	  proceeds	  with	  state	  and	  local	  agencies	  participating	  in	  the	  
investigations”,	  a	  “bureaucratic	  innovation	  which	  allowed	  for	  an	  expanded	  
interbureaucratic	  network	  of	  cooperation”169.	  Now,	  if	  local	  or	  state	  police	  could	  attract	  
federal	  interest,	  they	  stood	  to	  share	  in	  the	  substantial	  gains	  from	  asset	  seizures,	  which	  by	  
1991	  had	  become	  worth	  $700	  million	  annually.	  	  
The	  DEA	  was	  allowed	  to	  pay	  informants	  directly	  from	  the	  assets	  seized	  in	  cases,	  and	  
responded	  with	  a	  deliberate	  strategy	  of	  mass	  arrest	  and	  conviction.	  Rather	  than	  going	  
directly	  after	  traffickers	  or	  large	  suppliers,	  “a	  large	  number	  of	  arrests	  and	  convictions	  of	  
drug	  buyers	  and	  street-­‐level	  sellers	  [was]	  made	  relatively	  easily”	  to	  try	  to	  “induce	  
cooperation”	  by	  bargaining	  “the	  release	  of	  assets	  seized...[or]	  a	  money	  payment”	  against	  
the	  threat	  of	  a	  harsh	  prison	  sentence:	  “[t]he	  higher	  minimum	  sentences	  passed	  by	  state	  
legislatures	  and	  the	  Congress	  gave	  prosecutors	  a	  more	  significant	  threat	  that	  could	  be	  used	  
to	  induce	  accused	  drug	  criminals	  to	  bargain”170.	  Together	  the	  private	  treatment	  sector,	  the	  
courts,	  police	  agencies,	  and	  the	  federal	  drugs	  bureaucracy	  became	  developed	  a	  powerful	  
vicious	  cycle	  of	  incarceration	  and	  asset	  seizure	  which,	  if	  diminished	  from	  its	  peak,	  
continues	  to	  this	  day.	  The	  numbers	  climbed	  year	  after	  year,	  only	  leveling	  off	  in	  the	  ‘90s:	  	  
“Drug	  arrests	  per	  100,000	  population	  reached	  its	  peak	  level	  of	  528	  in	  1989,	  a	  
twenty-­‐fold	  increase	  from	  its	  1960	  level	  of	  twenty-­‐six…the	  drug	  arrest	  rate	  grew	  
slowly	  between	  1970	  and	  1984,	  about	  2.6%	  per	  year.	  Renewed	  escalation	  of	  drug	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  Rasmussen	  and	  Benson,	  The	  Economic	  Anatomy	  of	  a	  Drug	  War,	  165	  
169	  Ibid,	  132	  
170	  Ibid,	  164-­‐65	  
Kosinski	  76 
 
enforcement	  during	  the	  1984-­‐1989	  [the	  war	  on	  cocaine]	  period	  saw	  arrests	  per	  
100,000	  population	  rise	  from	  312	  to	  538,	  an	  average	  annual	  increase	  of	  
14.5%...Together	  the	  1965-­‐1970	  and	  1984-­‐89	  periods	  account	  for	  over	  80	  percent	  of	  
the	  increase	  in	  the	  drug	  arrest	  rate	  from	  1960	  to	  1990”171.	  
	  
	  
IV/Conclusion:	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Drug	  War	  state?	  
It	  is	  tempting	  to	  imagine	  how	  drugs	  policy	  might	  look	  if	  cultural	  biases	  and	  
historical	  institutionalism	  could	  be	  cast	  aside.	  The	  closest	  case	  to	  that	  scenario	  has	  been	  the	  
development	  of	  drug	  policy	  in	  Portugal	  since	  1974,	  and	  it	  offers	  promise	  for	  the	  future	  of	  
drug	  policy	  reform.	  Ironically,	  the	  country’s	  isolation	  during	  a	  right-­‐wing	  dictatorship	  
largely	  insulated	  it	  from	  both	  20th	  century	  drugs	  and	  drug	  laws.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  
liberal	  harm-­‐reduction	  focused	  drug	  policy	  in	  Portugal	  benefitted	  from	  the	  country’s	  late	  
exposure	  to	  addiction	  and	  widespread	  drug	  use.	  While	  the	  country	  adopted	  the	  
recommendations	  of	  the	  International	  Opium	  Convention	  of	  1912,	  the	  country	  did	  not	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begin	  to	  systematically	  regulate	  the	  “production,	  traffic	  and	  use	  of	  narcotics”	  until	  1970,	  
when	  the	  country	  was	  still	  under	  a	  dictatorship.	  Unsurprisingly,	  that	  law	  provided	  for	  
punitive	  sanctions	  in	  the	  form	  of	  incarceration:	  two	  to	  eight	  years	  for	  trafficking,	  six	  
months	  to	  two	  years	  for	  “consumption	  causing	  danger”172.	  
In	  drug	  policy	  terms,	  Portugal	  was	  fortunate	  in	  that	  its	  1974	  democratic	  revolution	  
occurred	  during	  a	  period	  of	  drug	  experimentation	  by	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  young	  similar	  to	  
the	  second	  demographic	  shift	  experienced	  in	  1960s	  and	  ‘70s	  America.	  This	  new	  
experimentation	  was	  “associated	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  new-­‐found	  freedoms”	  and	  the	  
government	  created	  a	  Youth	  Studies	  Centre	  and	  Drug	  Criminal	  Investigation	  Centre	  to	  
develop	  a	  rational	  and	  coordinated	  program	  of	  supply	  reduction	  and	  intervention173.	  The	  
idea	  of	  drug	  decriminalisation	  developed	  within	  the	  Youth	  Studies	  Centre,	  and	  was	  
introduced	  in	  1976	  in	  a	  text	  “suggest[ed]	  that	  the	  ‘concept	  of	  drug	  use	  as	  a	  criminal	  act’	  
should	  be	  revised	  and	  replaced...to	  bring	  it	  under	  an	  administrative	  offence	  framework”.	  
Even	  after	  ratification	  of	  the	  1971	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Psychotropic	  Substances	  and	  its	  
“increased...repressive	  focus	  on	  drug	  trafficking”	  the	  “law	  recognised	  the	  drug	  user	  as	  a	  
patient	  in	  need	  of	  medical	  care,	  stating	  that	  the	  priority	  was	  to	  treat	  and	  not	  to	  punish”174.	  	  
Portugese	  society	  avoided	  the	  traumatic	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  drug	  panics	  that	  were	  
so	  influential	  in	  developing	  the	  concept	  of	  drug	  use	  as	  a	  criminal	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  health	  
problem.	  The	  closed	  society	  of	  Portugal’s	  dictatorship	  may	  have	  incidentally	  helped	  by	  
limiting	  in-­‐migration;	  drug	  use	  was	  never	  associated	  with	  foreigners	  or	  ethnic	  minorities,	  
nor	  was	  it	  especially	  associated	  with	  political	  radicalism.	  The	  lack	  of	  political	  salience	  in	  the	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drug	  issue	  in	  Portugal	  allowed	  government	  bodies	  to	  develop	  policy	  without	  distorting	  
influence	  from	  the	  media,	  industry,	  or	  moral	  entrepreneurs.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  a	  
dictatorship	  there	  was	  no	  desire	  to	  sustain	  or	  recreate	  the	  kind	  of	  repressive	  apparatus	  
necessary	  to	  implement	  a	  prohibition	  drug	  policy.	  The	  liberal	  atmosphere	  resulting	  from	  a	  
successful	  democratic	  transition	  may	  best	  explain	  why	  Portugal’s	  government	  was	  willing	  
to	  work	  with	  the	  tide	  of	  demographic	  change	  and	  wider	  drug	  experimentation	  rather	  than	  
embracing	  the	  zero-­‐tolerance	  conservative	  attitude	  that	  became	  dominant	  in	  Western	  drug	  
policy	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  ‘80s.	  
The	  Drug	  War	  type	  is	  facing	  the	  strongest	  challenges	  today	  that	  it	  has	  since	  its	  
inception.	  In	  Europe,	  increasing	  public	  knowledge	  about	  drugs	  and	  a	  diminished	  appetite	  
for	  incarceration	  is	  leading	  most	  countries	  in	  the	  directions	  of	  Harm	  Reduction	  or	  
Decriminalization	  for	  the	  most	  common	  illicit	  drugs.	  Copenhagen	  has	  announced	  that	  it	  will	  
create	  legal	  cannabis	  markets,	  unilaterally	  if	  necessary,	  and	  other	  liberal	  European	  cities	  
have	  expressed	  interest	  in	  similar	  policies175.	  Two	  United	  States	  have	  passed	  referendums	  
requiring	  their	  state	  governments	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  and	  federal	  drug	  enforcement	  is	  seeing	  
budget	  cuts	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  decades	  due	  to	  the	  “sequester”176.	  Continuation	  of	  Drug	  
War	  policies	  for	  cannabis	  at	  the	  national	  level	  are	  indeed	  threatened;	  while	  the	  federal	  
government	  may	  be	  able	  to	  shut	  down	  a	  large	  number	  of	  dispensaries,	  “principles	  of	  
federalism	  prevent	  the	  federal	  government	  from	  mandating	  that	  the	  states	  support	  or	  
participate	  in	  enforcing	  the	  federal	  law”177.	  But	  the	  explosion	  of	  ideas	  for	  Decriminalization	  
and	  Legal	  Markets	  in	  Latin	  America	  may	  be	  the	  biggest	  threat	  of	  all.	  Uruguay’s	  plans	  to	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legalize	  marijuana,	  Bolivia’s	  to	  decriminalize	  or	  legalize	  coca,	  and	  continent-­‐wide	  tolerance	  
for	  the	  native	  psychedelic	  ayahuasca	  strike	  at	  the	  cultural	  divisions	  between	  “drugs”,	  
“alcohol”,	  and	  “medicines”	  that	  are	  the	  basis	  of	  almost	  every	  drug	  regulation	  state178.	  
For	  proponents	  of	  reform,	  it	  is	  an	  exciting	  time	  to	  be	  alive.	  It	  would	  be	  naïve,	  
however,	  to	  expect	  that	  liberalization	  will	  continue	  without	  obstacles,	  or	  that	  the	  backlash	  
has	  not	  already	  started	  to	  materialize.	  Large	  numbers	  of	  workers	  and	  powerful	  financial	  
interests	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  harshly	  punitive	  drugs	  policy.	  Reform	  
involves	  creating	  new	  jobs	  in	  health	  and	  public	  safety	  to	  replace	  those	  that	  must	  be	  lost	  in	  
law	  enforcement	  and	  the	  prison	  industry.	  Above	  all,	  this	  paper	  should	  caution	  that	  not	  all	  
proponents	  of	  reform	  want	  the	  same	  things,	  or	  carry	  the	  same	  assumptions	  about	  drug	  use.	  
The	  gaps	  between	  Legal	  Markets,	  Decriminalization,	  and	  Harm	  Reduction	  are	  very	  real,	  and	  
their	  advocates	  have	  very	  different	  ideas	  about	  the	  level	  of	  drug	  use	  that	  is	  acceptable	  or	  
desirable	  in	  society.	  Countries,	  based	  on	  their	  economies	  and	  the	  histories	  of	  their	  state	  
institutions,	  have	  different	  capabilities	  and	  limitations.	  Change	  will	  not	  be	  easy,	  and	  it	  will	  
take	  time;	  but	  the	  reform	  movement	  today	  is	  stronger	  than	  ever	  before,	  and	  stronger	  for	  its	  
diversity	  of	  opinions.	  Drug	  policy	  is	  once	  again	  becoming	  a	  contentious,	  complicated,	  
raucous,	  diverse	  and	  politicized	  debate	  –	  as	  it	  should	  be.	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Acker,	  Caroline	  Jean.	  Creating	  the	  American	  Junkie:	  Addiction	  Research	  in	  the	  Classic	  	  
	   Era	  of	  Narcotic	  Control.	  Baltimore	  &	  London:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  
	   2002.	  
Ackerman,	  McCarton.	  “Uruguay	  Lays	  Out	  Plan	  for	  State	  Pot	  Business”	  (thefix.com,	  July	  30	  
	   2012)	  
	   http://www.thefix.com/content/uruguay-­‐government-­‐marijuana90443	  
Allen,	  Rob.	  “Reducing	  the	  Use	  of	  Imprisonment:	  What	  Can	  We	  Learn	  from	  Europe?”	  	   Report	  
	   for	  Criminal	  Justice	  Alliance,	  May	  2012.	  
	   http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/CJA_ReducingImprisonment_Europe.pdf	  
Armentano,	  Paul.	  “Why	  I’m	  Not	  Convinced	  Big	  Pharma	  is	  Behind	  Pot	  Prohibition”.	  
	   Huffington	  Post,	  July	  9,	  2008.	  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-­‐armentano/why-­‐im-­‐not-­‐convinced-­‐
big_b_111523.html	  
Carter,	  Jimmy.	  "Drug	  Abuse	  Message	  to	  the	  Congress.,"	  August	  2,	  1977.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  
	   Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  
	   http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7908	  
Coolican,	  J.	  Patrick.	  “Beer	  Lobby	  gives	  $10,000	  to	  ‘No’	  On	  Prop	  19	  Pot	  Legislation”.	  LA	  	  





Daemmrich,	  Arthur.	  Pharmacopolitics:	  Drug	  Regulation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  	  
	   Germany.	  Chapel	  Hill	  &	  London:	  University	  of	  NC	  Press,	  2004.	  
Doyle,	  Michael.	  “Feds	  battle	  Walgreens	  in	  painkiller	  distribution	  case”.	  Miami	  Herald,	  March	  
	   9,	  2013.	  
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/19/3295204/feds-­‐battle-­‐walgreens-­‐in-­‐
painkiller.html	  
Eban,	  Katherine.	  “Oxycontin:	  Purdue	  Pharma’s	  Painful	  Medicine”.	  Fortune,	  November	  9,	  
	   2011.	  
	   http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/09/oxycontin-­‐purdue-­‐
	   pharma/	  
Gamble,	  Andrew.	  “The	  Free	  Economy	  and	  the	  Strong	  State:	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Social	  
	   Market	  Economy”.	  Socialist	  Register	  Vol.	  16	  (1979):	  accessed	  April	  18,	  2013.	  
	   http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5431#.UXnFs4KKP	  9u	  
Garvey,	  Todd.	  “Medical	  Marijuana:	  The	  Supremacy	  Clause,	  Federalism,	  and	  the	  	  
Interplay	  Between	  State	  and	  Federal	  Laws”.	  Report	  for	  the	  Congressional	  Research	  
Service,	  November	  2012.	  
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42398.pdf	  
Gladwell,	  Malcolm.	  “Drinking	  Games”.	  New	  Yorker,	  February	  15,	  2010.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/02/15/100215fa_fact_gladwell	  
Grob,	  Charles	  S.	  “Psychiatric	  Research	  with	  Hallucinogens:	  What	  Have	  We	  Learned?”.	  
	   Yearbook	  for	  Ethnomedicine	  and	  the	  Study	  of	  Consciousness	  (1994):	  accessed	  April	  
	   20,	  2013	  
	   http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/lsd/grob.htm	  
Kosinski	  82 
 
Gray,	  Kevin.	  “The	  Drug	  Warriors	  Cashing	  In	  on	  Pot	  Prohibition”.	  Thefix.com,	  March	  21,	  
	   2013.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
http://www.thefix.com/content/marijuana-­‐legalization-­‐drug-­‐prohibition-­‐lobbying-­‐
revolving-­‐door8111	  
Guy,	  Mike.	  “Interview	  with	  the	  Drug	  Czar”.	  Thefix.com,	  July	  2012.	  
	   http://www.thefix.com/content/interview-­‐drug-­‐czar-­‐gil-­‐
	   kerlikowske7459?page=all	  
Hall,	  Stuart	  et	  al.	  “Policing	  the	  Crisis:	  Mugging,	  the	  State,	  and	  Law	  and	  Order”.	  Crime	  and	  
	   Social	  Justice	  No.	  12	  (1979):	  accessed	  April	  18,	  2013.	  
	   http://www.jstor.org/stable/29766074	  
Harvey,	  David.	  The	  Condition	  of	  Postmodernity:	  An	  Enquiry	  into	  the	  Origins	  of	  Cultural	  
	   Change.	  Oxford”	  Blackwell	  Publishers	  Inc,	  1990.	  
International	  Narcotics	  Control	  Board,	  “Narcotic	  Drugs:	  Estimated	  World	  
	   Requirements	  for	  2012	  and	  Statistics	  for	  2010”.	  INCB	  Technical	  Publications:	  
	   accessed	  March	  20,	  2013.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
http://www.incb.org/documents/Narcotic-­‐Drugs/Technical-­‐
Publications/2011/Part_FOUR_Complete_English-­‐NAR-­‐Report-­‐2011.pdf	  
Jenkins,	  Philip.	  Synthetic	  Panics:	  The	  Symbolic	  Politics	  of	  Designer	  Drugs.	  New	  York	  &	  
	   London:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1999.	  
Lenson,	  David.	  On	  Drugs.	  Minneapolis,	  MN:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1995.	  
Mack,	  Alison	  and	  Janey	  Joy,	  Marijuana	  as	  Medicine?	  The	  Science	  Behind	  the	  Controversy.	  
	   Washington	  D.C.	  :	  National	  Academy	  Press,	  2001.	  
Maria	  Moreira,	  Brendan	  Hughes,	  Claudia	  Costa	  Storti,	  and	  Frank	  Zobel,	  “Drug	  policy	  	  
Kosinski	  83 
 
	   Profiles	  -­‐	  Portugal”	  in	  EMCDDA	  Drug	  policy	  profiles	  (Lisbon:	  European	  	  Monitoring	  
	   Centre	  for	  Drugs	  and	  Drug	  Addiction,	  June	  2011)	  
	   http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drug-­‐policy-­‐profiles/portugal	  
“National	  Drug	  Control	  Strategy	  2013”,	  Office	  of	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Policy,	  White	  House.	  
	   http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_syste
	   m.pdf	  
New	  York	  City	  Bar.	  “The	  International	  Drug	  Control	  Treaties:	  Just	  How	  Important	  Are	  They	  
	   to	  US	  Drug	  Reform?”	  report	  for	  Committee	  on	  Drugs	  &	  the	  Law	  (New	  York:	  NYC	  Bar	  
	   Association,	  May	  2012).	  
	   http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/5_20072283-­‐
	   InternationalDrugControlTreaties.pdf	  
Pendell,	  Dale.	  Pharmako	  series	  Vol	  1,2.3.	  Pharmako/Poeia,	  Pharmako/Dynamis,	  
	   Pharmako/Gnosis,	  Berkeley,	  CA:	  North	  Atlantic	  Books,	  2010.	  
Perrine,	  Daniel.	  The	  Chemistry	  of	  Mind-­‐Altering	  Drugs.	  Washington	  D.C.	  :	  American	  
	   Chemical	  Society,	  1996.	  
Petteruti,	  Amanda	  and	  Paul	  Ashton.	  “Gaming	  the	  System:	  How	  the	  Political	  Strategies	  of	  
	   Private	  Prison	  Companies	  Promote	  Ineffective	  Incarceration	  Policies”,	  report	  by	  the	  
	   Justice	  Policy	  Institute,	  June	  2011.	  
	   http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_syste
	   m.pdf	  
Rasmussen,	  David	  and	  Bruce	  Benson.	  The	  Economic	  Anatomy	  of	  a	  Drug	  War:	  Criminal	  
	   Justice	  in	  the	  Commons.	  Lanham,	  MD:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers	  Inc,	  1994.	  
Kosinski	  84 
 
Rosenberg,	  Martha.	  “6	  ways	  Big	  Pharma	  manipulates	  consumers”,	  Salon.com,	  April	  28,	  
	   2013.	  
	   http://www.salon.com/2013/04/28/six_ways_big_pharma_wants_to_profit_from_y
	   our_health_concerns_partner/	  
Shannon,	  Sarah	  and	  Chris	  Uggen.	  “Visualizing	  Punishment”	  hosted	  on	  “The	  Society	  
	   Pages”,	  February	  19	  2013.	  Accessed	  April	  12	  2013.	  
	   http://thesocietypages.org/papers/visualizing-­‐punishment/	  
Soskice,	  David	  and	  Peter	  A.	  Hall,	  “An	  Introduction	  to	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism”	  in	  
	   Varieties	  of	  Capitalism:	  The	  Institutional	  Foundations	  of	  Comparative	  Advantage	  
	   (London:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  
Stanners,	  Peter.	  “Life	  after	  cannabis	  prohibition:	  The	  city	  announces	  its	  ambitions”	  (The	  	  
	   Copenhagen	  Post,	  March	  15,	  2013)	  
	   http://cphpost.dk/national/life-­‐after-­‐cannabis-­‐prohibition-­‐city-­‐announces-­‐its-­‐	  
	   ambitions	  
Strassman,	  Rick	  J.	  “Hallucinogenic	  Drugs	  in	  Psychiatric	  Research	  and	  Treatment:	  	  
	   Perspectives	  and	  Prospects”.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Nervous	  and	  Mental	  Disease,	  Vol.	  183	  No.	  
	   3	  (1995):	  accessed	  April	  18	  2013.	  
	   http://www.psychedelic-­‐library.org/rjspap.htm	  
Szalavitz,	  Maia.	  “The	  Loneliness	  of	  the	  Addict	  Activist”.	  Thefix.com,	  March	  24	  2013.	  
	   http://www.thefix.com/content/activism-­‐addicts-­‐AIDS-­‐needle-­‐
	   exchange8989?page=1	  
“The	  Federal	  Drug	  Budget	  Under	  Sequestration”	  (policy	  brief	  by	  Carnevale	  Associates,	  Dec	  




	   n_12-­‐4-­‐11.pdf	  
Tracy,	  Sarah	  and	  Caroline	  Jean	  Acker,	  introduction	  to	  Altering	  American	  
	   Consciousness,	  ed.	  Sarah	  Tracy	  and	  Caroline	  Jean	  Acker	  (Amherst	  &	  Boston:	  
	   University	  of	  Massachusetts,	  2004).	  
Walmsley,	  Roy.	  “World	  Prison	  Population	  List	  (9th	  edition)”,	  report	  for	  the	  International	  
	   Centre	  for	  Prison	  Studies	  (London:	  University	  of	  Essex,	  	   September	  2010)	  
	   http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-­‐9-­‐22.pdf	  
Weber,	  Max.	  Sociological	  Writings,	  ed.	  Wolf	  Heydebrand.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  The	  Continuum	  
	   Publishing	  Company,	  1999.	  
Whiting,	  Marcus	  and	  Susanne	  MacGregor.	  “The	  development	  of	  European	  drug	  policy	  and	  
	   the	  place	  of	  harm	  reduction	  within	  this”,	  in	  Harm	  reduction:	  evidence,	  impacts	  and	  
	   challenges	  (Lisbon:	  European	  Monitoring	  Centre	  for	  Drugs	  and	  Drug	  Addiction,	  April	  
	   2010.	   	  
	   http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/monographs/harm-­‐reduction	  
	  
	  
	  
